

# Energy Tidbits

Last 48 Hours Sees Big Escalation of US Airstrikes Against Houthis in Yemen and Targets in Iraq, and Syria

Produced by: Dan Tsubouchi

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**Dan Tsubouchi**  
Chief Market Strategist  
dtsubouchi@safgroup.ca

**Ryan Dunfield**  
CEO  
rdunfield@safgroup.ca

**Aaron Bunting**  
COO, CFO  
abunting@safgroup.ca

**Ian Charles**  
Managing Director  
icharles@safgroup.ca

**Ryan Haughn**  
Managing Director  
rhaughn@safgroup.ca

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**Table 1. Summary of natural gas supply and disposition in the United States, 2018-2023**

billion cubic feet

Year and month	Gross withdrawals	Marketed production	NGPL production <sup>a</sup>	Dry gas production <sup>b</sup>	Supplemental gaseous fuels <sup>c</sup>	Net imports	Net storage withdrawals <sup>d</sup>	Balancing item <sup>e</sup>	Consumption <sup>f</sup>
<b>2018 total</b>	<b>37,326</b>	<b>33,009</b>	<b>2,235</b>	<b>30,774</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>-719</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>-300</b>	<b>30,139</b>
<b>2019 total</b>	<b>40,780</b>	<b>36,447</b>	<b>2,548</b>	<b>33,899</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>-1,916</b>	<b>-503</b>	<b>-408</b>	<b>31,132</b>
<b>2020 total</b>	<b>40,730</b>	<b>36,521</b>	<b>2,710</b>	<b>33,811</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>-2,734</b>	<b>-180</b>	<b>-357</b>	<b>30,603</b>
<b>2021</b>									
January	3,504	3,106	234	2,872	5	-279	719	18	3,335
February	2,939	2,597	195	2,402	5	-152	795	46	3,096
March	3,510	3,136	236	2,900	6	-357	64	27	2,640
April	3,428	3,059	230	2,829	5	-356	-180	-27	2,272
May	3,525	3,158	238	2,921	6	-373	-423	-13	2,116
June	3,390	3,045	229	2,816	5	-331	-254	6	2,242
July	3,509	3,177	239	2,938	6	-338	-175	-12	2,418
August	3,535	3,186	240	2,946	6	-343	-164	-9	2,436
September	3,441	3,104	233	2,871	5	-315	-398	-25	2,138
October	3,613	3,258	245	3,013	6	-317	-368	-75	2,259
November	3,564	3,189	240	2,949	6	-315	137	-92	2,685
December	3,720	3,323	250	3,073	6	-368	330	-33	3,008
<b>Total</b>	<b>41,677</b>	<b>37,338</b>	<b>2,809</b>	<b>34,529</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>-3,845</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>-188</b>	<b>30,646</b>
<b>2022</b>									
January	3,628	3,235	252	2,983	6	-315	1,013	-95	3,593
February	3,266	2,914	227	2,687	5	-288	673	-17	3,059
March	3,663	3,282	256	3,026	6	-380	171	-43	2,781
April	3,568	3,199	250	2,950	6	-342	-220	-33	2,360
May	3,695	3,332	260	3,072	6	-386	-412	-39	2,241
June	3,565	3,232	252	2,980	6	-325	-332	-13	2,317
July	3,736	3,375	263	3,112	6	-303	-187	-46	2,583
August	3,730	3,392	265	3,128	6	-322	-213	-39	2,559
September	3,669	3,330	260	3,071	6	-293	-446	-50	2,288
October	3,814	3,438	268	3,170	6	-315	-432	-66	2,364
November	3,712	3,327	259	3,067	6	-308	78	-77	2,767
December	3,755	3,370	263	3,107	6	-304	588	-21	3,376
<b>Total</b>	<b>43,802</b>	<b>39,428</b>	<b>3,075</b>	<b>36,353</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>-3,880</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>-539</b>	<b>32,288</b>
<b>2023</b>									
January	€3,820	€3,429	270	€3,159	7	-333	455	14	3,302
February	€3,456	€3,103	247	€2,856	6	-331	399	18	2,947
March	€3,858	€3,475	286	€3,189	6	-401	224	-8	3,010
April	€3,729	€3,362	283	€3,079	5	-400	-268	5	2,421
May	€3,869	€3,500	289	€3,210	6	-422	-452	-26	2,316
June	€3,720	€3,375	278	€3,098	4	-376	-343	-27	2,357
July	€3,827	€3,495	290	€3,205	6	-378	-134	-33	2,666
August	€3,850	€3,534	294	€3,240	5	-388	-133	-50	2,674
September	RE3,761	RE3,426	291	RE3,135	3	-396	-323	R-51	2,368
October	RE3,909	RE3,537	302	RE3,235	3	-420	R-321	R-57	2,441
November	€3,842	€3,470	292	€3,178	5	-403	66	-21	2,825
<b>2023 11-month</b>	<b>€41,641</b>	<b>€37,706</b>	<b>3,122</b>	<b>€34,584</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>-4,249</b>	<b>-830</b>	<b>-236</b>	<b>29,326</b>
<b>2022 11-month</b>	<b>40,047</b>	<b>36,058</b>	<b>2,812</b>	<b>33,246</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>-3,575</b>	<b>-307</b>	<b>-517</b>	<b>28,912</b>
<b>2021 11-month</b>	<b>37,957</b>	<b>34,015</b>	<b>2,559</b>	<b>31,456</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>-3,476</b>	<b>-247</b>	<b>-155</b>	<b>27,637</b>

<sup>a</sup> We derive monthly natural gas plant liquid (NGPL) production, gaseous equivalent, from sample data reported by gas processing plants on Form EIA-816, *Monthly Natural Gas Liquids Report*, and Form EIA-64A, *Annual Report of the Origin of Natural Gas Liquids Production*.

<sup>b</sup> Equal to marketed production minus NGPL production.

<sup>c</sup> We only collect supplemental gaseous fuels data on an annual basis except for the Dakota Gasification Co. coal gasification facility, which provides data each month. We calculate the ratio of annual supplemental fuels (excluding Dakota Gasification Co.) to the sum of dry gas production, net imports, and net withdrawals from storage. We apply this ratio to the monthly sum of these three elements. We add the Dakota Gasification Co. monthly value to the result to produce the monthly supplemental fuels estimate.

<sup>d</sup> Monthly and annual data for 2018 through 2022 include underground storage and liquefied natural gas storage. Data for January 2023 forward include underground storage only. Appendix A, Explanatory Note 5, contains a discussion of computation procedures.

<sup>e</sup> Represents quantities lost and imbalances in data due to differences among data sources. Net imports and balancing item excludes net intransit deliveries. These net intransit deliveries were (in billion cubic feet): 91 for 2022; 184 for 2021; 207 for 2020; -8 for 2019; and -12 for 2018. Appendix A, Explanatory Note 7, contains a full discussion of balancing item calculations.

<sup>f</sup> Consists of pipeline fuel use, lease and plant fuel use, vehicle fuel, and deliveries to consuming sectors as shown in Table 2.

<sup>R</sup> Revised data.

<sup>RE</sup> Revised estimated data.

<sup>E</sup> Estimated data.

**Source:** 2018-2022: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), *Natural Gas Annual 2022*. January 2023 through current month: Form EIA-914, *Monthly Crude Oil and Lease Condensate, and Natural Gas Production Report*; Form EIA-857, *Monthly Report of Natural Gas Purchases and Deliveries to Consumers*; Form EIA-191, *Monthly Underground Gas Storage Report*; EIA computations and estimates; and Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, *Natural Gas Imports and Exports*. Table 7 includes detailed source notes for Marketed Production. Appendix A, Notes 3 and 4, includes discussion of computation and estimation procedures and revision policies.

**Note:** Data for 2018 through 2022 are final. All other data are preliminary unless otherwise indicated. Geographic coverage is the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Totals may not equal sum of components because of independent rounding.

**Table 2. Natural gas consumption in the United States, 2018-2023**

billion cubic feet, or as indicated

Year and month	Lease and plant fuel <sup>a</sup>	Pipeline and distribution use <sup>b</sup>	Delivered to consumers						Total consumption	Heating value <sup>c</sup> (Btu per cubic foot)
			Residential	Commercial	Industrial	Electric power	Vehicle fuel	Total		
<b>2018 total</b>	<b>1,694</b>	<b>877</b>	<b>4,998</b>	<b>3,514</b>	<b>8,417</b>	<b>10,589</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>27,568</b>	<b>30,139</b>	<b>1,036</b>
<b>2019 total</b>	<b>1,823</b>	<b>1,018</b>	<b>5,019</b>	<b>3,515</b>	<b>8,417</b>	<b>11,288</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>28,291</b>	<b>31,132</b>	<b>1,038</b>
<b>2020 total</b>	<b>1,851</b>	<b>1,020</b>	<b>4,674</b>	<b>3,163</b>	<b>8,213</b>	<b>11,632</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>27,731</b>	<b>30,603</b>	<b>1,037</b>
<b>2021</b>										
January	154	125	895	496	796	864	5	3,056	3,335	1,038
February	129	117	876	496	690	785	4	2,850	3,096	1,041
March	155	98	574	357	709	742	5	2,387	2,640	1,038
April	152	83	342	247	682	761	4	2,037	2,272	1,036
May	157	77	218	182	664	814	5	1,883	2,116	1,035
June	151	82	130	143	644	1,087	4	2,009	2,242	1,034
July	157	89	113	143	673	1,238	5	2,171	2,418	1,035
August	158	90	106	141	674	1,262	5	2,189	2,436	1,034
September	154	78	119	150	645	989	4	1,906	2,138	1,035
October	162	82	193	195	684	939	5	2,015	2,259	1,035
November	158	99	482	337	736	868	4	2,428	2,685	1,037
December	165	112	669	401	778	879	5	2,732	3,008	1,038
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,851</b>	<b>1,131</b>	<b>4,717</b>	<b>3,289</b>	<b>8,375</b>	<b>11,229</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>27,663</b>	<b>30,646</b>	<b>1,037</b>
<b>2022</b>										
January	154	137	958	551	826	961	6	3,302	3,593	1,038
February	139	116	791	464	729	815	5	2,804	3,059	1,038
March	157	105	588	385	761	779	6	2,519	2,781	1,036
April	153	88	384	276	706	748	5	2,120	2,360	1,035
May	159	83	201	183	684	925	6	1,999	2,241	1,034
June	154	86	124	146	655	1,146	5	2,076	2,317	1,033
July	161	97	110	144	665	1,400	6	2,325	2,583	1,033
August	162	96	103	141	677	1,375	6	2,302	2,559	1,035
September	159	85	114	150	653	1,122	5	2,044	2,288	1,036
October	164	88	242	223	692	950	6	2,112	2,364	1,036
November	159	104	513	353	729	903	5	2,504	2,767	1,036
December	161	128	835	492	761	993	6	3,087	3,376	1,041
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,883</b>	<b>1,212</b>	<b>4,964</b>	<b>3,509</b>	<b>8,537</b>	<b>12,118</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>29,193</b>	<b>32,288</b>	<b>1,036</b>
<b>2023</b>										
January	£164	£124	799	475	771	964	£5	3,014	3,302	1,039
February	£148	£111	683	423	708	870	£4	2,689	2,947	1,038
March	£166	£113	633	408	756	930	£5	2,731	3,010	1,036
April	£161	£91	338	253	706	869	£4	2,170	2,421	1,035
May	£167	£87	197	183	681	997	£5	2,062	2,316	1,034
June	£161	£88	129	149	652	1,173	£4	2,107	2,357	1,034
July	£167	£100	111	143	669	1,471	£5	2,399	2,666	1,035
August	£169	£100	104	145	689	1,462	£5	2,405	2,674	1,035
September	£164	£89	113	146	665	1,187	£4	2,116	2,368	1,034
October	£169	£92	228	224	707	1,016	£5	2,180	2,441	1,035
November	£166	£106	494	347	744	965	£4	2,553	2,825	1,037
<b>2023 11-month YTD</b>	<b>£1,801</b>	<b>£1,101</b>	<b>3,828</b>	<b>2,896</b>	<b>7,747</b>	<b>11,904</b>	<b>£49</b>	<b>26,425</b>	<b>29,326</b>	<b>1,036</b>
<b>2022 11-month YTD</b>	<b>1,722</b>	<b>1,084</b>	<b>4,129</b>	<b>3,017</b>	<b>7,776</b>	<b>11,125</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>26,106</b>	<b>28,912</b>	<b>1,036</b>
<b>2021 11-month YTD</b>	<b>1,686</b>	<b>1,020</b>	<b>4,047</b>	<b>2,888</b>	<b>7,597</b>	<b>10,350</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>24,932</b>	<b>27,637</b>	<b>1,039</b>

<sup>a</sup> We only collect plant fuel data and lease fuel data annually. We estimate monthly lease and plant fuel use from monthly marketed production by assuming that the preceding annual percentage remains constant for the next 12 months.

<sup>b</sup> We base published pipeline and distribution use data on reports collected on an annual basis. We estimate monthly pipeline and distribution use data from monthly total consumption (excluding pipeline and distribution use) by assuming that the preceding annual percentage remains constant for the next 12 months. Pipeline and distribution use volumes include line loss, defined as known volumes of natural gas that were the result of leaks, damage, accidents, migration, and/or blow downs, as well as fuel used in liquefaction and regasification.

<sup>c</sup> Heating value is the average number of British thermal units per cubic foot of natural gas as reported on EIA-857 and EIA-176. Appendix A, Explanatory Note 11, contains further information.

<sup>e</sup> Estimated data.

**Source:** 2018-2022: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA): Form EIA-857, *Monthly Report of Natural Gas Purchases and Deliveries to Consumers*; state and federal agencies; EIA estimates based on historical data; and *Natural Gas Annual 2022*. January 2023 through current month: Form EIA-914, *Monthly Crude Oil and Lease Condensate, and Natural Gas Production Report*; Form EIA-857; Form EIA-923, *Power Plant Operations Report*. Appendix A, Explanatory Note 6, contains an explanation of computation procedures and revision policy.

**Note:** Data for 2018 through 2022 are final. All other data are preliminary unless otherwise indicated. Geographic coverage is the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Totals may not equal sum of components because of independent rounding. Appendix A, Explanatory Note 6, contains a definition of sectors.

**Table 5. U.S. natural gas exports, 2021-2023**

volumes in million cubic feet; prices in dollars per thousand cubic feet

	2023	2022	2021	2023				
	11-month YTD	11-month YTD	11-month YTD	November	October	September	August	July
<b>Exports</b>								
Volume (million cubic feet)								
<b>Pipeline</b>								
Canada	914,228	860,912	828,556	89,446	66,936	76,619	68,390	76,567
Mexico	2,065,944	1,919,989	1,987,501	178,531	199,930	202,402	213,050	208,625
<b>Total pipeline exports</b>	<b>2,980,173</b>	<b>2,780,901</b>	<b>2,816,057</b>	<b>267,977</b>	<b>266,866</b>	<b>279,021</b>	<b>281,440</b>	<b>285,193</b>
<b>LNG</b>								
Exports								
By vessel								
Antigua and Barbuda	42	21	4	4	7	7	5	4
Argentina	76,921	66,939	81,371	0	0	0	0	11,162
Bahamas	466	447	450	34	34	51	47	47
Bangladesh	20,889	12,663	37,734	3,240	0	0	7,095	0
Barbados	0	93	263	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	86,257	76,971	5,584	10,288	20,775	17,209	3,363	0
Brazil	34,888	71,998	283,468	3,563	3,720	6,561	3,287	0
Chile	31,217	30,131	118,943	0	0	0	3,065	7,144
China	162,958	89,668	436,253	25,601	18,013	10,222	14,252	38,997
Colombia	24,852	5,703	2,247	1,844	6,689	10,322	3,149	0
Croatia	52,389	71,083	33,015	9,995	0	10,542	3,023	10,121
Dominican Republic	70,585	44,179	47,126	8,647	8,826	6,734	10,055	6,076
El Salvador	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Finland	39,016	0	0	3,335	2,921	7,057	6,630	3,666
France	448,693	533,089	136,889	58,907	53,559	28,705	34,332	20,589
Germany	181,318	1	0	14,382	17,901	17,228	16,860	17,245
Greece	31,139	66,161	34,403	0	0	1,968	4,700	0
Haiti	100	106	133	8	8	10	9	8
India	147,263	108,379	193,015	7,441	13,698	24,452	13,713	20,494
Indonesia	3,157	3,323	2,051	0	0	489	766	1,097
Israel	0	0	8,906	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	175,765	109,042	34,210	20,164	6,850	22,094	21,519	13,923
Jamaica	8,568	1,369	25,163	122	1,831	4,038	3	1,443
Japan	275,618	188,685	330,650	24,896	24,357	36,686	27,825	40,356
Jordan	3,282	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,282
Kuwait	35,185	57,018	34,476	0	0	6,636	3,289	7,081
Lithuania	45,491	73,932	30,919	0	3,555	7,154	7,005	3,375
Malta	2,592	5,273	5,427	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	10,001	3,292	15,200	0	1,776	0	0	1,954
Netherlands	539,900	338,436	150,985	36,150	49,701	39,745	57,445	53,296
Nicaragua	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	0	3,074	45,818	0	0	0	0	0
Panama	19,237	13,509	8,436	3,530	0	3,196	0	3,295
Philippines	6,823	0	0	3,445	3,378	0	0	0
Poland	128,773	113,519	49,161	14,500	14,213	14,121	10,550	3,635
Portugal	70,213	59,558	56,235	3,204	7,125	6,437	6,660	9,845
Singapore	23,320	22,980	20,918	0	0	6,649	3,384	0
South Korea	240,592	268,032	415,282	26,140	28,224	24,112	34,932	16,462
Spain	253,573	392,810	182,483	17,280	49,792	9,933	20,023	34,106
Taiwan	97,420	97,535	87,316	3,104	6,686	13,201	14,117	13,090
Thailand	55,659	25,988	14,548	7,581	7,538	0	14,793	7,463
Turkiye	114,563	174,088	150,429	31,181	4,507	3,531	0	0
United Kingdom	401,094	395,130	134,730	47,642	25,414	7,464	7,133	0
By truck								
Canada	78	68	108	7	0	16	8	8
Mexico	577	1,391	1,102	19	27	35	19	25
<b>Total LNG exports</b>	<b>3,920,474</b>	<b>3,525,683</b>	<b>3,215,455</b>	<b>386,255</b>	<b>384,403</b>	<b>346,604</b>	<b>353,059</b>	<b>349,292</b>
<b>CNG</b>								
Canada	1	2	211	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total CNG exports</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total exports</b>	<b>6,900,647</b>	<b>6,306,586</b>	<b>6,031,722</b>	<b>654,232</b>	<b>651,269</b>	<b>625,625</b>	<b>634,499</b>	<b>634,485</b>

See footnotes at end of table.

Table 5. U.S. natural gas exports, 2021-2023

volumes in million cubic feet; prices in dollars per thousand cubic feet – continued

							2023	2022	
	June	May	April	March	February	January	Total	December	
<b>Exports</b>									
Volume (million cubic feet)									
<b>Pipeline</b>									
Canada	75,320	77,984	75,674	106,178	95,691	105,422	959,630	98,718	
Mexico	204,115	193,623	169,179	177,653	152,807	166,028	2,078,627	158,638	
<b>Total pipeline exports</b>	<b>279,435</b>	<b>271,608</b>	<b>244,853</b>	<b>283,832</b>	<b>248,498</b>	<b>271,450</b>	<b>3,038,257</b>	<b>257,355</b>	
<b>LNG</b>									
Exports									
By vessel									
Antigua and Barbuda	3	3	3	2	2	4	22	1	
Argentina	22,663	26,930	11,536	2,343	2,287	0	66,939	0	
Bahamas	45	45	43	53	27	42	489	42	
Bangladesh	3,624	3,561	0	0	0	3,369	12,663	0	
Barbados	0	0	0	0	0	0	93	0	
Belgium	6,953	3,809	4,844	8,053	7,322	3,640	80,245	3,274	
Brazil	8,628	4,196	3,598	1,334	0	0	71,998	0	
Chile	4,011	6,419	0	7,271	0	3,307	30,131	0	
China	20,261	6,593	3,426	5,132	2,565	17,896	96,659	6,992	
Colombia	0	2,847	0	0	0	0	5,703	0	
Croatia	0	2,932	3,163	3,694	6,006	2,913	77,286	6,204	
Dominican Republic	7,443	7,871	6,901	876	3,514	3,643	50,824	6,644	
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Finland	1,622	6,935	0	6,850	0	0	329	329	
France	45,569	51,658	53,211	28,581	39,457	34,124	571,399	38,311	
Germany	15,769	16,002	18,546	24,841	8,229	14,314	7,113	7,112	
Greece	2,924	4,498	3,905	3,156	6,781	3,207	69,031	2,869	
Haiti	6	12	11	8	11	8	115	9	
India	14,488	7,140	14,585	10,230	14,064	6,956	122,518	14,139	
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	0	805	6,579	3,256	
Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Italy	13,959	18,542	17,378	13,699	17,555	10,082	116,034	6,992	
Jamaica	3	289	31	540	161	107	1,516	147	
Japan	28,031	27,923	13,687	20,102	14,058	17,696	209,220	20,535	
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Kuwait	10,670	3,802	3,707	0	0	0	57,018	0	
Lithuania	3,629	7,048	3,412	3,599	0	6,713	77,212	3,281	
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	2,592	5,273	0	
Mexico	0	0	0	3,051	0	3,219	3,832	539	
Netherlands	45,866	60,691	60,234	61,017	39,301	36,453	378,329	39,893	
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,074	0	
Panama	0	3,289	0	3,209	0	2,718	13,759	249	
Philippines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Poland	18,046	17,422	7,165	7,236	10,347	11,538	127,404	13,885	
Portugal	3,194	10,424	4,237	6,133	6,138	6,816	69,583	10,025	
Singapore	10,009	0	0	0	0	0	22,980	0	
South Korea	17,044	10,958	24,734	10,807	22,672	24,507	292,732	24,700	
Spain	12,274	12,266	13,680	38,096	32,138	13,987	426,657	33,847	
Taiwan	6,848	10,262	9,774	10,311	6,557	3,471	106,738	9,203	
Thailand	4,242	0	4,225	4,249	1,829	3,738	25,988	0	
Turkiye	0	0	13,908	11,866	13,444	36,126	192,067	17,979	
United Kingdom	0	32,374	75,836	70,499	71,702	63,032	464,462	69,332	
By truck									
Canada	17	7	7	7	0	0	76	8	
Mexico	34	26	58	96	106	133	1,552	160	
<b>Total LNG exports</b>	<b>327,872</b>	<b>366,774</b>	<b>375,843</b>	<b>366,941</b>	<b>326,275</b>	<b>337,155</b>	<b>3,865,643</b>	<b>339,960</b>	
<b>CNG</b>									
Canada	0	0	0	*	*	*	2	0	
<b>Total CNG exports</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	
<b>Total exports</b>	<b>607,307</b>	<b>638,382</b>	<b>620,697</b>	<b>650,773</b>	<b>574,773</b>	<b>608,605</b>	<b>6,903,902</b>	<b>597,316</b>	

See footnotes at end of table.

**Table 5. U.S. natural gas exports, 2021-2023**

volumes in million cubic feet; prices in dollars per thousand cubic feet – continued

								2022
	November	October	September	August	July	June	May	April
<b>Exports</b>								
Volume (million cubic feet)								
<b>Pipeline</b>								
Canada	90,179	72,738	61,926	75,220	69,774	70,105	79,214	80,475
Mexico	160,986	171,766	169,159	182,596	189,652	182,995	186,003	176,447
<b>Total pipeline exports</b>	<b>251,165</b>	<b>244,505</b>	<b>231,086</b>	<b>257,816</b>	<b>259,426</b>	<b>253,100</b>	<b>265,217</b>	<b>256,922</b>
<b>LNG</b>								
Exports								
By vessel								
Antigua and Barbuda	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	3
Argentina	0	0	0	2,202	9,448	25,246	20,111	9,933
Bahamas	35	40	43	53	45	47	42	34
Bangladesh	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,346	0
Barbados	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	7,190	9,165	3,589	0	7,023	3,441	7,341
Brazil	0	3,439	0	10,542	5,192	3,857	15,303	3,448
Chile	0	0	3,365	0	6,917	0	9,943	3,530
China	17,308	22,598	10,275	10,272	784	7,329	0	10,217
Colombia	0	3,699	0	606	0	912	0	0
Croatia	5,122	2,922	9,073	7,824	4,600	7,925	8,543	6,763
Dominican Republic	0	3,469	3,196	3,357	6,532	5,838	4,964	3,645
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	50,655	41,959	57,943	33,885	53,443	37,564	47,150	56,343
Germany	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	421	4,424	0	10,763	12,922	9,633	12,650	1,336
Haiti	0	0	8	11	8	13	9	11
India	10,138	7,005	10,528	10,265	13,902	10,653	7,152	14,223
Indonesia	505	625	509	967	0	0	0	0
Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	3,205	0	8,355	15,462	9,914	7,137	21,696	15,519
Jamaica	137	144	240	110	121	48	144	135
Japan	24,396	10,684	7,005	20,156	18,189	21,561	24,024	13,231
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	0	3,299	7,038	6,415	5,382	8,105	14,204	7,298
Lithuania	3,708	7,072	3,541	7,579	7,947	6,729	11,237	13,770
Malta	2,928	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	3,292	0	0
Netherlands	20,645	39,703	30,924	50,020	32,637	34,420	28,902	28,395
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,074
Panama	3,833	0	0	0	0	623	1,192	1,536
Philippines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	3,453	7,095	16,917	6,885	17,780	14,282	18,224	13,882
Portugal	3,732	7,005	5,806	3,202	6,412	5,582	3,888	6,632
Singapore	0	6,628	0	0	6,275	3,352	0	0
South Korea	14,069	38,844	19,736	36,033	34,342	25,054	17,538	13,813
Spain	26,445	26,369	21,263	26,140	34,396	29,639	40,337	40,259
Taiwan	3,592	9,041	9,753	8,901	9,353	6,892	15,975	9,541
Thailand	0	0	3,673	3,607	0	6,920	3,419	0
Turkiye	31,430	10,333	5,458	0	0	7,542	7,281	6,637
United Kingdom	76,693	46,040	51,467	21,263	3,797	3,326	10,608	39,775
By truck								
Canada	0	19	0	0	0	8	8	15
Mexico	153	175	94	103	76	105	115	122
<b>Total LNG exports</b>	<b>302,608</b>	<b>309,823</b>	<b>295,379</b>	<b>300,215</b>	<b>300,415</b>	<b>300,659</b>	<b>351,448</b>	<b>330,463</b>
<b>CNG</b>								
Canada	*	1	*	*	1	*	0	0
<b>Total CNG exports</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total exports</b>	<b>553,774</b>	<b>554,328</b>	<b>526,465</b>	<b>558,031</b>	<b>559,842</b>	<b>553,760</b>	<b>616,665</b>	<b>587,385</b>

See footnotes at end of table.

Table 5. U.S. natural gas exports, 2021-2023

volumes in million cubic feet; prices in dollars per thousand cubic feet – continued

	2022				2021			
	March	February	January	Total	December	November	October	September
<b>Exports</b>								
Volume (million cubic feet)								
<b>Pipeline</b>								
Canada	105,074	74,630	81,577	937,124	108,568	85,136	62,464	72,023
Mexico	169,885	155,032	175,467	2,154,457	166,956	165,449	184,472	178,746
<b>Total pipeline exports</b>	<b>274,958</b>	<b>229,662</b>	<b>257,045</b>	<b>3,091,580</b>	<b>275,524</b>	<b>250,585</b>	<b>246,936</b>	<b>250,769</b>
<b>LNG</b>								
Exports								
By vessel								
Antigua and Barbuda	2	0	2	8	3	2	0	3
Argentina	0	0	0	83,449	2,077	0	0	1,950
Bahamas	43	31	34	486	36	34	36	43
Bangladesh	3,421	5,896	0	37,734	0	0	0	3,276
Barbados	34	31	28	297	34	27	25	33
Belgium	17,743	7,691	13,786	5,584	0	0	0	0
Brazil	2,236	10,660	17,322	307,714	24,246	10,715	40,769	38,282
Chile	3,214	0	3,162	121,881	2,938	2,956	6,364	7,929
China	7,527	3,357	0	453,304	17,050	50,228	42,202	48,584
Colombia	0	0	486	2,247	0	0	0	436
Croatia	3,358	5,870	9,084	36,133	3,117	9,416	0	0
Dominican Republic	6,530	0	6,647	53,095	5,969	2,780	5,619	0
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	64,415	39,646	50,084	170,780	33,892	10,021	9,333	6,578
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	4,116	8,094	1,802	39,708	5,305	7,629	1,515	799
Haiti	10	16	20	137	4	8	17	10
India	10,438	7,210	6,866	196,218	3,203	14,807	10,548	23,941
Indonesia	0	717	0	3,269	1,218	456	477	1,118
Israel	0	0	0	8,906	0	0	0	2,855
Italy	7,088	13,629	7,037	34,210	0	0	0	0
Jamaica	92	111	86	25,276	113	715	1,858	2,931
Japan	17,697	10,214	21,527	354,948	24,297	33,947	37,666	10,290
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	0	5,277	0	34,476	0	0	6,193	10,333
Lithuania	5,700	3,131	3,518	30,919	0	0	0	3,282
Malta	0	2,345	0	5,427	0	0	0	2,498
Mexico	0	0	0	15,200	0	0	1,088	0
Netherlands	24,922	31,591	16,279	174,339	23,354	8,829	17,157	10,424
Nicaragua	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	0	0	0	45,818	0	2,490	3,138	9,642
Panama	0	3,069	3,255	8,436	0	0	911	0
Philippines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	3,831	7,475	3,695	56,320	7,159	7,068	3,270	0
Portugal	10,728	3,703	2,868	65,865	9,630	5,380	10,459	3,696
Singapore	6,725	0	0	20,918	0	3,728	0	0
South Korea	19,289	27,489	21,824	453,483	38,201	30,787	33,836	31,375
Spain	59,224	39,359	49,379	215,062	32,579	22,821	35,638	31,274
Taiwan	12,161	6,115	6,211	99,350	12,034	3,404	7,123	5,789
Thailand	0	4,880	3,490	14,548	0	0	0	0
Turkiye	16,629	43,697	45,081	188,849	38,420	47,330	19,385	24,176
United Kingdom	56,799	25,301	60,060	195,046	60,315	30,648	3,302	3,099
By truck								
Canada	0	4	13	128	20	8	8	19
Mexico	144	157	148	1,250	148	160	182	150
<b>Total LNG exports</b>	<b>364,116</b>	<b>316,766</b>	<b>353,791</b>	<b>3,560,818</b>	<b>345,363</b>	<b>306,397</b>	<b>298,119</b>	<b>284,813</b>
<b>CNG</b>								
Canada	*	0	0	211	0	0	0	0
<b>Total CNG exports</b>	<b>*</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total exports</b>	<b>639,074</b>	<b>546,428</b>	<b>610,836</b>	<b>6,652,609</b>	<b>620,886</b>	<b>556,982</b>	<b>545,055</b>	<b>535,583</b>

See footnotes at end of table.

Table 5. U.S. natural gas exports, 2021-2023

volumes in million cubic feet; prices in dollars per thousand cubic feet – continued

								2021
	August	July	June	May	April	March	February	January
<b>Exports</b>								
Volume (million cubic feet)								
<b>Pipeline</b>								
Canada	71,586	68,264	69,528	70,561	74,567	91,301	78,198	84,927
Mexico	193,710	197,623	198,242	192,549	182,918	183,051	137,381	173,360
<b>Total pipeline exports</b>	<b>265,296</b>	<b>265,887</b>	<b>267,770</b>	<b>263,110</b>	<b>257,485</b>	<b>274,352</b>	<b>215,579</b>	<b>258,287</b>
<b>LNG</b>								
Exports								
By vessel								
Antigua and Barbuda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Argentina	14,363	22,798	19,312	16,226	4,485	2,238	0	0
Bahamas	56	46	48	45	46	39	29	28
Bangladesh	7,085	0	3,493	6,948	10,219	3,566	0	3,148
Barbados	27	31	22	19	30	14	19	17
Belgium	0	0	0	2,100	0	3,484	0	0
Brazil	34,204	39,637	32,293	19,726	11,615	21,977	13,118	21,132
Chile	16,262	19,913	0	17,598	10,293	21,320	6,524	9,784
China	51,662	42,222	42,319	37,731	50,474	28,476	3,415	38,940
Colombia	919	0	0	0	892	0	0	0
Croatia	2,980	3,299	2,923	3,364	3,666	7,367	0	0
Dominican Republic	5,901	1,806	4,670	5,283	2,905	5,577	5,689	6,895
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	7,111	0	3,683	11,926	36,120	33,678	14,851	3,587
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	3,607	6,651	0	6,796	0	6,805	0	600
Haiti	24	8	18	12	3	10	11	12
India	20,592	13,090	16,503	28,259	13,752	17,381	13,776	20,367
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	0	0	0	0	3,225	2,826	0	0
Italy	3,401	6,826	3,425	2,923	6,896	10,739	0	0
Jamaica	2,907	0	2,927	2,925	2,370	2,458	2,365	3,708
Japan	19,979	24,895	39,783	25,058	28,756	27,673	18,271	64,331
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	3,298	0	7,126	0	3,705	3,821	0	0
Lithuania	1,677	6,469	3,285	3,049	3,078	3,228	6,851	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	2,928	0	0	0
Mexico	0	758	0	0	0	0	13,354	0
Netherlands	7,347	10,597	3,030	26,611	17,060	24,204	22,777	2,949
Nicaragua	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	3,319	13,428	3,376	0	3,323	3,421	0	3,682
Panama	1,390	0	0	2,341	0	3,279	0	516
Philippines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	6,619	10,635	3,581	7,382	3,507	7,099	0
Portugal	6,382	3,296	5,538	10,765	7,358	0	3,360	0
Singapore	0	3,449	0	3,089	3,660	3,303	0	3,688
South Korea	50,101	39,314	55,918	46,033	21,683	32,203	18,094	55,936
Spain	23,068	8,630	7,833	5,234	22,974	13,900	3,733	7,377
Taiwan	6,728	20,653	3,097	10,157	6,594	13,450	0	10,319
Thailand	3,707	0	0	3,453	7,388	0	0	0
Turkiye	0	5,591	0	3,017	0	3,619	20,652	26,659
United Kingdom	0	0	0	10,586	13,877	17,440	34,343	21,436
By truck								
Canada	18	16	7	18	15	0	0	0
Mexico	147	97	105	48	48	19	63	83
<b>Total LNG exports</b>	<b>298,262</b>	<b>300,143</b>	<b>271,368</b>	<b>314,922</b>	<b>306,818</b>	<b>321,023</b>	<b>208,394</b>	<b>305,196</b>
<b>CNG</b>								
Canada	14	16	27	25	29	36	32	32
<b>Total CNG exports</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Total exports</b>	<b>563,572</b>	<b>566,046</b>	<b>539,165</b>	<b>578,056</b>	<b>564,333</b>	<b>595,411</b>	<b>424,004</b>	<b>563,515</b>

See footnotes at end of table.



**Table 7. Marketed production of natural gas in selected states and the Federal Gulf of Mexico, 2018-2023**

million cubic feet

Year and month	Alaska	Arkansas	California	Colorado	Kansas	Louisiana	Montana	New Mexico	North Dakota	Ohio
<b>2018 total</b>	<b>341,315</b>	<b>589,985</b>	<b>202,617</b>	<b>1,847,402</b>	<b>201,391</b>	<b>2,832,404</b>	<b>43,530</b>	<b>1,493,082</b>	<b>706,552</b>	<b>2,403,382</b>
<b>2019 total</b>	<b>329,361</b>	<b>524,757</b>	<b>196,823</b>	<b>1,986,916</b>	<b>183,087</b>	<b>3,212,318</b>	<b>43,534</b>	<b>1,769,086</b>	<b>850,826</b>	<b>2,651,631</b>
<b>2020 total</b>	<b>339,337</b>	<b>481,205</b>	<b>155,979</b>	<b>1,996,740</b>	<b>163,362</b>	<b>3,205,574</b>	<b>38,191</b>	<b>1,965,533</b>	<b>887,445</b>	<b>2,389,629</b>
<b>2021</b>										
January	31,667	39,288	11,467	160,766	12,900	277,421	3,292	173,924	83,195	193,017
February	28,365	30,185	10,352	143,192	10,142	223,272	2,860	144,784	70,130	174,338
March	31,483	42,468	11,434	157,254	13,251	283,012	3,300	180,642	83,245	193,017
April	29,514	37,756	11,121	156,092	12,830	273,644	3,078	178,897	82,920	185,344
May	29,005	38,563	12,342	163,746	13,073	283,573	3,329	187,958	85,321	191,522
June	27,715	36,921	11,209	155,104	12,711	276,148	2,975	184,699	82,521	185,344
July	26,280	38,047	12,141	161,273	13,227	299,944	3,321	195,871	79,978	189,619
August	27,864	37,755	11,512	159,501	13,227	292,795	3,343	199,330	84,253	189,619
September	28,534	36,527	11,202	154,695	12,770	290,609	3,286	194,265	85,061	183,502
October	30,458	37,648	11,298	162,706	13,227	307,739	3,462	200,454	87,534	199,954
November	30,735	36,102	10,925	156,654	12,711	310,407	3,297	195,247	87,017	193,503
December	33,039	37,023	11,031	159,277	12,918	325,203	3,176	201,095	87,918	199,954
<b>Total</b>	<b>354,660</b>	<b>448,283</b>	<b>136,034</b>	<b>1,890,260</b>	<b>152,986</b>	<b>3,443,767</b>	<b>38,719</b>	<b>2,237,165</b>	<b>999,094</b>	<b>2,278,731</b>
<b>2022</b>										
January	32,865	36,087	11,347	155,786	12,478	318,772	3,119	199,405	81,490	190,930
February	30,014	32,336	9,814	141,557	11,122	290,031	2,977	184,452	75,867	172,453
March	32,473	36,319	11,603	159,101	12,465	319,562	3,370	218,272	88,106	190,930
April	30,910	35,043	11,384	153,816	12,347	324,537	3,175	216,047	68,665	181,993
May	31,677	35,781	11,593	154,313	12,826	348,337	3,170	222,902	81,340	188,060
June	28,644	34,299	11,296	149,081	12,302	336,152	3,208	215,334	86,437	181,993
July	29,654	35,096	11,734	153,856	12,659	348,334	3,367	228,003	90,288	193,328
August	29,380	35,394	12,177	155,140	12,814	351,777	3,544	229,728	89,688	193,328
September	29,288	34,211	11,260	151,515	11,854	348,817	3,491	231,482	90,550	187,092
October	31,122	35,112	11,520	156,992	13,008	365,742	3,560	250,312	93,103	190,335
November	30,934	33,568	11,095	151,304	12,206	357,021	3,266	239,821	85,482	184,195
December	36,181	32,951	11,396	150,558	11,764	355,708	2,461	251,472	76,605	190,335
<b>Total</b>	<b>373,141</b>	<b>416,196</b>	<b>136,220</b>	<b>1,833,019</b>	<b>147,846</b>	<b>4,064,791</b>	<b>38,709</b>	<b>2,687,231</b>	<b>1,007,621</b>	<b>2,244,971</b>
<b>2023</b>										
January	33,391	£34,788	£11,055	£151,849	£11,783	£363,863	£3,538	£254,905	£83,384	£198,189
February	30,726	£31,085	£10,042	£135,238	£10,528	£352,464	£3,233	£233,411	£80,766	£174,917
March	32,676	£34,429	£10,900	£150,138	£11,441	£370,158	£3,565	£268,590	£88,736	£199,571
April	31,313	£32,911	£10,652	£146,856	£11,228	£363,538	£3,475	£259,515	£88,066	£187,566
May	31,288	£33,689	£11,243	£152,690	£11,555	£379,548	£3,577	£263,626	£92,326	£191,104
June	28,991	£32,280	£10,795	£149,138	£10,817	£345,747	£3,469	£252,650	£92,129	£179,766
July	28,478	£33,094	£11,217	£155,584	£10,985	£363,583	£3,551	£264,909	£96,906	£189,040
August	26,756	£32,973	£11,217	£157,964	£11,293	£365,347	£3,654	£270,933	£97,655	£195,216
September	28,784	RE31,874	RE10,827	RE152,177	RE10,902	RE351,720	RE3,535	RE265,057	RE98,252	RE188,594
October	31,535	RE32,603	RE10,922	RE157,719	RE11,293	RE361,555	RE3,587	RE271,562	RE100,204	RE186,974
November	30,734	£31,507	£10,307	£157,662	£10,885	£344,507	£3,396	£270,210	£98,288	£185,714
<b>2023 11-month</b>	<b>334,671</b>	<b>£361,231</b>	<b>£119,177</b>	<b>£1,667,015</b>	<b>£122,708</b>	<b>£3,962,030</b>	<b>£38,581</b>	<b>£2,875,367</b>	<b>£1,016,712</b>	<b>£2,076,650</b>
<b>2022 11-month</b>	<b>336,960</b>	<b>383,245</b>	<b>124,823</b>	<b>1,682,461</b>	<b>136,081</b>	<b>3,709,083</b>	<b>36,248</b>	<b>2,435,759</b>	<b>931,016</b>	<b>2,054,637</b>
<b>2021 11-month</b>	<b>321,621</b>	<b>411,260</b>	<b>125,003</b>	<b>1,730,982</b>	<b>140,068</b>	<b>3,118,564</b>	<b>35,543</b>	<b>2,036,071</b>	<b>911,177</b>	<b>2,078,778</b>

See footnotes at end of table.

**Table 7. Marketed production of natural gas in selected states and the Federal Gulf of Mexico, 2018-2023**

million cubic feet – continued

Year and month	Oklahoma	Pennsylvania	Texas	Utah	West		Other states	Federal Gulf of Mexico	U.S. total
					Virginia	Wyoming			
<b>2018 total</b>	<b>2,875,787</b>	<b>6,264,832</b>	<b>8,041,010</b>	<b>295,826</b>	<b>1,771,698</b>	<b>1,637,517</b>	<b>485,675</b>	<b>974,863</b>	<b>33,008,867</b>
<b>2019 total</b>	<b>3,036,052</b>	<b>6,896,792</b>	<b>9,378,489</b>	<b>271,808</b>	<b>2,155,214</b>	<b>1,488,854</b>	<b>456,024</b>	<b>1,015,343</b>	<b>36,446,918</b>
<b>2020 total</b>	<b>2,673,207</b>	<b>7,168,902</b>	<b>9,813,035</b>	<b>241,965</b>	<b>2,567,990</b>	<b>1,206,122</b>	<b>435,117</b>	<b>791,491</b>	<b>36,520,826</b>
<b>2021</b>									
January	216,559	652,283	799,384	19,392	226,357	97,700	35,166	71,804	3,105,581
February	162,358	585,293	610,705	18,126	198,404	89,387	31,295	64,043	2,597,230
March	217,547	649,393	828,055	20,404	217,550	95,201	34,611	74,201	3,136,068
April	211,950	620,194	823,807	19,783	215,237	92,348	34,385	69,762	3,058,663
May	218,136	635,492	847,314	20,313	226,230	94,307	35,810	72,051	3,158,085
June	209,019	616,203	817,582	19,522	220,743	90,244	29,181	67,424	3,045,264
July	219,906	638,130	860,680	20,601	221,714	93,624	30,406	71,746	3,176,507
August	218,176	646,670	862,398	20,347	234,964	89,735	33,021	61,409	3,185,920
September	216,136	627,305	858,752	19,928	224,034	92,092	30,825	34,553	3,104,078
October	222,128	651,674	886,988	20,460	231,720	93,092	37,901	60,037	3,258,481
November	220,076	646,383	856,488	20,004	221,495	90,106	32,243	65,566	3,188,958
December	223,437	678,051	897,003	20,541	236,698	91,580	37,047	68,035	3,323,025
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,555,430</b>	<b>7,647,068</b>	<b>9,949,156</b>	<b>239,422</b>	<b>2,675,145</b>	<b>1,109,416</b>	<b>401,892</b>	<b>780,632</b>	<b>37,337,860</b>
<b>2022</b>									
January	216,347	657,613	878,743	20,719	234,795	89,680	30,986	64,105	3,235,266
February	196,621	577,251	795,295	18,516	209,707	78,589	31,234	56,642	2,914,480
March	225,203	634,328	903,364	21,502	239,344	87,991	34,249	64,273	3,282,454
April	226,464	614,569	880,176	21,243	235,580	86,485	31,383	65,402	3,199,218
May	235,497	638,527	918,979	22,306	247,179	85,606	32,053	61,895	3,332,041
June	231,202	616,619	881,753	21,786	240,568	85,970	31,592	64,090	3,232,326
July	239,209	644,039	920,414	22,646	251,625	89,886	34,763	66,176	3,375,077
August	238,619	635,404	937,041	23,549	255,603	87,801	33,420	67,976	3,392,383
September	238,112	618,364	925,985	21,849	245,734	83,339	32,595	64,875	3,330,414
October	245,755	637,050	941,968	22,103	251,647	88,939	33,226	66,250	3,437,743
November	234,562	613,000	910,587	21,297	255,298	85,621	32,901	64,414	3,326,572
December	236,429	624,415	934,211	22,675	253,533	82,730	32,644	64,307	3,370,376
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,764,019</b>	<b>7,511,179</b>	<b>10,828,515</b>	<b>260,192</b>	<b>2,920,613</b>	<b>1,032,634</b>	<b>391,046</b>	<b>770,406</b>	<b>39,428,350</b>
<b>2023</b>									
January	E241,437	E646,645	E935,962	E22,310	E256,931	E79,538	E31,536	E67,666	E3,428,769
February	E217,813	E572,742	E842,907	E18,969	E231,585	E69,492	E27,372	E59,490	E3,102,781
March	E240,498	E642,354	E961,177	E22,752	E266,638	E78,520	E27,921	E64,871	E3,474,934
April	E232,276	E619,656	E932,661	E22,593	E256,029	E75,109	E30,110	E58,454	E3,362,007
May	E237,558	E648,124	E982,394	E24,031	E268,279	E81,880	E30,706	E56,290	E3,499,909
June	E233,220	E627,912	E949,437	E24,338	E266,083	E80,375	E31,225	E57,076	E3,375,450
July	E238,429	E643,265	E985,195	E24,165	E279,996	E70,816	E32,548	E63,043	E3,494,802
August	E236,507	E648,577	E996,400	E25,154	E282,678	E79,142	E32,273	E59,986	E3,533,722
September	RE234,235	RE616,784	RE966,776	E24,587	RE268,946	RE78,776	E31,376	RE62,802	RE3,426,002
October	RE240,288	RE640,992	RE998,758	RE25,742	RE284,303	RE85,069	RE32,116	RE61,708	RE3,536,929
November	E229,724	E643,602	E971,670	E25,802	E282,602	E84,798	E30,888	E58,068	E3,470,365
<b>2023 11-month YTD</b>	<b>E2,581,984</b>	<b>E6,950,654</b>	<b>E10,523,33</b>	<b>E260,443</b>	<b>E2,944,070</b>	<b>E863,515</b>	<b>E338,071</b>	<b>E669,455</b>	<b>E37,705,670</b>
<b>2022 11-month YTD</b>	<b>2,527,590</b>	<b>6,886,764</b>	<b>9,894,304</b>	<b>237,517</b>	<b>2,667,080</b>	<b>949,904</b>	<b>358,402</b>	<b>706,099</b>	<b>36,057,974</b>
<b>2021 11-month YTD</b>	<b>2,331,993</b>	<b>6,969,017</b>	<b>9,052,153</b>	<b>218,880</b>	<b>2,438,447</b>	<b>1,017,836</b>	<b>364,845</b>	<b>712,597</b>	<b>34,014,835</b>

RE Revised estimated data.

E Estimated data.

**Source:** 2018-2022: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), *Natural Gas Annual 2022*, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), IHS Markit, and Enverus. January 2023 through current month: Form EIA-914, *Monthly Crude Oil and Lease Condensate, and Natural Gas Production Report*; and EIA computations.

**Note:** For 2023 forward, we estimate state monthly marketed production from gross withdrawals using historical relationships between the two. We collect data for Arkansas, California, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming, and federal offshore Gulf of Mexico individually on the EIA-914 report. The "other states" category comprises states/areas not individually collected on the EIA-914 report (Alabama, Arizona, Federal Offshore Pacific, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia). Before 2023, Federal Offshore Pacific is included in California. We obtain all data for Alaska directly from the state. Monthly preliminary state-level data for all states not collected individually on the EIA-914 report are available after the final annual reports for these series are collected and processed. Final annual data are generally available in the third quarter of the following year. The sum of individual states may not equal total U.S. volumes because of independent rounding.



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
**ENERGY**


Fossil Energy and  
Carbon Management

**OFFICE OF RESOURCE SUSTAINABILITY**

Office of Regulation, Analysis, and Engagement  
Division of Natural Gas Regulation

# U.S. Natural Gas Imports and Exports Monthly November 2023

Data are current as of the publication date. Any revisions to reported data will be published in the next scheduled monthly report.



**U.S. LNG Historical Countries of Destination**

To be placed on the U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports Monthly email distribution list, please add your contact information [here](#).

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For electronic version: <https://www.energy.gov/fecm/listings/natural-gas-imports-exports-monthly-reports>

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**Executive Summary**

November 2023

**Summary**

In November 2023, the United States exported 654.7 Bcf and imported 265.3 Bcf of natural gas, which resulted in 389.4 Bcf of net exports.

**U.S. LNG Exports**

The United States exported 386.2 Bcf (59.0% of total U.S. natural gas exports) of natural gas in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to 28 countries.

- Europe (267.0 Bcf, 69.1%), Asia (101.4 Bcf, 26.3%), Latin America/ Caribbean (17.8 Bcf, 4.6%)
- 0.5% increase from October 2023
- 27.7% increase from November 2022
- 89.6% of total LNG exports went to non-Free Trade Agreement countries (nFTA), while the remaining 10.4% went to Free Trade Agreement countries (FTA).

U.S. LNG exports to the top five countries of destination accounted for 51.8% of total U.S. LNG exports.

- France (58.9 Bcf, 15.3%), United Kingdom (47.6 Bcf, 12.3%), Netherlands (36.2 Bcf, 9.4%), Turkiye (31.2 Bcf, 8.1%), and South Korea (26.1 Bcf, 6.8%).

**U.S. Imports and Exports by Pipeline and Truck with Mexico**

The United States exported 179.0 Bcf of natural gas to Mexico and imported less than 0.1 Bcf of natural gas from Mexico, which resulted in 179.0 Bcf of net exports.

- 10.7% decrease from October 2023
- 11.1% increase from November 2022

**U.S. Imports and Exports by Pipeline and Truck with Canada**

The United States exported 89.5 Bcf of natural gas to Canada and imported 258.5 Bcf of natural gas from Canada, which resulted in 169.0 Bcf of net imports.


- 1.9% decrease from October 2023
- 4.2% increase from November 2022

# U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports

## Monthly Summary

2

### U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports by Mode of Transport (November 2023)



### 1a. Monthly Summary: U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports by Mode of Transport

Volume (Bcf)	Monthly			Percentage Change	
	Nov 2023	Oct 2023	Nov 2022	Nov 2023 vs. Oct 2023	Nov 2023 vs. Nov 2022
<b>Exports</b>					
LNG by Vessel	386.2	384.3	302.3	<1%	28%
Pipeline	268.4	267.4	252.4	<1%	6%
Truck	<0.1	<0.1	0.2	-2%	-83%
LNG by ISO Container	<0.1	<0.1	0.2	-4%	-72%
<b>Total</b>	<b>654.7</b>	<b>651.8</b>	<b>555.0</b>	<b>&lt;1%</b>	<b>18%</b>
<b>Imports</b>					
LNG by Vessel	0	0	1.2	-	-100%
Pipeline	258.3	239.1	253.4	8%	2%
Truck	0.2	0.2	0.2	-30%	-17%
LNG by ISO Container	0	0	0	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>258.5</b>	<b>239.3</b>	<b>254.8</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>Net Exports</b>	<b>396.2</b>	<b>412.5</b>	<b>300.2</b>	<b>-4%</b>	<b>32%</b>


#### Notes

- Natural gas imports & exports by truck included compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG).
- Does not include LNG Re-Exports or Puerto Rico LNG Imports or Exports. See Table 6 for LNG Re-Exports and Table 8 for Puerto Rico LNG Imports and Exports.
- Totals may not equal sum of components because of independent rounding.
- not applicable(-).

# U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports

Year-to-Date and Annual Summary

## U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports



### 1b. Year-to-Date and Annual Summary: U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports by Mode of Transport

Volume (Bcf) Mode of Transport	Year-to-Date (Jan-Nov)			Annual		
	YTD 2023	YTD 2022	% Change	2022	2021	% Change
<b>Exports</b>						
LNG by Vessel	3,918.8	3,522.3	11%	3,861.9	3,558.3	9%
Pipeline	2,981.2	2,782.1	7%	3,040.8	3,103.3	-2%
Truck	0.7	1.5	-55%	1.6	1.6	3%
LNG by ISO Container	1.0	1.9	-46%	2.1	1.1	83%
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,901.7</b>	<b>6,307.8</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>6,906.4</b>	<b>6,664.4</b>	<b>4%</b>
<b>Imports</b>						
LNG by Vessel	10.5	20.7	-49%	23.5	21.4	10%
Pipeline	2,732.8	2,807.4	-3%	3,104.0	2,890.5	7%
Truck	2.3	1.9	19%	2.1	0.5	296%
LNG by ISO Container	0	0	-	0	0	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,745.6</b>	<b>2,830.0</b>	<b>-3%</b>	<b>3,129.6</b>	<b>2,912.4</b>	<b>7%</b>
<b>Net Exports</b>	<b>4,156.1</b>	<b>3,477.8</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>3,776.8</b>	<b>3,752.0</b>	<b>&lt;1%</b>

#### Notes

- Does not include LNG Re-Exports or Puerto Rico LNG Imports or Exports. See Table 6 for LNG Re-Exports and Table 8 for Puerto Rico LNG Imports and Exports.
- Totals may not equal sum of components because of independent rounding.
- not applicable(-).



## **QATARENERGY, EXCELERATE ENERGY SIGN 15-YEAR AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY 1 MTPA OF LNG TO BANGLADESH -**

DOHA, Qatar • 29 January 2024 – QatarEnergy and Excelerate Energy (Excelerate) signed a long-term LNG sale and purchase agreement (SPA) for the supply of LNG from Qatar to Bangladesh.

Pursuant to the SPA, Excelerate will purchase up to one million tons per annum (MTPA) of LNG from QatarEnergy to be delivered to floating storage and regasification units in Bangladesh for 15 years starting in January 2026.

Excelerate will purchase 0.85 MTPA of LNG in 2026 and 2027, and one MTPA from 2028 to 2040. Commenting on this occasion, His Excellency Mr. Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi, the Minister of State for Energy Affairs, the President and CEO of QatarEnergy, said: “We are pleased to sign this agreement with Excelerate for the supply of up to one million tons per annum of LNG to Bangladesh. This new agreement will further strengthen our relationship with Excelerate while also supporting the energy requirements of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and its stride towards greater economic development.”

Qatar is the largest LNG supplier to Bangladesh and aspires to continue being the LNG supplier of choice for partners in the South Asia LNG markets.

January 30, 2024

## **ADNOC Gas Signs 10-year LNG Supply Agreement with GAIL India Limited**

ADNOC Gas Signs 10-year LNG Supply Agreement with GAIL India Limited

Agreement underscores ADNOC Gas' growing global presence, particularly in the Asian LNG market

Latest agreement follows several international LNG sales agreements, reinforcing ADNOC Gas' position as a global export partner of choice

ADNOC Gas continues to build on strong sales momentum and domestic growth investments to meet growing global demand for LNG, an important fuel in the energy transition

Abu Dhabi, UAE – January 30, 2024: ADNOC Gas plc (“ADNOC Gas” or the “Company”) (ADX symbol: “ADNOCGAS” / ISIN: “AEE01195A234”), a world-class integrated gas processing company, today announced a 10-year agreement to supply 0.5 million metric tons per annum (mmtpa) of liquified natural gas (LNG) to GAIL India Limited, India's leading natural gas company.

This agreement underscores ADNOC Gas' growing global presence, particularly in the Asian LNG market and further reinforces the relationship between the UAE and India. This agreement follows several significant international LNG sales agreements, including those with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), TotalEnergies Gas and Power, Indian Oil Corporation (IOCL), and PetroChina International (PCI), underscoring ADNOC Gas' position as a global export partner of choice.

The world continues to witness long-term structural demand growth for natural gas, an important fuel in a just and responsible global energy transition. ADNOC Gas remains focused on investments that will drive sustainable growth for its business, aligned with customer demand. In 2023, ADNOC Gas maintained a strong sales momentum signing several LNG agreements valued between \$9.4 billion (AED34.5 billion) and \$12 billion (AED44 billion), while continuing to invest domestically to position itself to meet both local and international demand for natural gas.

Dr. Ahmed Mohamed Alebri, Chief Executive Officer of ADNOC Gas, said: “This long-term LNG supply agreement with GAIL India marks a significant step forward in our commitment to continue providing reliable and sustainable energy solutions to our partners and customers around the world. India continues to be a key market for ADNOC Gas, and this latest supply agreement underscores our ongoing dedication to fostering long-term partnerships that promote responsible energy consumption.”

Natural gas plays a crucial role as a transitional fuel, with lower carbon emissions compared to other fossil fuels. It also serves as an important raw material in industrial value chains.

ADNOC Gas continues to leverage opportunities arising from ADNOC's integrated gas masterplan, which links every part of the gas value chain in the UAE, ensuring a sustainable and economic supply of natural gas to meet local and international demand.

Within the ADNOC Group's broader Gas masterplan, ADNOC is progressing a new low-carbon Ruwais LNG project, currently under development in Al Ruwais Industrial City, Abu Dhabi. The Ruwais LNG



project is set to be the first LNG export facility in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to run on clean power, making it one of the lowest-carbon intensity LNG plants in the world, supporting ADNOC's accelerated Net Zero by 2045 ambition. When completed, the project, is expected to consist of two 4.8 mmtpa LNG liquefaction trains with a total capacity of 9.6 mmtpa.

# # #

#### About ADNOC Gas

ADNOC Gas, listed on the ADX (ADX symbol: "ADNOCGAS" / ISIN: "AEE01195A234"), is a world-class, large-scale integrated gas processing company operating across the gas value chain, from receipt of raw gas feedstock from ADNOC through large, long-life operations for gas processing and fractionation to the sale of products to domestic and international customers. ADNOC Gas supplies approximately 60% of the UAE's sales gas needs and supplies end-customers in over 20 countries. To find out more, visit: [www.adnocgas.ae](http://www.adnocgas.ae).

## Asian LNG Buyers Abruptly Change and Lock in Long Term Supply – Validates Supply Gap, Provides Support For Brownfield LNG FIDs

Posted 11am on July 14, 2021

The last 7 days has shown there is a sea change as Asian LNG buyers have made an abrupt change in their LNG contracting and are moving to lock in long term LNG supply. This is the complete opposite of what they were doing pre-Covid when they were trying to renegotiate Qatar LNG long term deals lower and moving away from long term deals to spot/short term sales. Why? We think they did the same math we did in our April 28 blog “*Multiple Brownfield LNG FIDs Now Needed To Fill New LNG Supply Gap From Mozambique Chaos? How About LNG Canada Phase 2?*” and saw a much bigger and sooner LNG supply gap driven by the delay of 5 bcf/d of Mozambique LNG that was built into most, if not all LNG supply forecasts. Asian LNG buyers are committing real dollars to long term LNG deals, which we believe is the best validation for the LNG supply gap. Another validation, Shell, Total and others are aggressively competing to invest long term capital to partner in Qatar Petroleum’s massive 4.3 bcf/d LNG expansion despite plans to reduce fossil fuels production in the 2020s. And even more importantly to LNG suppliers, the return to long term LNG contracts provides the financing capacity to commit to brownfield LNG FIDs. The abrupt change by Asian LNG buyers to long term contracts is a game changer for LNG markets and sets the stage for brownfield LNG FIDs likely as soon as before year end 2021. It has to be brownfield LNG FIDs if the gap is coming bigger and sooner. And we return to our April 28 blog point, if brownfield LNG is needed, what about Shell looking at 1.8 bcf/d brownfield LNG Canada Phase 2? LNG Canada Phase 1 at 1.8 bcf/d capacity is already a material positive for Cdn natural gas producers. A FID on LNG Canada Phase 2 would be huge, meaning 3.6 bcf/d of Cdn natural gas will be tied to Asian LNG markets and not competing in the US against Henry Hub. And with a much shorter distance to Asian LNG markets. This is why we focus on global LNG markets for our views on the future value of Canadian natural gas.

Sea change in Asian LNG buyers is also the best validation of the LNG supply gap and big to LNG supply FIDs. Has the data changed or have the market participants changed in how they react to the data? We can’t recall exactly who said that on CNBC on July 12, it’s a question we always ask ourselves. In the LNG case, the data has changed with Mozambique LNG delays and that has directly resulted in market participants changing and entering into long term contracts. We can’t stress enough how important it is to see Asian LNG buyers move to long term LNG deals. (i) Validates the sooner and bigger LNG supply gap. We believe LNG markets should look at the last two weeks of new long term deals for Asian LNG buyers as being the validation of the LNG supply gap that clearly emerged post Total declaring force majeure on its 1.7 bcf/d Mozambique LNG Phase 1 that was under construction and on track for first LNG delivery in 2024. Since then, markets have started to realize the Mozambique delays are much more than 1.7 bcf/d. They have seen major LNG suppliers change their outlook to a more bullish LNG outlook and, most importantly, are now seeing Asian LNG buyers changing from trying to renegotiate long term LNG deals lower to entering into long term LNG deals to have security of supply. Asian LNG buyers are cozying up to Qatar in a prelude to the next wave of Asian buyer long term deals. What better validation is there than companies/countries putting their money where their mouth is. (ii) Provides financial commitment to help push LNG suppliers to FID. We believe these Asian LNG buyers are doing much more than validating a LNG supply gap to markets. The big LNG suppliers can move to FID based on adding more LNG supply to their portfolio, but having more long term deals provides the financial anchor/visibility to long term capital commitment from the buyers. Long term contracts will only help LNG suppliers get to FID.

It was always clear that the Mozambique LNG supply delay was 5.0 bcf/d, not just 1.7 bcf/d from Total Phase 1. LNG markets didn’t really react to Total’s April 26 declaration of force majeure on its 1.7 bcf/d Mozambique LNG Phase 1. This was an under construction project that was on time to deliver first LNG in 2024. It was in all LNG supply forecasts. There was no timeline given but, on the Apr 29 Q1 call, Total said that it expected any restart decision would be least a year away. If so, we believe that puts any actual construction at least 18 months away. There will be work to do just to get back to where they were when they were forced to stop development work on Phase 1. Surprisingly, markets didn’t look the broader implications, which is why we posted our 7-pg Apr 28 blog “*Multiple Brownfield LNG FIDs Now Needed To Fill New LNG Supply Gap From Mozambique Chaos? How About LNG Canada Phase 2?*” [\[LINK\]](#) We highlighted that Mozambique LNG delays were actually 5 bcf/d, not 1.7 bcf/d. And this 5 bcf/d of Mozambique LNG supply was built into most, if not all, LNG supply forecasts. The delay in Total Phase 1 would lead to a commensurate delay in its Mozambique LNG Phase 2 of 1.3 bcf/d. Total Phase 2 was to add 1.3 bcf/d. There was no firm in service date, but it was expected to

follow closely behind Phase 1 to maintain services. That would have put it originally in the 2026/2027 period. But if Phase 1 is pushed back at least 2 years, so will the follow on Phase 2, so more likely, it will be at least 2028/2029. The assumption for most, if not all, LNG forecasts was that Phase 2 would follow Phase 1. Exxon Rozuma Phase 1 of 2.0 bcf/d continues to be pushed back in timeline especially following Total Phase 1. Exxon's Mozambique Rozuma Phase 1 LNG will add 2.0 bcf/d and, pre-Covid, was originally expected to be in service in 2025. The project was being delayed and Total's force majeure has added to the delays. Rozuma onshore LNG facilities are right by Total. On June 20, we tweeted [\[LINK\]](#) on the Reuters report "*Exclusive: Galp says it won't invest in Rovuma until Mozambique ensures security*" [\[LINK\]](#). Galp is one of Exxon's partners in Rozuma. Reuters reported that Galp said they won't invest in Exxon's Rozuma LNG project until the government ensures security, that this may take a while, they won't be considering the project until after Total has reliably resumed work on its Phase 1, which likely puts any Rozuma decision until at least end of 2022 at the earliest. Galp has taken any Rozuma Phase 1 capex out of their new capex plans thru 2025 and will have to take out projects in their capex plan if Rozuma does come back to work. This puts Rozuma more likely 2028 at the earliest as opposed to before the original expectations of before 2025. Pre-pandemic, Exxon's March 6, 2019 Investor Day noted their operated Mozambique Rovuma LNG Phase 1 was to be 2 trains each with 1.0 bcf/d capacity for total initial capacity of 2.0 bcf/d with FID expected in 2019 and first LNG deliveries sometime before 2025. LNG forecasts had been assuming Exxon Rozuma would be onstream around 2025. The 2019 FID expectation was later pushed to be expected just before the March 2020 investor day. But the pandemic hit, and on March 21, 2020, we tweeted [\[LINK\]](#) on the Reuters story "*Exclusive: Coronavirus, gas slump put brakes on Exxon's giant Mozambique LNG plan*" [\[LINK\]](#) that noted Exxon was expected to delay the Rovuma FID. There was no timeline, but now, any FID is not expected until late 2022 at the earliest, that would push first LNG likely to at least 2028. What this means is that the Mozambique LNG delays are not 1.7 bcf/d but 5.0 bcf/d of projects that were in all, if not most, LNG supply forecasts. There is much more in our 7-pg blog. But Mozambique is what is driving a much bigger and sooner LNG supply gap starting ~2025 and stronger outlook for LNG prices

One of the reasons why it went under the radar is that major LNG suppliers played stupid on the Mozambique impact. It makes it harder for markets to see a big deal when the major LNG suppliers weren't making a big deal of Mozambique or playing stupid in the case of Cheniere in their May 4 Q1 call. In our May 9, 2021 Energy Tidbits memo, we said we had to chuckle when we saw Cheniere's response in the Q&A to its Q1 call on May 4 that they only know what we know from reading the Total releases on Mozambique and its impact on LNG markets. It's why we tweeted [\[LINK\]](#) "*Hmm! \$LNG says only know what we read on #LNG market impact from \$TOT \$XOM MZ LNG delays. Surely #TohokuElectric & other offtake buyers are reaching out to #Cheniere. MZ LNG delays is a game changer to LNG in 2020s, see SAF Group blog. Thx @olympemattei @TheTerminal #NatGas*". How could they not be talking to LNG buyers for Total and/or Exxon Mozambique LNG projects. In the Q1 Q&A, mgmt was asked about Mozambique and didn't know any more than what you or I have read. Surely, they were speaking to Asian LNG buyers who had planned to get LNG supply from Total Mozambique or Exxon Rozuma Mozambique or both. Mgmt is asked "*wanted to just kind of touch on the color use talking about for these supply curve. And are you able to kind of provide any thoughts on the Mozambique and a deferral with the project of that size on 13 and TPA being deferred by we see you have you noticed any impact to the market has is there any impact for stage 3 with that capacity? Thanks.*" Mgmt replies "*No. Look, I only know about the Mozambique delay with what I read as well as what you read that from total and an Exxon. And it's a sad situation and I hope everybody is safe and healthy that were there to experience that unrest but no I don't think it's, again it's a different business paradigm than what we offer. So, we offer a full value product, the customer doesn't have to invest in equity, customer doesn't have to worry about the E&P side of the business because, we've been able to both the by at our peak almost 7 Dec's a day of US NAT gas from almost a 100 different producers on 26 different pipelines and deliver it to our facilities. So we take care of a lot of what the customer needs*".

There are other LNG supply delays/interruptions beyond Mozambique. There have been a number of other smaller LNG delay or existing supply interruptions that add to Asian LNG buyers feeling less secure about the reliability of mid to long term LNG supply. Here are just a few examples. (i) Total Papua LNG 0.74 bcf/d. On June 8, we tweeted [\[LINK\]](#) "*Timing update Papua #LNG project. \$OSH June 8 update "2022 FEED, 2023 FID targeting 2027 first gas". \$TOT May 5 update didn't forecast 1st gas date. Papua is 2 trains w/ total capacity 0.74 bcf/d.*" We followed the tweet saying [\[LINK\]](#) "*Bigger #LNG supply gap being created >2025. Papua #LNG originally expected FID in 2020 so 1st LNG is 2 years delayed.*"

*Common theme - new LNG supply is being delayed ie. [Total] Mozambique. Don't forget need capacity>demand due to normal maintenance, etc. Positive for LNG." (ii) Chevron's Gorgon. A big LNG story in H2/20 was the emergence of weld quality issues in the propane heat exchangers at Train 2, which required additional downtime for repair. Train 2 was shut on May 23 with an original restart of July 11, but the repairs to the weld quality issues meant it didn't restart until late Nov. The same issue was found in Train 1 but repairs were completed. However extended downtime for the trains led to lower LNG volumes. Gorgon produced ~2.3 bcf/d in 2019 but was down to 2.0 bcf/d in 2020. (iii) Equinor's Melkøya 0.63 bcf/d shut down for 18 months due to a fire. A massive fire led to the Sept 28, 2020 shutdown of the 0.63 bcf/d Melkøya LNG facility in Norway. On April 26, Equinor released "Revised start-up date for Hammerfest LNG" [\[LINK\]](#) with regard to the 0.63 bcf/d Melkøya LNG facility. The original restart date was Oct 1, 2021 (ie. a 12 month shut down), but Equinor said "Due to the comprehensive scope of work and Covid-19 restrictions, the revised estimated start-up date is set to 31 March 2022". When we read the release, it seemed like Equinor was almost setting the stage for another potential delay in the restart date. Equinor had two qualifiers to this March 31, 2022 restart date. Equinor said "there is still some uncertainty related to the scope of the work" and "Operational measures to handle the Covid-19 situation have affected the follow-up progress after the fire. The project for planning and carrying out repairs of the Hammerfest LNG plant must always comply with applicable guidelines for handling the infection situation in society. The project has already introduced several measures that allow us to have fewer workers on site at the same time than previously expected. There is still uncertainty related to how the Covid-19 development will impact the project progress."*

Cheniere stopped the game playing the game on June 30. Our July 4, 2021 Energy Tidbits memo noted that it looks like Cheniere has stopped playing stupid with respect to the strengthening LNG market in 2021. We can't believe they thought they were fooling anyone, especially their competitors. Bu that week, they came out talking about how commercial discussions have picked up in 2021 and it's boosted their hope for a Texas (Corpus Christi) LNG expansion. On Wednesday, Platts reported "[Pickup in commercial talks boosts Cheniere's hopes on mid-scale LNG project](#)" [\[LINK\]](#) Platts wrote "*Cheniere Energy expects to make a "substantial dent" by the end of 2022 in building sufficient buyer support for a proposed mid-scale expansion at the site of its Texas liquefaction facility, Chief Commercial Officer Anatol Feygin said June 30 in an interview.*" "*As a result, he said, " The commercial engagement, I think it is very fair to say, has really picked up steam, and we are quite optimistic over the coming 12-18 months to make a substantial dent in that Stage 3 commercialization."* Platts also reported that Cheniere noted this has been a tightening market all year (ie would have been known by the May 4 Q1 call). Platts wrote "*We obviously find ourselves at the beginning of this year and throughout in a very tight market where prices today into Asia and into Europe are at levels that we frankly haven't seen in a decade-plus," Feygin said. "We've surpassed the economics that the industry saw post the Fukushima tragedy in March 2011, and that's happened in the shoulder period."* It's a public stance as to a more bullish LNG outlook


But we still see major LNG suppliers like Australia hinting but not outright saying that LNG supply gap is coming sooner. We have to believe Australia will be unveiling a sooner LNG supply gap in their September forecast. On June 28, we tweeted [\[LINK\]](#) on Australia's Resources and Energy Quarterly released on Monday [\[LINK\]](#) because there was a major change to their LNG outlook versus their March forecast. We tweeted "[#LNGSupplyGap. AU June fcast now sees #LNG mkt tighten post 2023 vs Mar fcast excess supply thru 2026. Why? \\$TOT Mozambique delays. See below SAF Apr 28 blog. Means brownfield LNG FID needed ie. like #LNGCanada Phase 2. #OOTT #NatGas](#)". Australia no longer sees supply exceeding demand thru 2026. In their March forecast, Australia said "*Nonetheless, given the large scale expansion of global LNG capacity in recent years, demand is expected to remain short of total supply throughout the projection period.*" Note this is thru 2026 ie. a LNG supply surplus thru 2026. But on June 28, Australia changed that LNG outlook and now says the LNG market may tighten beyond 2023. Interestingly, the June forecast only goes to 2023 and not to 2026 as in March. Hmmm! On Monday, they said "*Given the large scale expansion of global LNG capacity in recent years, import demand is expected to remain short of export capacity throughout the outlook period. Beyond 2023, the global LNG market may tighten, due to the April 2021 decision to indefinitely suspend the Mozambique LNG project, in response to rising security issues. This project has an annual nameplate capacity of 13 million tonnes, and was previously expected to start exporting LNG in 2024.*" 13 million tonnes is 1.7 bcf/d so they are only referring to Total Mozambique LNG Phase 1. So no surprise the change is Mozambique LNG driven but we have to believe the reason why they cut their forecast off this time at 2023 is that they are looking at trying to figure out what to forecast beyond 2023 in addition to Total Phase 1. And, importantly, we believe they will be changing their LNG forecast for more than Mozambique ie. India

demand that we highlight later in the blog. They didn't say anything else specific on Mozambique but, surely they have to also be delaying the follow on Total Phase 2 of 1.3 bcf/d and Exxon Rozuma Phase 1 of 2.0 bcf/d.

## Australia's LNG Outlook: March 2021 vs June 2021 Forecasts

### March 2021 LNG Outlook


Figure 7.1: LNG demand and world supply capacity



Source: Nexant (2021) World Gas Model; Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources (2021)

### June 2021 LNG Outlook

Figure 7.1: LNG demand and world supply capacity




Source: Nexant (2021) World Gas Model; Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources (2021)

Source: Australia Resources and Energy Quarterly

Clearly Asian LNG buyers did the math, saw the new LNG supply gap and were working the phones in March/April/May trying to lock up long term supply. We wrote extensively on the Total Mozambique LNG situation before the April 26 force majeure as it was obvious that delays were coming to a project counted on for first LNG in 2024. Total had shut down Phase 1 development in December for 3 months due to the violence and security risks. It restarted development on Wed March 24, violence/attacks immediately resumed for 3 consecutive days, and then Total suspended development on Sat March 27. That's why no one should have been surprised by the April 26 force majeure. Asian LNG buyers were also seeing this and could easily do the same math we were doing and saw a bigger and sooner LNG supply gap. They were clearly working the phones with a new priority to lock up long term LNG supply. Major long term deals don't happen overnight, so it makes sense that we started to see these new Asian long term LNG deals start at the end of June.

A big pivot from trying to renegotiate down long term LNG deals or being happy to let long term contracts expire and replace with spot/short term LNG deals. This is a major pivot or abrupt turn on the Asian LNG buyers contracting strategy for the 2020s. There is the natural reduction of long term contracts as contracts reach their term. But with the weakness in LNG prices in 2019 and 2020, Asian LNG buyers weren't trying to extend long term contracts, rather, the push was to try to renegotiate down its long term LNG deals. The reason was clear, as spot prices for LNG were way less than long term contract prices. And this led to their LNG contracting strategy – move to increase the proportion of spot LNG deliveries out of total LNG deliveries. Shell's LNG Outlook 2021 was on Feb 25, 2021 and included the below graphs. The spot LNG price derivation from long term prices in 2019 and 2020 made sense for Asian LNG buyers to try to change their contract mix. Yesterday, Maeil Business News Korea reported on the new Qatar/Kogas long term LNG deal with its report "*Korea may face LNG supply cliff or pay hefty price after long-term supplies run out*" [\[LINK\]](#), which highlighted this very concept – Korea wasn't worried about trying to extend expiring long term LNG contracts. Maeil wrote "*Seoul in 2019 secured a long-term LNG supply contract with the U.S. for annual 15.8 million tons over a 15-year period. But even with the latest two LNG supply contracts, the Korean government needs extra 6 million tons or more of LNG supplies to keep up the current power pipeline. By 2024, Korea's long-term supply contracts for 9 million tons of LNG will expire - 4.92 million tons on contract with Qatar and 4.06 million tons from Oman, according to a government official who asked to be unnamed.*"

## Spot LNG deliveries and Spot deviation from term price



Source: Shell LNG Outlook 2021 on Feb 25, 2021

Asian LNG buyers moving to long term LNG deals provide financing capacity for brownfield LNG FIDs. We believe this abrupt change and return to long term LNG deals is even more important to LNG suppliers who want to FID new projects. The big LNG players like Shell can FID new LNG supply without new long term contracts as they can build into their supply options to fill their portfolio of LNG contracts. But that doesn't mean the big players don't want long term LNG supply deals, as having long term LNG contracts provide better financing capacity for any LNG supplier. It takes big capex for LNG supply and long term deals make the financing easier.

Four Asian buyer long term LNG deals in the last week. It was pretty hard to miss a busy week for reports of new Asian LNG buyer long term LNG deals. There were two deals from Qatar Petroleum, one from Petronas and one from BP. The timing fits, it's about 3 months after Total Mozambique LNG problems became crystal clear. And as noted later, there are indicators that more Asian buyer LNG deals are coming.

Petronas/CNOOC is 10 yr supply deal for 0.3 bcf/d. On July 7, we tweeted [\[LINK\]](#) on the confirmation of a big positive to Cdn natural gas with the Petronas announcement [\[LINK\]](#) of a new 10 year LNG supply deal for 0.3 bcf/d with China's CNOOC. The deal also has special significance to Canada. (i) Petronas said "This long-term supply agreement also includes supply from LNG Canada when the facility commences its operations by middle of the decade". This is a reminder of the big positive to Cdn natural gas in the next 3 to 4 years – the start up of LNG Canada Phase 1 is ~1.8 bcf/d capacity. This is natural gas that will no longer be moving south to the US or east to eastern Canada, instead it will be going to Asia. This will provide a benefit for all Western Canada natural gas. (ii) First ever AECO linked LNG deal. It's a pretty significant event for a long term Asia LNG deal to now have an AECO link. Petronas wrote "The deal is for 2.2 million tonnes per annum (MTPA) for a 10-year period, indexed to a combination of the Brent and Alberta Energy Company (AECO) indices. The term deal between PETRONAS and CNOOC is valued at approximately USD 7 billion over ten years." 2.2 MTPA is 0.3 bcf/d. (iii) Reminds of LNG Canada's competitive advantage for low greenhouse gas emissions. Petronas said "Once ready for operations, the LNG Canada project paves the way for PETRONAS to supply low greenhouse gas (GHG) emission LNG to the key demand markets in Asia."

Qatar Petroleum/CPC (Taiwan) is 15 yr supply deal for 0.16 bcf/d. Pre Covid, Qatar was getting pressured to renegotiate lower its long term LNG contract prices. Now, it's signing a 15 year deal. On July 9, they entered in a new small long term LNG sales deal [\[LINK\]](#), a 15-yr LNG Sale and Purchase Agreement with CPC Corporation in Taiwan to supply it ~0.60 bcf/d of LNG. LNG deliveries are set to begin in January 2022. H.E. Minister for Energy Affairs & CEO of Qatar Petroleum Al-Kaabi said "We are pleased to enter into this long term LNG SPA, which is another milestone in our relationship with CPC, which dates back to almost three decades. We look forward to commencing deliveries under this SPA and to continuing our supplies as a trusted and reliable global LNG provider." The pricing was reported to be vs a basket of crudes.

BP/Guangzhou Gas, a 12-yr supply deal for 0.13 bcf/d. On July 9, there was a small long term LNG supply deal with BP and Guangzhou Gas (China). Argus reported [\[LINK\]](#) BP had signed a 12 year LNG supply deal with Guangzhou Gas (GG), a Chinese city's gas distributor, which starts in 2022. The contract prices are to be linked to an index of international crude prices. Although GG typically gets its LNG from the spot market, it used a tender in late April for ~0.13 bcf/d starting in 2022. BP's announcement looks to be for most of the tender, so it's a small deal. But it fit into the trend this week of seeing long term LNG supply deals to Asia. This was intended to secure deliveries to the firm's Xiaohudao import terminal which will become operational in August 2022.

Qatar/Korea Gas is a 20-yr deal to supply 0.25 bcf/d. On Monday, Reuters reported [\[LINK\]](#) "South Korea's energy ministry said on Monday it had signed a 20-year liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply agreement with Qatar for the next 20 years starting in 2025. South Korea's state-run Korea Gas Corp (036460.KS) will buy 2 million tonnes of LNG annually from Qatar Petroleum". There was no disclosure of pricing.

More Asian buyer long term LNG deals (ie. India) will be coming. There are going to be more Asian buyer long term LNG deals coming soon. Our July 11, 2021 Energy Tidbits highlighted how India's new petroleum minister Hardeep Singh Puri (appointed July 8) hit the ground running with what looks to be a priority to set the stage for more India long term LNG deals with Qatar. On July 10, we retweeted [\[LINK\]](#) "New India Petroleum Minister hits ground running. What else w/ Qatar but #LNG. Must be #Puri setting stage for long term LNG supply deal(s). Fits sea change of buyers seeing #LNGSupplyGap (see SAF Apr 28 blog <http://safgroup.ca>) & wanting to tie up LNG supply. #OOTT". It's hard to see any other conclusion after seeing what we call a sea change in LNG buyer mentality with a number of long term LNG deals this week. Puri tweeted [\[LINK\]](#) "Discussed ways of further strengthening mutual cooperation between our two countries in the hydrocarbon sector during a warm courtesy call with Qatar's Minister of State for Energy Affairs who is also the President & CEO of @qatarpetroleum HE Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi". As noted above, we believe there is a sea change in LNG markets that was driven by the delay in 5 bcf/d of LNG supply from Mozambique (Total Phase 1 & Phase 2, and Exxon Rozuma Phase 1) that was counted on all LNG supply projections for the 2020s. Puri's tweet seems to be him setting the stage for India long term LNG supply deals with Qatar.

Supermajors are aggressively competing to commit 30+ year capital to Qatar's LNG expansion despite stated goal to reduce fossil fuels production. It's not just Asian LNG buyers who are now once again committing long term capital to securing LNG supply, it's also supermajors all bidding to be able to commit big capex to part of Qatar Petroleum's 4.3 bcf/d LNG expansion. Qatar Petroleum received a lot of headlines following their June 23 announcement on its LNG expansion [\[LINK\]](#) on how they received bids for double the equity being offered. And there were multiple reports that these are on much tougher terms for Qatar's partners. Qatar Petroleum CEO Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi specifically noted that, among the bidders, were Shell, Total and Exxon. Shell and Total have two of the most ambitious plans to reduce fossil fuels production in the 2020's, yet are competing to allocate long term capital to increase fossil fuels production. And Shell and Total are also two of the global LNG supply leaders. It has to be because they are seeing a bigger and sooner LNG supply gap.

Remember Qatar's has a massive expansion but India alone needs 3x the Qatar expansion LNG capacity. In addition to the competition to be Qatar Petroleum's partners, we remind that, while this is a massive 4.3 bcf/d LNG expansion, India alone sees its LNG import growing by ~13 bcf/d to 2030. The Qatar announcement reminded they see a LNG supply gap and continued high LNG prices. We had a 3 part tweet. (i) First, we highlighted [\[LINK\]](#) "1/3. #LNGSupplyGap coming. big support for @qatarpetroleum expansion to add 4.3 bcf/d LNG. but also say "there is a lack of investments that could cause a significant shortage in gas between 2025-2030" #NatGas #LNG". This is after QPC accounts for their big LNG expansion. The QPC release said "However, His Excellency Al-Kaabi voiced concern that during the global discussion on energy transition, there is a lack of investment in oil and gas projects, which could drive energy prices higher by stating that "while gas and LNG are important for the energy transition, there is a lack of investments that could cause a significant shortage in gas between 2025-2030, which in turn could cause a spike in the gas market." (ii) Second, this is a big 4.3 bcf/d expansion, but India alone has 3x the increase in LNG import demand. We tweeted [\[LINK\]](#) "2/3. Adding 4.3 bcf/d is big, but dwarfed by items like India. #Petronet gave 1st specific forecast for what it means if #NatGas is to be 15%

of energy mix by 2030 - India will need to increase #LNG imports by ~13 bcf/d. See SAF Group June 20 Energy Tidbits memo.” (iii) Third, Qatar’s supply gap warning is driven by the lack of investments in LNG supply. We agree, but note that the lack of investment is in great part due to the delays in both projects under construction and in FIDs that were supposed to be done in 2019. We tweeted [\[LINK\]](#) “3/3. #LNGSupplyGap is delay driven. \$TOT Mozambique Phase 1 delay has chain effect, backs up 5 bcf/d. See SAF Group Apr 28 blog Multiple Brownfield LNG FIDs Now Needed To Fill New #LNG Supply Gap From Mozambique Chaos? How About LNG Canada Phase 2? #NatGas.”

Seems like many missed India’s first specific LNG forecast to 2030. Our June 20, 2021 Energy Tidbits memo highlighted the first India forecast that we have seen to estimate the required growth in natural gas consumption and LNG imports if India is to meet its target for natural gas to be 15% of its energy mix by 2030. India will need to increase LNG imports by ~13 bcf/d or 3 times the size of the Qatar LNG expansion. Our June 6, 2021 Energy Tidbits noted the June 4 tweet from India’s Energy Minister Dharmendra Pradhan [\[LINK\]](#) reinforcing the 15% goal “We are rapidly deploying natural gas in our energy mix with the aim to increase the share of natural gas from the current 6% to 15% by 2030.” But last week, Petronet CEO AK Singh gave a specific forecast. Reuters report “LNG’s share of Indian gas demand to rise to 70% by 2030: Petronet CEO” [\[LINK\]](#) included Petronet’s forecast if India is to hit its target for natural gas to be 15% of energy mix by 2030. Singh forecasts India’s natural gas consumption would increase from current 5.5 bcf/d to 22.6 bcf/d in 2030. And LNG shares would increase from 50% to 70% of natural gas consumption ie. an increase in LNG imports of ~13 bcf/d from just under 3 bcf/d to 15.8 bcf/d in 2030. Singh did not specifically note his assumption for India’s natural gas production, but we can back into the assumption that India natural gas production grows from just under 3 bcf/d to 6.8 bcf/d. It was good to finally see India come out with a specific forecast for 2030 natural gas consumption and LNG imports if India is to get natural gas to 15% of its energy mix in 2030. Petronet’s Singh forecasts India natural gas consumption to increase from 5.5 bcf/d to 22.6 bcf/d in 2030. This forecast is pretty close to our forecast in our Oct 23, 2019 blog “Finally, Some Visibility That India Is Moving Towards Its Target For Natural Gas To Be 15% Of Its Energy Mix By 2030”. Here part of what we wrote in Oct 2019. “It’s taken a year longer than we expected, but we are finally getting visibility that India is taking significant steps towards India’s goal to have natural gas be 15% of its energy mix by 2030. On Wednesday, we posted a SAF blog [\[LINK\]](#) “Finally, Some Visibility That India Is Moving Towards Its Target For Natural Gas To Be 15% Of Its Energy Mix By 2030”. Our 2019 blog estimate was for India natural gas demand to be 24.0 bcf/d in 2030 (vs Singh’s 22.6 bcf/d) and for LNG import growth of +18.4 bcf/d to 2030 (vs Singh’s +13 bcf/d). The difference in LNG would be due to our Oct 2019 forecast higher natural gas consumption by 1.4 bcf/d plus Singh forecasting India natural gas production +4 bcf/d to 2030. Note India production peaked at 4.6 bcf/d in 2010.

Bigger, nearer LNG supply gap + Asian buyers moving to long term LNG deals = LNG players forced to at least look at what brownfield LNG projects they could advance and move to FID. All we have seen since our April 28 blog is more validation of the bigger, nearer LNG supply gap. And now market participants (Asian LNG buyers) are reacting to the new data by locking up long term supply. Cheniere noted how the pickup in commercial engagement means they “are quite optimistic over the coming 12-18 months to make a substantial dent in that Stage 3 commercialization.” Cheniere can’t be the only LNG supplier having new commercial discussions. It’s why we believe the Mozambique delays + Asian LNG buyers moving to long term deals will effectively force major LNG players to look to see if there are brownfield LNG projects they should look to advance. Prior to March/April, no one would think Shell or other major LNG players would be considering any new LNG FIDs in 2021. Covid forced all the big companies into capital reduction mode and debt reduction mode. But Brent oil is now solidly over \$70, and LNG prices are over \$13 this summer and the world’s economic and oil and gas demand outlook are increasing with vaccinations. And we are starting to see companies move to increasing capex with the higher cash flows. The theme in Q3 reporting is going to be record or near record oil and gas cash flows, reduced debt levels and increasing returns to shareholders. And unless new mutations prevent vaccinations from returning the world to normal, we suspect that major LNG players, like other oil and gas companies, will be looking to increase capex as they approve 2022 budgets. The outlook for the future has changed dramatically in the last 8 months. The question facing major LNG players like Shell is should they look to FID new LNG brownfield projects in the face of an increasing LNG supply gap that is going to hit faster and harder and Asian LNG buyers prepared to do long term deals. We expect these decisions to be looked at before the end of 2021 for 2022 capex budget/releases. One wildcard that could force these decisions sooner is the already stressed out global supply chain. We have to believe that discussion there will be pressure for more Asian LNG buyer long term deals sooner than later.



For Canada, does the increasing LNG supply gap provide the opportunity to at least consider a LNG Canada Phase 2 FID over the next 6 months? Our view on Shell and other LNG players is unchanged since our April 28 blog. Shell is no different than any other major LNG supplier in always knowing the market and that the oil and gas outlook is much stronger than 9 months ago. Even 3 months post our April 28 blog, we haven't heard any significant talks on how major LNG players will be looking at FID for new brownfield LNG projects. We don't have any inside contacts at Shell or LNG Canada, but that is no different than when we looked at the LNG markets in September 2017 and saw the potential for Shell to FID LNG Canada in 2018. We posted a September 20, 2017 blog "*China's Plan To Increase Natural Gas To 10% Of Its Energy Mix Is A Global Game Changer Including For BC LNG*" [\[LINK\]](#). Last time, it was a demand driven supply gap, this time, it's a supply driven supply gap. We have to believe any major LNG player, including Shell, will be at least looking at their brownfield LNG project list and seeing if they should look to advance FID later in 2021. Shell has LNG Canada Phase 2, which would add 2 additional trains or approx. 1.8 bcf/d. And an advantage to an FID would be that Shell would be able to commit to its existing contractors and fabricators for a continuous construction cycle following on LNG Canada Phase 1 ie. to help keep a lid on capital costs. We believe maintaining a continuous construction cycle is even more important given the stressed global supply chain. No one is talking about the need for these new brownfield LNG projects, but, unless some major change in views happen, we believe its inevitable that these brownfield LNG FID internal discussions will be happening in H2/21. Especially since the oil and gas price outlook is much stronger than it was in the fall and companies will be looking to increase capex in 2022 budgets.

A LNG Canada Phase 2 would be a big plus to Cdn natural gas. LNG Canada Phase 1 is a material natural gas development as its 1.8 bcf/d capacity represents approx. 20 to 25% of Cdn gas export volumes to the US. The EIA data shows US pipeline imports of Cdn natural gas as 6.83 bcf/d in 2020, 7.36 bcf/d in 2019, 7.70 bcf/d in 2018, 8.89 bcf/d in 2017, 7.97 bcf/d in 2016, 7.19 bcf/d in 2015 and 7.22 bcf/d in 2014. A LNG Canada Phase 2 FID would be a huge plus for Cdn natural gas. It would allow another ~1.8 bcf/d of Cdn natural gas to be priced against pricing points other than Henry Hub. And it would provide demand offset versus Trudeau if he moves to make electricity "emissions free" and not his prior "net zero emissions". Mozambique has been a game changer to LNG outlook creating a bigger and sooner LNG supply gap. And with a stronger tone to oil and natural gas prices in 2021, the LNG supply gap will at least provide the opportunity for Shell to consider FID for its brownfield LNG Canada Phase 2 and provide big support to Cdn natural gas for the back half of the 2020s. And perhaps if LNG Canada is exporting 3.6 bcf/d from two phases, it could help flip Cdn natural gas to a premium vs US natural gas especially if Biden is successful in reducing US domestic natural gas consumption for electricity. The next six months will be very interesting to watch for LNG markets and Cdn natural gas valuations. Imagine the future value of Cdn natural gas is there was visibility for 3.6 bcf/d of Western Canada natural gas to be exported to Asia.

## Pemex Refinery Runs Still Subdued as Fire Impact Lingers

2024-01-31 17:46:56.569 GMT

By Lucia Kassai

(Bloomberg) -- Pemex increased runs at its refineries in Mexico in December but is still struggling to bring utilization rates back to levels seen before a spate of fires at multiple plants 8 months ago, according to company data compiled by Bloomberg.

\* Utilization rate rose to 50.6%, highest since April

\*\* In May, half of the company's refineries were hit by fires; prior to that, they were operating at 56.2% of capacity

\*\* Mexico's six refineries have capacity to process 1.627m b/d of crude, according to Pemex

\* For the full year, refineries processed 792k b/d in 2023, down 2.9% from the previous year

\* Pemex didn't disclose data for its new Olmeca refinery, also known as Dos Bocas, which started operations in September

\*\* Refinery should start producing fuels on Feb. 28, president Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador said on the X platform

\* Here's the data by refinery:

Refinery	December (b/d)	m/m	y/y	Capacity use	NOTE
Cadereyta	155,845	5.9%	14%	56.7%	highest since June 2022
Madero	86,683	418%	-20%	45.6%	4-month high
Tula	171,677	-23%	12%	54.5%	
Salamanca	117,581	-12%	-20%	53.4%	
Minatitlan	154,938	19%	62%	54.4%	highest since Nov. 2021
Salina Cruz	136,149	20%	-29%	41.3%	
Dos Bocas	not available				
Total	822,872	7.9%	-1.1%	50.6%	highest since April

To contact the reporter on this story:

Lucia Kassai in Houston at [lkassai@bloomberg.net](mailto:lkassai@bloomberg.net)

To contact the editors responsible for this story:

Catherine Traywick at [ctraywick@bloomberg.net](mailto:ctraywick@bloomberg.net)

David Marino

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01/30/2024 06:46:58 [BN] Bloomberg News

### Russian Oil Refining Holds Up Despite Drone Attack on Plant

- Volumes just nudged lower in latest week, versus December
- Ukrainian drones recently attacked Novatek, Rosneft facilities


By Bloomberg News

(Bloomberg) -- Russia's oil-processing rates remained relatively resilient in the latest week, as the impact of attacks on refinery operations was yet to fully materialize and other facilities churned through more crude.

The country processed 5.49 million barrels a day in the seven days through Jan. 24, the week when Ukrainian drones intensified attacks on Russia's downstream facilities, a person with knowledge of industry data said. That's just 56,000 barrels a day below the average for most of December, Bloomberg calculations show.

As Moscow's war in Ukraine approaches the two-year mark, drone attacks by Ukraine on Russian downstream facilities have become more disruptive. That's threatening the nation's ability to export petroleum products and supply the domestic fuel market.

Oil exports are crucial for the Kremlin, as the energy industry provides about 30% of total budget revenues. The flow of petrodollars is helping to finance the war and fund domestic spending ahead of presidential elections in March.



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Two major export-focused refineries – Novatek PJSC's condensate-processing plant on the Baltic coast and Rosneft PJSC's Tuapse refinery near the Black Sea – recently halted operations after drone attacks. Combined, they accounted for almost 5% of the nation's daily processing average in December.

### Drone Attacks

Daily crude-processing volumes at Novatek's facility in Ust-Luga more than halved to 64,000 barrels in the week to Jan. 24 compared with most of December, according to the person with knowledge of data. The figure includes volumes for a few days before the plant was hit on Jan. 21.

The Tuapse refinery was attacked on Jan. 25, just outside of the period for the latest industry data. Daily processing rates there averaged 163,000 barrels in the week to Jan. 24, some 38,000 barrels a day above the average for most of December, the person said.

Read More: [Russia's Tuapse Refinery Halted at Least Into February by Attack](#)

The disruptions come on top of an incident that damaged equipment and led to lower processing at Lukoil PJSC's Norski refinery in the Volga region. Norski, which mainly focuses on domestic fuel supplies, accounted for more than 5% of the nation's average processing for most of December.

While the refinery's daily processing recovered to more than 270,000 barrels in the week to Jan. 24, its runs still remain roughly 18,000 barrels a day below the December average.

Novatek, Rosneft and Lukoil didn't immediately respond to requests for a comment on damage assessments and the time frame for return to full-scale operations at their facilities.

The drop in refining at those sites has been partially made up elsewhere. Processing rose by a combined 131,000 barrels a day at Gazprom Neft PJSC's refineries in Moscow and Omsk, the Afipsky plant in the southern Krasnodar region, the TAIF refinery in the Volga region and Surgutneftegas PJSC's Kirishi facility.

Russia's daily diesel output in the seven days to Jan. 24 was almost flat compared with the average for the most of December, according to Bloomberg calculations based on data from the person familiar. Gasoline production fell almost 3.5% amid lower volumes at Norski.

### Related tickers:

LKOH RM (LUKOIL PJSC)

NVTK RM (Novatek PJSC)

ROSN RM (Rosneft Oil Co PJSC)

To contact Bloomberg News staff for this story:  
James Herron in London at [jherron9@bloomberg.net](mailto:jherron9@bloomberg.net)

To contact the editors responsible for this story:  
James Herron at [jherron9@bloomberg.net](mailto:jherron9@bloomberg.net)  
Nicholas Larkin

01/30/2024 05:34:04 [BN] Bloomberg News

### Russia's Seaborne Crude Exports Are Battered by Winter Storms

Weekly flows slump to the lowest in almost two months

By Julian Lee


(Bloomberg) -- Russia's seaborne crude shipments fell further last week, with flows from a key Pacific port that supplies Chinese buyers halted for five days by high winds and freezing temperatures.

About 3.09 million barrels a day of crude were shipped from Russian ports in the four weeks to Jan. 28, tanker-tracking data monitored by Bloomberg show. That was down by about 250,000 barrels a day from the revised figure for the period to Jan. 21.

The more volatile weekly average fell by about 120,000 barrels a day to an eight-week low of 2.8 million. Exports were hit by the storm that closed Kozmino and by four days of maintenance at the Baltic port of Ust-Luga, where loadings had been interrupted earlier by a Ukrainian drone strike on a nearby processing plant.

The impact of last week's weather and maintenance disruptions was partly offset by a record-equaling 11 tankers loaded at Primorsk.

Russian crude destined for Asian buyers from western ports continues to pass through the Red Sea, despite attacks on merchant vessels from Yemen-based Houthi rebels.



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Russia has said it will cut oil exports by 500,000 barrels a day below the May–June average during the first quarter, after several other members of the OPEC+ group agreed to make further output curbs. The Russian cut will be shared between crude shipments, which will be reduced by 300,000 barrels a day, and refined products. The four-week average crude measure was about 500,000 barrels a day below the May–June level.

In the Middle East, the Houthi militants have assured Russia and China that the group is “ready to ensure the safe passage of their ships in the Red Sea.” However, the first tanker reported to have been struck off Yemen was carrying Russian crude. The Sai Baba, carrying a cargo of Russian Urals crude, was hit by a drone off Yemen on Dec. 23, according to a post by the US Central Command on X, formerly known as Twitter. The Marlin Luanda, struck by a missile fired by the Houthis and set on fire on Friday, was carrying Russian naphtha.


Russia is still struggling to sell its Sokol crude. Twenty cargoes, totaling about 14 million barrels, are sitting on tankers that appear to be going nowhere. Another two 700,000 barrel cargoes are on their way to join them.

For the first time since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, shipments to Europe have hit zero on a four-week average basis, with Bulgaria – Moscow's last customer in the region – taking nothing in the four weeks to Jan. 28.

The gross value of Russia's crude exports fell to a five-month low of \$1.32 billion in the seven days to Jan. 28 from a revised \$1.33 billion the previous week. Meanwhile, four-week average income also slipped, down by \$102 million to a six-month low of \$1.41 billion a week.

### Flows by Destination

Russia's seaborne crude flows in the four weeks to Jan. 28 fell to 3.09 million barrels a day. That was down from a revised 3.34 million barrels a day in the period to Jan. 21, to the lowest in almost two months. Shipments were about 500,000 barrels a day below the average seen in May and June, or about 200,000 barrels a day below Russia's first quarter target.



All figures exclude cargoes identified as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO grade. Those are shipments made by KazTransoil JSC that transit Russia for export through Novorossiysk and the Baltic port of Ust-Luga and are not subject to European Union sanctions or a price cap.

The Kazakh barrels are blended with crude of Russian origin to create a uniform export grade. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan has rebranded its cargoes to distinguish them from those shipped by Russian companies.

- **Asia**

Observed shipments to Russia’s Asian customers, including those showing no final destination, fell to a five-week low in the 28 days to Jan. 28. Flows dropped to 2.77 million barrels a day from a revised 3 million in the period to Jan. 21.

About 980,000 barrels a day of crude was loaded onto tankers heading to China in the four weeks to Jan. 28. China’s seaborne imports are boosted by about 800,000 barrels a day of crude delivered directly from Russia by pipeline, either directly, or via Kazakhstan.

Flows on ships signaling destinations in India averaged about 940,000 barrels a day in the four weeks to Jan. 28.


Both the Chinese and Indian figures will rise as the discharge ports become clear for vessels that are not currently showing final destinations.

The equivalent of about 540,000 barrels a day was on vessels signaling Port Said or Suez in Egypt, or are expected

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to be transferred from one ship to another off the South Korean port of Yeosu. Those voyages typically end at ports in India or China and show up in the chart below as “Unknown Asia” until a final destination becomes apparent. This figure includes more than 15 million barrels of Sokol crude destined for India that has been stuck on ships since late November.

The “Other Unknown” volumes, running at about 270,000 barrels a day in the four weeks to Jan. 28, are those on tankers showing no clear destination. Most of those cargoes originate from Russia’s western ports and go on to transit the Suez Canal, but some could end up in Turkey. Others could be moved from one vessel to another, with most such transfers now taking place in the Mediterranean, off the coast of Greece.




### Europe and Turkey

Russia’s seaborne crude exports to European countries have collapsed since Moscow’s troops invaded Ukraine in February 2022. A market that consumed about 1.5 million barrels a day of short-haul seaborne crude, coming from export terminals in the Baltic, Black Sea and Arctic has been lost almost completely, to be replaced by long-haul destinations in Asia that are much more costly and time-consuming to serve.

Combined flows to Turkey and Bulgaria, Russia’s only two remaining buyers close to its western ports, fell to about 280,000 barrels a day in the four weeks to Jan. 28, tanker-tracking data show. That’s down from about 310,000 barrels a day in the period to Jan. 21 and the lowest since September.

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Exports to Turkey fell to a 16-week low of about 280,000 barrels a day in the four weeks to Jan. 28.

Flows to Bulgaria fell to zero in the most recent four-week period. Bulgaria’s parliament approved a measure to end imports of Russian oil from March, nine months earlier than permitted under an exemption to EU sanctions on purchases of Moscow’s oil.

No Russian crude was shipped to northern European countries, or those in the Mediterranean in the four weeks to Jan. 28.

Vessel-tracking data are cross-checked against port agent reports as well as flows and ship movements reported by other information providers including Kpler and Vortexa Ltd.

**Export Value**


Following the abolition of export duty on Russian crude, we have begun to track the gross value of seaborne crude exports, using Argus Media price data and our own tanker tracking.

The gross value of Russia’s crude exports fell to a five-month low of \$1.32 billion in the seven days to Jan. 28 from a revised \$1.33 billion the previous week. Meanwhile four-week average income also slipped, down by \$102 million to a six-month low of \$1.41 billion a week. The four-week average peaked at \$2.17 billion a week in the period to June 19, 2022. The highest it reached last year was \$2 billion a week in the period to Oct. 22.

During the first four weeks after the Group of Seven nations’ price cap on Russian crude exports came into effect in

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early December 2022, the value of seaborne flows fell to a low of \$930 million a week, but soon recovered.



The chart above shows a gross value of Russia’s seaborne oil exports on a weekly and four–week average basis. The value is calculated by multiplying the average weekly crude price from Argus Media Group by the weekly export flow from each port. For shipments from the Baltic and Arctic ports we use the Urals FOB Primorsk dated, London close, midpoint price. For shipments from the Black Sea we use the Urals Med Aframax FOB Novorossiysk dated, London close, midpoint price. For Pacific shipments we use the ESPO blend FOB Kozmino prompt, Singapore close, midpoint price.

Export duty was abolished at the end of 2023 as part of Russia’s long–running tax reform plans.

**Ships Leaving Russian Ports**

The following table shows the number of ships leaving each export terminal.


A total of 26 tankers loaded 19.6 million barrels of Russian crude in the week to Jan. 28, vessel–tracking data and port agent reports show. That was down by about 830,000 barrels from the revised figure for the previous week.

A storm in the Pacific halved exports of ESPO crude from Kozmino. Tankers anchored in Nakhodka Bay waiting to load left the area in the early hours of Monday Jan. 22 and didn’t return until Friday.

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Maintenance work cut exports from the Baltic port of Ust-Luga in the week to Jan. 28, with a four-day gap in loadings. A drone attack on a neighboring condensate processing plant briefly interrupted loading at Ust-Luga the previous week, but both crude berths at the terminal were in use again by Monday evening.

The losses at these two ports were partly offset by a record-equaling 11 tankers loaded at Primorsk during the week.



All figures exclude cargoes identified as Kazakhstan's KEBCO grade. Three cargoes of KEBCO were loaded at Ust-Luga during the week.

### NOTES

Note: This story forms part of a weekly series tracking shipments of crude from Russian export terminals and the gross value of those flows. Weeks run from Monday to Sunday. The next update will be on **Tuesday, Feb. 6**.

Note: All figures exclude cargoes owned by Kazakhstan's KazTransOil JSC, which transit Russia and are shipped from Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga as KEBCO grade crude.

If you are reading this story on the Bloomberg terminal, click [here](#) for a link to a PDF file of four-week average flows from Russia to key destinations.

--With assistance from Sherry Su.

To contact the author of this story:  
 Julian Lee in London at [jlee1627@bloomberg.net](mailto:jlee1627@bloomberg.net)

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John Deane at [jdeane3@bloomberg.net](mailto:jdeane3@bloomberg.net)

01/31/2024 07:04:12 [BN] Bloomberg News

### Russian Fuel Exports Reverse Earlier Slump to Hit Six-Week High


By Julian Lee

(Bloomberg) -- Russia's refined fuel exports climbed to the highest in a month and a half last week as flows of most finished products rose, reversing the slump seen over the previous seven days.

Exports averaged 2.63 million barrels a day in the four weeks to Jan. 28, according to data compiled by Bloomberg from analytics firm Vortexa Ltd. That's about 134,000 barrels, or 5%, higher than the revised figure for the previous week. The more volatile weekly flows surged 52% from the revised figure for the previous week to 2.99 million barrels a day in the fourth week of January.

Moscow has pledged to curb exports of refined products by 200,000 barrels a day in the first quarter, compared with the May-June 2023 baseline, estimated at 2.28 million barrels a day from the Vortexa data. That puts the latest four-week average shipments 528,000 barrels a day above the first quarter target. The weekly figure exceeded the target by 884,000 barrels a day.

Russian seaborne crude exports fell below their target level in the four weeks to Jan. 28, with storms battering exports last week. Overall shipments of crude and refined products in the most recent four-week period were broadly in line with the target. Russia has made its pledged cuts in overseas supplies of oil, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said on Saturday.



Drone attacks on several Russian refineries could impact refined products exports in the coming weeks. Plants at Ust-Luga on the Baltic and Tuapse on the Black Sea have both been hit, while a drone was shot down near the refinery at

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
Yaroslavl. Damage to a compressor unit at the Norsi refinery in Nizhny Novgorod adds to issues affecting the refining sector.

Here’s a breakdown of shipments from Russian ports for the week to Jan. 28:

Diesel and gasoil exports jumped by 42% from the previous week to 1.43 million barrels a day, according to the Vortexa data. That’s the highest since August.

Shipments to buyers in Africa jumped by 82% to exceed 500,000 barrels a day, their highest in five months.


While Russia has eased earlier curbs on overseas shipments of road fuels, some restrictions on the export of winter-grade diesel remain. The energy ministry has allowed outflows only for fuels delivered to ports by pipeline and refiners need to keep at least 50% of their output at home.




Though gasoline makes up only a small part of Russia’s refined product exports, shipments dropped sharply in the week to Jan. 28. The decline comes after an incident at Lukoil’s Norsi refinery, with the government reported by IFX to be considering a ban. Shipments fell by 46% to 106,000 barrels a day from the revised figure for the previous week.

Naphtha shipments rose by 12% to about 301,000 barrels a day. One cargo of jet fuel was loaded from St. Petersburg in the week to Jan. 28, according to Vortexa, and is heading to Mexico.

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Fuel oil exports jumped by 64% to a four-week high of 757,000 barrels a day, with a sharp drop in cargoes sailing toward the Middle East more than offset by increased shipments to Asian and African destinations.



Exports of refinery feedstocks like vacuum gasoil soared to 354,000 barrels a day from a revised 36,000 barrels a day the previous week, taking them to a five-week high.

Cargo volumes and destinations are likely to be revised as more port data or vessel information becomes available.

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To contact the reporter on this story:

[Julian Lee in London at \[jlee1627@bloomberg.net\]\(mailto:jlee1627@bloomberg.net\)](#)

To contact the editors responsible for this story:

[Alaric Nightingale at \[anightingal1@bloomberg.net\]\(mailto:anightingal1@bloomberg.net\)](#)

[John Deane](#)



## Sayyed Abdulmalik: Yemen's Military Stance Represents People, Expresses Their Will



**News - Yemen: The leader of the Yemeni revolution, Sayyed Abdulmalik Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi, revealed new American movements through a major power to stop the Yemeni naval operations in support of the Palestinian people.**

Sayyed Abdulmalik stated in a televised speech on Thursday evening, "One of the signs of failure is America's attempt to seek China's mediation and persuasion to stop our supportive operations for the Palestinian people."

He pointed out that China understands its interests and does not want to follow the American lead, and it knows what the Americans are doing in Taiwan.

The disclosure of Yemeni mediation comes after the United States failed to convince Tehran to mediate with Sana'a to halt the Yemeni naval operations targeting Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.

Sayyed Abdulmalik Al-Houthi announced the continuation of Yemen's military stance and naval operations as long as the aggression and blockade on Gaza continues. He affirmed that Yemen cannot remain silent or stand idly by while people in Gaza suffer, and the enemy must pay a high price for that.

He also emphasized that the aggression against Yemen will not affect its stance, but it will only enhance its military capabilities, which is clear to the Americans, and they can see it in the missiles.

Regarding the failed US and British strikes on Yemen, he stated that they have no impact and will not limit Yemen's military capabilities.

He added, "The UK should learn a lesson from its ship that burned from night to night and caused harm to its economy without any result."

Sayyed Abdulmalik pointed out that initially, America envisioned that its aggressive operations to protect Israeli ships would provide it with protection and deceptive headlines to gain cooperation from other countries, but it failed.

He said, "The Americans and the British cannot even protect their own ships, nor can they protect their naval assets from being targeted by destroyers and warships." He added, "When the US President decided to wage aggression against Yemen to protect Israeli ships, he violated the US Constitution, and there were protests within Congress from some members."

He also noted that instead of starting wars, the US President should first deal with the crises in his own country and the problems created by his policies in Texas and elsewhere.

It was reiterated that the Yemeni people have proven that the target is the ships heading to the occupying entity, while the rest of the ships pass safely and securely.

The leader of the Yemeni revolution affirmed that the resilience of the fighters in Gaza is "very honorable, despite the huge suffering and the weapons of destruction possessed and used by the enemy." He emphasized that the fighters in Gaza "are tormenting the enemy, who resort to insane bombardment in an attempt to achieve the criminal act of killing."

He viewed the achievements of the fighters in the Gaza Strip as a reflection of their steadfastness and resilience, and the enemy's failure to achieve its goals or decisively win the battle. He also stated that the recent missile strikes by the Al-Qassam Brigades on Tel Aviv were a "very important achievement."

Sayyed Abdulmalik also addressed the Yemeni popular stance, affirming that "the Americans, the British, and the Israeli enemy should realize that they cannot break the determination of our people."

He explained that "popular activities are an essential part of our battle, including military mobilization in support of the Palestinian people." He added that there is broad participation in military mobilization in support of the Palestinian people, with over 165,000 trainees in most provinces. He mentioned that there are "600,000 trainees in general and specialized training, in service of the supportive stance towards Gaza, with passion, determination, and resolve." He revealed plans to expand the mobilization activities to include all provinces in order to enhance readiness.

He noted that the Yemeni people are accustomed to difficulties and suffering, living with all the meanings of dignity and honor. They are effective and influential, and they continue to hold their position. He emphasized that Yemen has an armed and trained army prepared for events, and the United States will not succeed in its exaggeration through its failed strikes.

Regarding the mass rallies, marches, and demonstrations in Yemen in support of Gaza, the leader of the Yemeni revolution stated that "no country in the world has witnessed similar." He pointed out that the current phase requires action and a clear stance commensurate with the Palestinians' oppression. He also stressed the necessity for the resilience of the Palestinians in Gaza to receive support from all free people of the nation.

Concerning other support fronts, Sayyed Abdulmalik hailed the daily operations of the Islamic resistance in Lebanon describing them as "painful and disturbing the enemy on the hot southern front of Lebanon, as well as the operations of the Islamic resistance in Iraq."

Commenting on the decision of the International Court of Justice, Sayyed Abdulmalik considered the decision 'weak' and 'does not represent justice towards the Israeli crimes against the people of Gaza,' emphasizing that international institutions 'are influenced by the United States, and despite the strength of the case, the decision does not have an impact.'

The leader believes that it is 'shameful' for the Israeli enemy to be a member of the United Nations, affirming that this is 'contrary to justice and fairness.'

In the same context, he pointed out that the US-Israeli decision to halt funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) came after the decision of the ICJ, in parallel with the continuation of aggression and siege on the Gaza Strip, and the increasing suffering of its people.

He also affirmed that the United States has 'led the campaign against the agency, reflecting terrible cruelty towards the people of Gaza,' considering that this American decision 'reflects the tyranny of the West and its moral bankruptcy.'

He noted that 'the world is witnessing the terrible suffering experienced by the people of Gaza, deprived of medicine and even oxygen cylinders.'

The suffering of the people of Gaza is a curse upon the Israeli and American.

Speaking about the deteriorating conditions in the Gaza Strip as a result of the aggression, Sayyed Abdulmalik pointed out the 'deaths in Gaza due to hunger and even thirst, which forced the population to drink seawater due to the blockade imposed by the occupation.

He explained that the Israeli occupation 'seeks to prevent all necessities of life from reaching Gaza, where about 700,000 displaced people suffer from infectious diseases and other illnesses.'

In this regard, he pointed out that the wounded in Gaza, totaling more than 65,000, 'face catastrophic conditions and surgical operations without anesthesia,' as 'the occupation destroyed many hospitals and medical centers, even the health personnel, making them targets for killing and arrest.'

He stated that "the occupation declares hospitals as military targets, in a shameful audacity that reflects its moral and political bankruptcy".

He also mentioned that the Israeli occupation kills children and women in Gaza with American, British, and German shells and rockets.

The leader of the Yemeni revolution called on the Arab and Islamic communities, especially the Yemeni community, 'to spread more awareness about the oppression of the Palestinian people,' pointing out the 'emergence of free voices among Western peoples that reject the Western policy towards what the people of Gaza are facing.'


He expressed his regret 'that some Arab and Muslim regimes has not awakened yet, and that some of these regimes even supply the enemy with goods,' emphasizing the need for 'everyone to do what they can for Gaza and confront American, Israeli, and British tyranny.'"

About day

FEBRUARY 1, 2024

## Red Sea attacks increase shipping times and freight rates

Selected commercial shipping routes, as of January 2024



Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration using calculations from Vortexa  
Note: Voyage time is calculated for laden Suezmax tankers traveling at 14 knots without extended chokepoint delays.

After Yemen-based Houthi militia attacks on commercial ships transiting the Red Sea started in November 2023, some vessels began opting to avoid the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint—a narrow strait that borders the Yemeni coast and is the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Instead, they're choosing to take longer, more costly routes around the tip of Africa.

Ships transiting between Europe and Asia via the Suez Canal must pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is an [important oil and natural gas chokepoint](#), accounting for 12% of seaborne oil trade and 8% of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade in the first half of 2023. Major oil and natural gas companies that are [avoiding the Red Sea](#) include Equinor, which operates mostly natural gas carriers, and bp, which operates both oil and natural gas carriers. As of January 23, 2024, other major energy companies pausing Red Sea transits include [Euronav](#), [QatarEnergy](#), [Torm](#), [Shell](#), and [Reliance](#).


Vessels that do not pass through the Suez Canal via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea can go around southern Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, but that route can add significant time to the voyage, depending on the ship's origin and its destination. A typical voyage from the Persian Gulf to the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp petroleum trading hub (ARA) via the Suez Canal takes 19 days. If the ship takes the Cape of Good Hope route, it takes nearly 35 days to reach the ARA. For products leaving the U.S. Gulf Coast and heading toward Asia, vessels typically pass through the Panama Canal, which is nearly a month-long trip. [Due to the ongoing drought and restrictions](#) at the Panama Canal, more [Very Large Gas Carriers](#) (VLGCs), which primarily carry propane and butane, started going through the Suez Canal. Now some of these VLGCs are going around the Cape of Good Hope. A journey from the U.S. Gulf Coast to Chiba in Japan through the Suez Canal adds about 17 days and one through the Cape of Good Hope adds about 21 days, compared with going through the Panama Canal.

Longer routes put upward pressure on freight rates because of fuel costs and fewer available ships. A VLGC, for example, consumes about \$30,000 to \$35,000 worth of fuel per day if using high-sulfur bunker fuel at average 2023 prices. In addition to adding to fuel costs, a longer voyage requires more

ships to maintain the same delivery schedule, and fewer available ships contribute to higher tanker rates and costs.

**Energy product flows through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (2020–2023)**

million barrels per day



Data source: Vortexa


Note: Clean petroleum products include gasoline, distillate, diesel, jet fuel, naphtha, and biodiesel.

After the attacks began in November, flows of oil, refined products, and natural gas passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait slowed. About 18% less crude oil flowed through the Bab el-Mandeb in December than on average from January to November 2023. Most crude oil trade that goes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait leaves Russia and Iraq en route to Asia and the Mediterranean, respectively. Clean petroleum product flows through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait were 30% lower in December than the rest of 2023. The majority of petroleum product trade leaves Saudi Arabia and India bound for Europe and leaves Russia bound for Asia.

In December, 24% less LNG and 1% more liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) were traded globally compared with the rest of 2023. Vessel restrictions at the [Panama Canal due to a drought](#) are causing more VLGCs leaving from the United States to head east toward either the Suez Canal or the Cape of Good Hope. LPG flows through the Bab el-Mandeb increased by 59% in 2023 compared with 2022 because water conservation efforts at the Panama Canal began in January 2023, causing delays and higher costs for VLGCs. The Combined Maritime Forces, a [partnership](#) representing 39 nations, [warned ships](#) to avoid the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on January 12, which will likely reduce passages through January 2024.

**Weekly clean tanker rates (Jan 2023–Jan 2024)**

dollars per metric ton



Data source: Argus Freight

Note: Rates are for long-range 1 tankers, except the Mideast Gulf to UK Continent rates, which are for medium-range tankers.


Clean petroleum product tanker rates for routes that cross the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Suez Canal increased in December 2023 because of the ongoing conflict in the Red Sea. Because routes going through the Red Sea have elevated [risk insurance premiums](#), these costs are passed on to tanker rates. For the four tanker rates that pass through the Red Sea, the average increase was 20% in December compared with November, according to Argus Freight. [Long-range 1](#) tankers traveling from the western coast of India to the UK Continent increased the most (23%), and tankers traveling from the Mideast Gulf to the UK Continent increased the least (16%). Rates for dirty tankers, which mostly transport crude oil, have been relatively unchanged from the elevated prices in November. Brent [crude oil spot prices](#) for the week ending November 17, 2023, the week before attacks on ships in the Red Sea began, were \$82 per barrel (b). Since then, prices have traded in range, and they closed at \$79/b as of January 18, 2024.

**Principal contributor:** Josh Eiermann

DECEMBER 4, 2023

## Red Sea chokepoints are critical for international oil and natural gas flows

### Arabian Peninsula maritime chokepoints



Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

The Suez Canal, the SUMED pipeline, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait are strategic routes for Persian Gulf oil and natural gas shipments to Europe and North America. Total oil shipments via these routes accounted for about 12% of total seaborne-traded oil in the first half of 2023, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments accounted for about 8% of worldwide LNG trade.

The Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline are located in Egypt and connect the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. The SUMED pipeline transports crude oil north through Egypt and has a capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. Most exports of petroleum and natural gas from the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America pass through multiple [chokepoints](#), including the Suez Canal or the SUMED pipeline and both the Bab el-Mandeb and the [Strait of Hormuz](#).

### Volume of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products transported through the Suez Canal, SUMED pipeline, and Bab el-Mandeb Strait (2018–1H23)

million barrels per day



	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	1H23
<b>Total oil flows through Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>9.2</b>
crude oil and condensate	3.4	3.1	2.6	2.2	3.6	4.9
petroleum products	3.0	3.1	2.6	2.9	3.6	4.3
<b>LNG flows through Suez Canal (billion cubic feet per day)</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.1</b>
<b>Total oil flows through Bab el-Mandeb Strait</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>8.8</b>
crude oil and condensate	3.0	2.7	2.2	1.9	3.3	4.5
petroleum products	3.1	3.2	2.8	3.1	3.8	4.4
<b>LNG flows through Bab el-Mandeb Strait (billion cubic feet per day)</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.1</b>

Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration analysis based on Vortexa tanker tracking


Note: 1 LNG=liquefied natural gas. 1H23=first half of 2023

### Oil shipments

Northbound oil flows toward Europe via the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline fell between 2018 and 2020. Renewed U.S. sanctions on

Iran reduced all exports from Iran, including those through the Suez Canal. In addition, less crude oil and oil products from Middle East producers moved through the Suez Canal because Europe imported less oil from the Middle East and more from the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic further reduced flows through the Suez Canal because of slowing global oil demand. In the first half of 2023, northbound crude oil flowing through the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline had increased by more than 60% from 2020, as demand in Europe and the United States rose from pandemic-induced lows. Also, Western sanctions on Russia's oil beginning in early 2022 shifted global trade patterns, leading Europe to import more oil from the Middle East via the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline and less from Russia.


**Northbound crude oil and petroleum product volumes transiting Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline (2018-H123)**



Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration analysis based on Vortexa tanker tracking  
Note: 1H23=first half of 2023.

Southbound shipments through the Suez Canal rose significantly between 2021 and 2023, largely because of Western sanctions on Russia's oil exports. Oil exports from Russia accounted for 74% of Suez southbound oil traffic in the first half of 2023, up from 30% in 2021. Most of those export volumes were destined for India and China, which imported mostly crude oil from Russia. The Middle East, primarily [Saudi Arabia](#) and the [United Arab Emirates](#), increased imports of refined oil products from Russia in 2022 and the first half of 2023 in order to generate electric power or to store or re-export.

**Southbound crude oil and petroleum product volumes transiting Suez Canal (2018-H123)**




Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration analysis based on Vortexa tanker tracking

**LNG shipments**

LNG flows through the Suez Canal in both directions rose to a combined peak in 2021 and 2022 of 4.5 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) before total flows declined in the first half of 2023 to 4.1 Bcf/d. Southbound LNG flows more than doubled from 2020 to 2021, mainly driven by [growing exports from the United States](#) and Egypt heading to Asia. In 2022 and the first half of 2023, southbound LNG volumes via the Suez Canal declined as U.S. and Egyptian LNG exports both favored European destinations over Asian markets, supplanting some of the natural gas exports that Russia historically sent to Europe. Most of the variation in northbound volumes reflects changes in Qatar's exports to Europe (via the Suez Canal) compared with Asia. Qatar also sent more LNG to Europe in 2022 to replace some volumes from Russia, increasing northbound flows.



**Flows through the Suez Canal, SUMED pipeline, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait  
crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products liquefied natural gas**



Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration analysis based on Vortexa tanker tracking  
 Note: 1H23=first half of 2023.

Data source: U.S. Energy Information

Although oil flow trends through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait are similar to those of the Suez Canal, more oil exits the Red Sea (northbound via the Suez Canal and southbound via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait) than enters the Red Sea through these chokepoints. Saudi Arabia transports some crude oil from the Persian Gulf via pipeline to the Red Sea for export mostly to Europe. LNG flows through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have matched those in the Suez Canal over the last few years because the few LNG import terminals in the Red Sea have been used less.

**Principal contributors:** Candace Dunn, Justine Barden

Jan 29, 2024, 11:25 AM

Journalist ID: 5288 News ID: 85369016

## **Regional resistance groups take no order from Iran in their actions: FM spokesperson**

Tehran, IRNA – Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kanaani has said that resistance groups in the West Asia region do not take orders from the Islamic Republic for their decisions and actions including those in support of the Palestinian people or defense of their countries against acts of aggression.

“The resistance groups in the region do not take orders from the Islamic Republic of Iran in their decisions and actions. The Islamic Republic has no involvement in the resistance groups’ decisions on the way they support the Palestinian nation or defend themselves and the people of their countries in the face of any aggression and occupation,” Kanaani said in a statement on Monday.

He made the comments in reaction to a drone attack, which killed three American forces in Jordan on Saturday night. US President Joe Biden said the attack hit American forces stationed near the Syrian border, and blamed it on Iran-backed groups operating in Iraq and Syria.

The spokesman rejected “the baseless accusations” against Iran, describing them as “a blame game and a plot by those who try to protect their own interests and cover up their problems by dragging the US into a new conflict in the region and provoking it to intensify the crisis.”

Kanaani also said, since the onset of the Gaza war in early October, Iran has repeatedly warned against the spillover of the conflict due to continued Israeli attacks against Palestinians and the US all-out support for the genocide in Gaza and the West Bank.

The Islamic Republic has also reiterated that the constant violation of the national sovereignty of Iraq and Syria by American forces as well as attacks against groups and people in those countries and Yemen is the main cause of escalating instability.



The spokesman stressed the need for protecting peace, stability and security in the region, saying that an end to the Israeli attacks in Gaza and an immediate ceasefire there can pave the way for restoring tranquility in West Asia.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is monitoring the ongoing developments in the region with vigilance and preparedness, Kanaani said, adding that the responsibility for leveling such provocative accusations against Iran lies with those behind making such unfounded allegations.

NOVEMBER 21, 2023

# The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil transit chokepoint

**Annual volumes of crude oil, condensate and petroleum products transported through the Strait of Hormuz (2018–1H23)**  
million barrels per day



**Data source:** U.S. Energy Information Administration analysis based on Vortexa tanker tracking and FACTS Global Energy  
**Note:** 1H23=first half of 2023

The Strait of Hormuz, located between Oman and Iran, connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint because large volumes of oil flow through the strait. In 2022, its oil flow averaged 21 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption. In the first half of 2023, total oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz remained relatively flat compared with 2022 because increased flows of oil products partially offset declines in crude oil and condensate.

Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes that are critical to global energy security. The inability of oil to transit a major chokepoint, even temporarily, can create substantial supply delays and raise shipping costs, increasing world energy prices. Although most chokepoints can be circumvented by using other routes, which often add significantly to transit time, some chokepoints have no practical alternatives.

Between 2020 and 2022, volumes of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products transiting the Strait of Hormuz rose by 2.4 million b/d as oil demand recovered after the economic downturn from the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first half of 2023, shipments of crude oil and condensates dropped because OPEC+ members implemented crude oil production cuts starting in November 2022. Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2022 and the first half of 2023 made up more than one-quarter of total global seaborne traded oil. In addition, around one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade also transited the Strait of Hormuz in 2022.

**Volume of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products transported through the Strait of Hormuz (2018–1H23)**  
million barrels per day

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	1H23
<b>Total oil flows through Strait of Hormuz</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>18.3</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>20.5</b>
Crude oil and condensate	16.4	15.0	13.5	13.7	15.2	14.7
Petroleum products	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.1	5.6	5.8
<b>World maritime oil trade</b>	<b>77.4</b>	<b>77.1</b>	<b>71.9</b>	<b>73.2</b>	<b>75.2</b>	<b>76.3</b>
<b>World total petroleum and other liquids consumption</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>100.9</b>	<b>91.6</b>	<b>97.1</b>	<b>99.6</b>	<b>100.3</b>
<b>LNG flows through Strait of Hormuz (billion cubic feet per day)</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>10.8</b>


Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Short-Term Energy Outlook*, and U.S. Energy Information Administration analysis based on Vortexa tanker tracking and FACTS Global Energy  
 Note: World maritime oil trade excludes intra-country volumes except those volumes that transit the Strait of Hormuz.  
 LNG=liquefied natural gas. 1H23=first half of 2023.

Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have operating pipelines that can circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Aramco operates the 5-million-b/d East-West crude oil pipeline and temporarily expanded the pipeline’s capacity to 7 million b/d in 2019 when it converted some natural gas liquids pipelines to accept crude oil. The UAE links its onshore oil fields to the Fujairah export terminal on the Gulf of Oman with a 1.5 million b/d pipeline.

Iran inaugurated the Goreh-Jask pipeline and the Jask export terminal on the Gulf of Oman with a single export cargo in July 2021. The pipeline’s capacity was 0.3 million b/d at that time, although Iran has not used the pipeline since then. We estimate that around 3.5 million b/d of effective unused capacity from these pipelines could be available to bypass the strait in the event of a supply disruption. Based on tanker tracking data published by Vortexa, Saudi Arabia moves more crude oil and condensate through the Strait of Hormuz than any other country, most of which is exported to other countries. Around 0.5 million b/d transited the strait in 2022 from Saudi ports in the Persian Gulf to Saudi ports in the Red Sea.

We estimate that 82% of the crude oil and condensate that moved through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asian markets in 2022. China, India, Japan, and South Korea were the top destinations for crude oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz to Asia, accounting for 67% of all Hormuz crude oil and condensate flows in 2022 and the first half of 2023.

**Annual volumes (crude oil and condensate) transported through the Strait of Hormuz (2018–1H23)**



Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration analysis based on Vortexa tanker tracking data  
 Note: 1H23=first half of 2023.

In 2022, the United States imported about 0.7 million b/d of crude oil and condensate from Persian Gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for about 11% of U.S. crude oil and condensate imports and 3% of U.S. petroleum liquids consumption. U.S. crude oil imports from countries in the Persian Gulf have fallen by half since 2018 as domestic production has increased.

**Principal contributors:** Candace Dunn, Justine Barden

Saudi Arabia Is Said to Weigh Reviving Aramco Share Sale  
2024-01-31 11:30:46.259 GMT

By Matthew Martin and Dinesh Nair

(Bloomberg) -- Saudi Arabia is considering plans to revive a follow-on offering in Aramco as soon as February, in a multibillion-dollar deal that's likely to rank among the biggest share sales in recent years, according to people familiar with the matter.

The kingdom is working with a group of advisers and is seeking to potentially raise at least 40 billion riyals (\$10 billion) from the share sale on the Saudi stock exchange, the people said, asking not to be identified because the information is private. A successful deal would bring in funds for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's ambitious push to diversify the economy.

Plans for the new sale comes four years after Saudi Arabia raised about \$30 billion in Aramco's initial public offering, which was the world's largest ever stock sale. MBS, as the crown prince is called, has increased his spending ambitions since as he pumps huge amounts of money into the new development Neom, tourism, sports and other projects.

There's no final decision on the timing of the share sale and the deal could still be delayed. The Saudi government referred requests for comment to Aramco, which declined to comment.

Aramco is the world's biggest oil exporter, with a market value of just over \$2 trillion. The company this week surprised the market by abandoning plans to boost its oil production capacity, a dramatic u-turn that will raise questions about the company's views on demand for its oil but also free up billions of dollars of spending that can be used elsewhere.

MBS had said in January 2021 that the government would look to sell more shares in the firm, with proceeds transferred to the kingdom's sovereign wealth fund. Those plans had been gaining momentum last year, Bloomberg reported in May. The Saudi IPO market was relatively subdued for much of last year, though a revival in the second of half of 2023 raised hopes that the government would push on with the Aramco deal. The Riyadh bourse has had a strong start to 2024 — MBC Group, the biggest Gulf broadcaster, listed in the kingdom on Jan. 8 and its shares have since more than doubled.

Capacity U-Turn

The Saudi government directly owns about 90% of Aramco, with a further 8% held by the Public Investment Fund. The fund,

chaired by MBS, was the biggest spending sovereign wealth fund globally last year. It's the key vehicle for his ambitions to reshape the Saudi economy, spending billions on everything from investing in electric car makers, creating a new airline to backing upstart golf tournaments. Aramco Chairman Yasir Al Rumayyan is also governor of the fund.

The company was ordered by the government to halt raising its oil output capacity to 13 million barrels a day. It's been ordered by the government to hold it at 12 million instead, which would leave the company with a 3 million a day buffer relative to its current production level.

While the change in the plan raises questions over Saudi Arabia's view on demand for its oil in the future, it also helps save Aramco billions of dollars. RBC Capital Markets expects the company to lower its annual budget by about \$5 billion from previous guidance.

Aramco hasn't said where those funds will go, but some could make their way to the government through dividend payments. The company paid \$29 billion in dividends in both the second and third quarters.

Those help partly fund the government's budget deficit.

Saudi Arabia will probably post a budget shortfall of about 4.3% of gross domestic product in 2024 and have more than \$46 billion of funding requirements, according to Dubai-based bank Emirates NBD.

--With assistance from Julia Fioretti.

To contact the reporters on this story:

Matthew Martin in Riyadh at [mmartin128@bloomberg.net](mailto:mmartin128@bloomberg.net);

Dinesh Nair in London at [dnair5@bloomberg.net](mailto:dnair5@bloomberg.net)

To contact the editors responsible for this story:

Adveith Nair at [anair29@bloomberg.net](mailto:anair29@bloomberg.net);

Ben Scent at [bscent@bloomberg.net](mailto:bscent@bloomberg.net)

Rakteem Katakey

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January 29, 2024

The Honorable Michael McCaul, Chairman  
United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Gregory Meeks, Ranking Member  
United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs

2170 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Mr. Meeks,

On behalf of the member companies of the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) we hope this year brings you peace and prosperity. Our association's membership includes eight international oil and gas companies operating in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), including three U.S. owned companies and several more with substantial U.S. equity and bond holdings.

We request your immediate assistance to persuade the Federal Government of Iraq (GoI) to promptly resolve issues that have resulted in the halt of greater than 400,000 barrels a day of crude oil exports from the KRI to global markets. The White House has extended an invitation for the Federal Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani to visit. We ask that you take this opportunity to impress on the Iraqi PM that GoI must allow U.S. oil companies, and all APIKUR members, to freely produce and export their oil to the global markets. The GoI must immediately resolve two issues: the full implementation of the Iraqi budget for the Kurdistan Region which is essential for western and American companies to resume operations, as well as payment surety for past and future oil exports in accordance with their contractual rights.

We refer to our previous communications, dated February 9 and April 24, 2023, regarding the critical situation in the KRI. Unfortunately, the circumstances have deteriorated since our last correspondence. The halt of crude oil exports from the region, now lasting over 10 months, coupled with the unresolved Federal Budget issues by the GoI, continue to threaten the fiscal stability and autonomous status of the KRI—a region that has been a steadfast security ally of the United States in the Middle East.

The United States has made significant public and private sector investments in the KRI; Iraqi governmental intransigence is thwarting the return on that investment. The U.S. Development Finance Corporation, for instance, has invested \$300 million in energy projects in the KRI. Moreover, our APIKUR member companies, have invested over \$10 billion in the region. These investments, which were made based on solid, legally-binding agreements, are now being jeopardized.

Our disquiet is shared by others; for example, on September 18, 2023, your good self, Congressman McCaul, and your colleagues Congressmen Michael Waltz and Joe Wilson expressed similar concerns in a letter to President Biden. On September 21, 2023, Deputy Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk and Deputy Assistant and Senior Advisor to the President for Energy and Investment Amos Hochstein met with the Iraqi PM, and “emphasized the urgency of reopening the Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline as soon as possible.” Despite Washington’s encouragement the stalemate continues between the GOI on the one hand and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), International Oil Companies and the Republic of Türkiye on the other, notwithstanding repeated statements by the Iraqi PM, and others in his government, to the contrary.

APIKUR and its members reiterate their request for preserving the sanctity of their contractual rights as well as certainty of past and future payments to end this deadlock. APIKUR is confident that, with advocacy from the U.S. Executive Branch as well as the U.S. Congress, the desired solution can be reached. APIKUR notes that meetings were held in Baghdad on January 7-9, 2024, between representatives of the GOI, the KRG, and International Oil Companies — including representatives of several APIKUR member companies. But, thus far, there has been no concrete progress towards that end presented to the members of APIKUR.

We remain committed to Kurdistan, despite the recent ballistic missile attacks and increased threats from Iranian-backed militia groups throughout Iraq. It is imperative that we resume full oil production and recommence oil exports from Kurdistan to create economic stability in the region as a bulwark against destructive and destabilizing influences from external actors.

We look forward to your engagement and support in resolving these pressing issues.

For the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan,



Nicholas W. Atencio

Secretary General

email: [nicholas.atencio@APIKUR.uk](mailto:nicholas.atencio@APIKUR.uk)

*About APIKUR:*

*APIKUR’s objective and purpose is to promote the KRI as an attractive destination for international oil and gas companies, service providers and investors. In addition, APIKUR aims to advocate for and represent the common interests of its members, function as a joint and effective voice towards all relevant stakeholders whether in the KRI, or elsewhere, and provide a forum for its members to share appropriate public industry information and best practices.*




By Bloomberg News

(Bloomberg) -- China is struggling in its attempt to lure foreigners back as data shows more direct investment flowing out of the country than coming in, suggesting companies may be diversifying their supply chains to reduce risks.

Direct investment liabilities in the country's balance of payments have been slowing in the last two years. After hitting a near-peak value of more than \$101 billion in the first quarter of 2022, the gauge has weakened nearly every quarter since. It fell \$11.8 billion in the July-to-September period, marking the first contraction since records started in 1998.

"It's concerning to see net outflows where China's doing its best at the moment to try and open — certainly the manufacturing sector — to new inflows," said Robert Carnell, regional head of research for Asia-Pacific at ING Groep NV.

"Maybe this is the beginning of a sign that people are just increasingly looking at alternatives to China for investment."



The Chinese government has embarked on a big push in recent months to lure foreign investment back to the country. On Wednesday, the Ministry of Commerce asked local governments to clear discriminatory policies facing foreign companies in a bid to stabilize investment confidence.

It cited the need to ensure subsidies for new energy vehicles are not limited to domestic brands as one example. In

some industries, foreign firms wait longer and are subject to more rigorous reviewing process when applying for licenses. In August, the internet regulator met with executives from dozens of international firms to ease concerns about new data rules. The government has also pledged to offer overseas companies better tax treatment and make it easier for them to obtain visas.

But Beijing's pledges have rung hollow for some firms, with foreign business groups decrying "promise fatigue" amid skepticism about whether meaningful policy support is forthcoming. They also have incentive to repatriate earnings overseas because of the wide gap in interest rates between China and the US, which may be pushing them to seek higher returns elsewhere.

The FDI outflows are adding pressure on the onshore yuan, which has hit the weakest level since 2007 earlier this year. China's benchmark 10-year government bond yield is trading at 191 basis points below that of comparable US Treasuries, versus an average premium of about 100 basis points over the past decade.

"Decoupling" or "derisking" from China is an important reason for the declining FDI data reported by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, according to Louis Kuijs, chief economist for Asia Pacific at S&P Global Ratings. Concerns about geopolitics and US-China relations were cited as major reasons for foreign corporate pessimism in a survey published in September by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai. Companies have cited various countries in the region as destinations for their supply chain shifts. Japan, India and Vietnam were floated as "top destinations gaining more attraction" in a spring survey of companies by UBS Group AG. A March AmCham report pointed to developing Asia and the US as places where members were considering moving capacity to from China.

### Widespread Consequences

The lack of investment among global firms in China may have far reaching effects on the world's second-largest economy, especially as it tries counter US curbs on access to advanced technology.

Aside from geopolitical risks, companies had also been pulling back on investment in China last year as the country rolled out pandemic restrictions. While those curbs have been removed, firms are still contending with other challenges from rising manufacturing costs in China and regulatory hurdles as Beijing scrutinizes activity at foreign corporations due to national security concerns.

"Some of the most damaging things have been the abrupt regulatory changes that have taken place," said Carnell, pointing to this year's anti-espionage campaign, which resulted in some firms having their offices raided by local authorities.

"Once you damage the sort of perception of the business

environment, it's quite difficult to restore trust. I think it will take some time."

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Majority of US Firms Don't See China as Priority for Investment  
US Companies in China Grow More Pessimistic About Bilateral Ties

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Foreign companies make up less than 3% of the total number of corporations in China, but contribute to 40% of its trade, more than 16% of tax revenue and almost 10% of urban employment, state media has reported. They've also been key to China's technological development, with foreign investment in the country's high-tech industry growing at double-digit rates on average since 2012, according to the official Xinhua News Agency.

"A decline in trade and investment links with advanced economies will be a particularly significant headwind for a catching up economy such as China, weighing on productivity growth and technological progress," Kuijs said.

#### Limited Optimism

There are some reasons for optimism in the coming weeks and months. President Joe Biden is set to meet with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco later this month, which may help stabilize strained bilateral ties.

It would be helpful if increased communication yielded some "more stability and clarity on the geopolitical front," Kuijs said, though he added it is unlikely the US will meaningfully change its policy stance.

## Another Measure of FDI in China Holds Up Better Than SAFE's

Still, investment actually utilized in third quarter was less than year ago

Quarterly actually-utilized FDI



Source: Bloomberg calculations based on data from China's Ministry of Commerce.

Bloomberg

Some economists also argue that FDI will stabilize once the China-US yield differential narrows. They also point to data on actually utilized FDI published by the Ministry of Commerce, which holds up better the SAFE data: Those figures show FDI fell 8.4% in the first nine months of this year from the same time period in 2022, to 920 billion yuan.

"I think things are not as bad as they seem from the SAFE data, otherwise policy tightening for China's capital account management would be witnessed," said Bruce Pang, chief economist for Greater China at Jones Lang LaSalle Inc.

In any case, China still needs to convince investors that they are welcome in the country.

"The more that it can offer a stable, conducive policy environment, the better it would be for FDI," Kuijs said. "That includes minimizing the impact of national security-related measures on the economy and sentiment."

--With assistance from Wenjin Lv and Evelyn Yu.

To contact Bloomberg News staff for this story:

John Liu in Beijing at [jliu42@bloomberg.net](mailto:jliu42@bloomberg.net);

Fran Wang in Beijing at [fwang315@bloomberg.net](mailto:fwang315@bloomberg.net)

To contact the editors responsible for this story:

Jenni Marsh at [jmarsh74@bloomberg.net](mailto:jmarsh74@bloomberg.net)

Jill Disis, Jasmine Ng

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## China braces for Spring Festival travel rush with record 9 billion passenger trips expected

By Xiong Xinyi and Tu Lei

Published: Jan 25, 2024 10:34 PM Updated: Jan 25, 2024 11:38 PM

The chunyun or Spring Festival travel rush for 2024 - the world's largest annual human migration - officially starts on Friday, and is expected to set a new record of 9 billion passenger trips during the 40-day travel peak.

From jam-packed transportation hubs to the hustle and bustle seen in markets nationwide, the anticipated booming Chinese New Year holidays are poised to continue the country's steady recovery while ushering in a lively 2024.

At the Beijing Capital International Airport on Thursday, crowds of tourists were seen in the departure hall, children and parents were holding hands waiting for checked luggage at the counter, and Year of the Dragon stickers were also pasted on glass doors, adding to the coming Chinese Lunar New Year atmosphere.

The airport will see 7.2 million passenger trips during chunyun, a growth of more than 60 percent from the same period of 2023, the airport said on Thursday, adding that overseas passenger flow will reach 1.41 million passenger trips following the implementation of visa reciprocity policies between China and many countries.

The scene witnessed by the Global Times at the airport is just a snapshot illustrating the brisk personnel flow nationwide at one of the busiest times of the year in China. Observers expected the travel rush to boost consumption for the upcoming holidays, which will inject fresh vitality and bolster the country's economic progress in 2024.

### Flourishing consumption

A retired white-collar worker surnamed Yin from Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality recently completed a self-driving road trip in South China's Hainan Province with her family. Yin told the Global Times on Thursday that she had already experienced a tourism boom with crowds of visitors and packed restaurants even before the holidays officially kicked off, adding that the well-constructed roads and convenient infrastructure facilities have elevated the traveling experience.

Propelled by the record-high personnel flow and China's steady economic recovery, both domestic and international tourism is set to become major driving forces spurring consumption.

China and Singapore on Thursday [agreed on mutual visa exemption](#) which will officially come into effect on February 9, 2024 - the eve of the Chinese New Year, as ordinary passport holders from both sides will be able to enter each other's countries without visa requirements for activities including tourism for 30 days.

[Searches for hotels in Singapore](#) on Chinese online travel platform Qunar.com surged four times after the two countries announced the decision, the company told the Global Times on Thursday. Meanwhile, Tongcheng Travel told the Global Times that Singapore-related searches rose by more than 340 percent on the platform within an hour after the visa-free policy announcement.

Domestic tourism is also thriving, represented by the sparkling ice-snow trips in popular cities such as Harbin in Northeast China's Heilongjiang Province. Bookings for products related to winter tourism on Trip.com for the holidays increased by more than 10 times year-on-year, the company told the Global Times in a recent statement.

The record-high chunyun reflected China's rapid development in transportation construction amid its advancing economic recovery, Jiang Yiyi, deputy head of the School of Leisure Sports and Tourism at Beijing Sport University, told the Global Times on Thursday.

Jiang emphasized that activities related to the cultural sector such as visiting museums will also play a significant role in promoting consumption.

In addition, consumption themed around the Chinese New Year's holidays has also been jacked up. Restaurants have been busy taking bookings for traditional Spring Festival reunion dinners, while e-commerce

platforms saw sales surging as consumers stocked up on holiday necessities, according to media reports.

Among the 9 billion passenger trips, around 1.8 billion will be made through rail, road, aviation and water transportation, while the remaining 7.2 billion trips are expected to be self-driving trips, according to recent data released by the Ministry of Transport.

China's railway system already saw a [pre-Spring Festival ticket sales peak](#) with 61.08 million tickets for chunyun sold since January 12, a year-on-year increase of 159 percent, China State Railway Group Co said in a statement sent to the Global Times on Wednesday.

Amid the expected record-breaking chunyun, domestic carriers have ramped up efforts to ensure transportation capacity.

Air China said on Tuesday that it plans to arrange 67,691 flights during the 40-day travel peak with an average of 1,693 flights per day, an increase of 32 percent compared with 2019 and 40.6 percent compared with 2023. Meanwhile, [four homegrown C919 aircraft](#) from China Eastern Airlines will also be serving the travel rush. The four planes will fly routes between Beijing and Shanghai, and Shanghai and Chengdu in Southwest China's Sichuan Province, the first time the aircraft is being used for the Spring Festival travel.

### **Vital momentum to last in 2024**

Consumption played an indispensable role in bolstering China's economic growth in 2023, with the final consumption [contributing to 82.5 percent of GDP growth](#), official data showed. Experts noted that the momentum will extend into 2024 with optimistic outlooks, while the consumption boom for the Chinese New Year holidays will become an essential engine driving economic growth in the first quarter.

The recently released GDP data from multiple Chinese provinces and cities have showcased the uplifting achievements realized nationwide, while last year's considerable economic growth rate will lay a solid foundation for this year's economic expectations, Cong Yi, a professor at the Tianjin School of Administration, told the Global Times on Thursday.

Shanghai's GDP expanded by 5 percent year-on-year in 2023, while Guangdong's GDP passed 13 trillion yuan (\$1.83 trillion) for the first time, according to the ["report cards"](#) released by the local governments.

Meanwhile, Cong highlighted the culture-infused tourism boom as an example of the country's continuous upgrading in consumption structure, further adding to optimistic expectations for the coming year.

In 2023, the consumption sector, especially the services industry, contributed primarily to the GDP growth rather than the primary and secondary industries, Cao Heping, a professor of economics at Peking University, told the Global Times on Thursday.

Data from the National Bureau of Statistics showed that the growth of retail sales of services increased by 20 percent year-on-year last year, while the catering sector achieved a revenue exceeding 5 trillion yuan for the first time.

Cao noted that developing consumption-related investment along with relevant industries will be a major focal point for China's economic transformation.

Cao said that holiday consumption is set to hugely boost GDP growth for the first quarter of 2024. He added that if the GDP growth rate for the first quarter exceeds 5.2 percent and can get close to 5.5 percent, then the growth rate for 2024 is very like to approach 5.5 percent, higher than the estimate of 4.6 percent projected by some foreign institutions.

The world's second-largest economy posted [a GDP growth of 5.2 percent for 2023](#), successfully meeting the previously set annual target and aligning with market forecasts.

# Cathay Pacific offering pilots bonuses for flying during Lunar New Year

By [Danny Lee](#) / [Bloomberg](#)

30 Jan 2024, 07:18 pm

Cathay Pacific Airways is offering bonuses of up to 30% of their usual hourly flying rates to pilots to fly between Feb 7 and 18 during next month's Lunar New Year period.

(Jan 30): Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd is offering bonuses to pilots to fly during next month's Lunar New Year period as the airline seeks to avoid cancelling even more flights over the peak travel season.

Hong Kong's largest airline, which has already cut an average of 12 flights a day through the end of February in order to ensure enough pilots are available, will offer a special flying allowance between Feb 7 and 18, according to people familiar with the matter. Aircrew will be eligible for bonuses of 30%, 25% or 15% of their usual hourly flying rates, they said, asking not to be identified because they're not authorised to speak publicly.

The offer is just the latest in a growing list of incentives Cathay has rolled out to tackle a chronic shortage of aircrew after Covid-related job losses gutted its ranks and pay cuts of more than 45% for some of those that remained sparked an exodus. The carrier is already facing intense criticism for cancelling hundreds of flights over Christmas and New Year as a surge in illness and limits on annual flying hours compounded its pilot deficit.

"We are confident in our ability to operate our flights as planned," Cathay Pacific said in an emailed statement.

Still, the short-term bonus will do little to address the longer-term issues Cathay faces in recruiting staff. The carrier's flight volume is at around 70% of 2019 levels currently, and it aims to get back to normal by the end of this year.

"It's a band-aid measure, not a solution," Paul Weatherilt, chairman of the Hong Kong Aircrew Officers Association, said. "It's an acknowledgment that even with a reduced Lunar New Year schedule compared to 2019, Cathay are still short of pilots."



# Caixin China General Manufacturing PMI®

## Manufacturing sector expansion holds steady in January

January PMI® data indicated that China's manufacturing sector continued to expand, with firms signalling sustained increases in both output and new orders. While production growth was broadly stable, the upturn in overall new business did lose some momentum since December, despite a fresh rise in new export work. Nevertheless, firms were more buoyant when assessing the year-ahead outlook, and the rate of job shedding across the sector eased notably on the month.

Prices data indicated that cost pressures remained relatively weak, with input costs rising at an historically slow pace that was the weakest in five months. Meanwhile, competition for new business led companies to discount their selling prices slightly.

The headline seasonally adjusted *Purchasing Managers' Index™ (PMI)* – a composite indicator designed to provide a single-figure snapshot of operating conditions in the manufacturing economy – posted 50.8 in January, unchanged from December, and pointed to a further mild improvement in business conditions. The health of the sector has now strengthened for three successive months, to mark the longest period of continuous improvement for two-and-a-half years.

Chinese manufacturing companies signalled an expansion of output for the third month running in January. The rate of growth was little-changed from December and, though modest, was among the fastest recorded over the past year-and-a-half. Firms often mentioned raising output due to firmer market conditions and higher sales.

Overall new business increased for the sixth successive month, though the rate of growth slipped to the slowest since last October. The softer rise in total sales was despite a renewed improvement in foreign demand. New export orders increased for the first time since last June, albeit marginally.

In line with rising business requirements, manufacturers expanded their purchasing activity in January. Whilst modest, the rate of growth was the best recorded since last August. Inventories of purchased inputs and finished items also increased at the start of the year, though rates of accumulation were only slight in both cases.

Supply chain performance improved for the third time in the past four months, albeit fractionally. Firms often mentioned that suppliers had sufficient capacity to deliver orders in a timely manner.


Capacity pressures at manufacturing firms in China were also relatively muted, as highlighted by a back-to-back decline in unfinished workloads. This led firms to trim their workforce numbers again at the start of the year. However, the rate of job shedding moderated notably from December and was the weakest recorded in five months.

The softer drop in employment coincided with an improvement in business confidence around the 12-month outlook for production. The degree of positive sentiment was the most pronounced in nine months, and supported by forecasts of stronger global demand conditions, planned investment, new product releases and efforts to expand into new markets.

Finally, prices data indicated that inflationary pressures remained muted at the start of 2024. Average inputs costs increased at a marginal pace that was the slowest in five months. At the same time, efforts to attract and secure new business prompted manufacturers to cut their own selling prices slightly in January.

### China General Manufacturing PMI

sa, >50 = improvement since previous month



Sources: Caixin, S&P Global PMI

#### Key findings:

- Production continues to expand modestly, but total sales growth softens
- New export business rises for first time in seven months
- Business confidence improves to nine-month high



## New Export Orders Index

sa, >50 = growth since previous month



Commenting on the China General Manufacturing PMI® data, Dr. Wang Zhe, Senior Economist at Caixin Insight Group said:

“The Caixin China General Manufacturing PMI was 50.8 in January, unchanged from December. This marks the first time since May 2021 that the index has remained in the expansion zone for three straight months.

“Both supply and demand expanded, with supply outpacing demand. Market sentiment continued to improve with manufacturing output growing for the fifth time in the past six months. The subindex for total new orders remained in expansionary territory for six consecutive months.

“Overseas demand picked up slightly with new export orders expanding for the first time in seven months. Surveyed companies reported that the largest output increase was in investment goods, while the improvement in external demand was mainly seen in intermediate goods.


“Employment continued to decline. Cutting costs and improving efficiency remained companies’ top concerns, so the upturn in market activity failed to fully translate into new jobs. The labor market shrank in January for the 10th time in the past 11 months, though less drastically than in the previous month. Despite continued staff cuts, companies were able to reduce backlogs of work, with the gauge dipping moderately.

“Price levels remained weak. Increases in input costs were limited due to the slight increase in raw material prices. The measure for input costs hit the lowest level since August. Output prices were even weaker, as growing market competition constrained companies’ bargaining power, pushing the gauge back into contractionary territory.

“Supplier logistics speeds increased. Supply growth resulted in a rise in manufacturers’ purchases. Coupled with a recovery in supplier capacity, this shortened delivery times. Meanwhile, companies increased inventories of raw materials and finished products.

## Employment Index

sa, >50 = growth since previous month



“Market optimism improved, with the gauge for future output expectations hitting its highest level since last April, despite remaining slightly below the historical average. Some surveyed companies indicated that their own production will grow with the expected increase in market demand in the new year.

“Overall, the manufacturing sector continued to improve in January, with both supply and demand increasing. Quicker logistics, increased procurement, and rising inventories reflected improved business confidence. However, employment remained in the contraction zone, price levels were subdued, and deflationary pressures persisted.

“China hit the growth target set in early 2023, but economic growth in the final quarter was slower than the third quarter on a quarter-on-quarter basis, indicating that the recovery was losing momentum.

“Currently, the economy contends with significant challenges marked by numerous uncertainties and adverse factors. Specifically, they are tepid demand, heightened employment pressures and subdued market expectations. This status quo has yet to experience a fundamental reversal.

“Policy efforts should concentrate on boosting employment, income, and expectations. Given there is still room for further adjustments in fiscal and monetary policies, policy measures need to be strengthened. Crucially, policies should facilitate effective communication and positive interaction with the market. In addition, collaboration and coordination among different government departments are imperative to enhance the coherence of market expectations.”



Press Release No: 5

Date: 31 January 2024



## Air Cargo Demand Surges 10.8% in December, Closing 2023 Near 2022 Levels



**Translations:** [Le fret aérien en hausse de 10,8 % en décembre, et 2023 se termine près du niveau de 2022](#) (pdf)

[国际航协：12月航空货运需求激增 10.8% 2023 年业绩几乎与2022 年持平](#) (pdf)

[La demanda de carga aérea repunta un 10,8% en diciembre y cierra 2023 rozando niveles de 2022](#) (pdf)

[Demanda por carga aérea aumenta 10,8% em dezembro, fechando 2023 perto dos níveis de 2022](#) (pdf)

**Geneva** - The International Air Transport Association (IATA) released data for global air freight markets showing that air cargo demand rebounded in 2023 with a particularly strong fourth quarter performance despite economic uncertainties. Full-year demand reached a level just slightly below 2022 and 2019.

Global full-year demand in 2023, measured in cargo tonne-kilometers (CTKs), was down 1.9% compared to 2022 (-2.2% for international operations). Compared to 2019, it was down 3.6% (-3.8 for international operations).

Capacity in 2023, measured in available cargo tonne-kilometers (ACTKs), was 11.3% above 2022 (+9.6% for international operations). Compared to 2019 (pre-COVID) levels, capacity was up 2.5% (0.0% for international operations).

December 2023 saw an exceptionally strong performance: global demand was 10.8% above 2022 levels (+11.5% for international operations). This was the strongest annual growth performance over the past two years. Global capacity was 13.6% above 2022 levels (+14.1% for international operations).

Some indicators to note include:

- Global cross-border trade recorded growth for the third consecutive month in October, reversing its previous downward trend.
- December inflation in both the United States and the EU as measured by the corresponding Consumer Price Indices (CPI) stayed below 3.5% year-on-year. China's CPI, however, indicated deflation for the third consecutive month, raising concerns of an economic slowdown.
- Both the manufacturing output and new export order Purchasing Managers Indexes (PMIs) – two leading indicators of global air cargo demand—continued to hover below the 50-mark in December, usual markers for contraction.

"Despite political and economic challenges, 2023 saw air cargo markets regain ground lost in 2022 after the extraordinary COVID peak in 2021. Although full year demand was shy of pre-COVID levels by 3.6%, the significant strengthening in the last quarter is a sign that markets are stabilizing towards more normal demand patterns. That puts the industry on very solid ground for success in 2024. But with continued, and in some cases intensifying, instability in geopolitics and economic forces, little should be taken for granted in the months ahead," said Willie Walsh, IATA's Director General.

### Air Cargo Market in Detail

DECEMBER 2023 (%YEAR-ON-YEAR)	Total Market
WORLD SHARE *1	100%
CTK	10.8%

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<b>DECEMBER 2023 (%YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Africa
<b>WORLD SHARE *1</b>	2.0%
<b>CTK</b>	-1.2%
<b>ACTK</b>	7.4%
<b>CLF (%-PT) *2</b>	-3.6%
<b>CLF (LEVEL) *3</b>	41.0%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (%YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Asia Pacific
<b>WORLD SHARE *1</b>	32.4%
<b>CTK</b>	18.5%
<b>ACTK</b>	31.1%
<b>CLF (%-PT) *2</b>	-5.1%
<b>CLF (LEVEL) *3</b>	47.9%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (%YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Europe
<b>WORLD SHARE *1</b>	21.8%
<b>CTK</b>	8.6%
<b>ACTK</b>	7.4%
<b>CLF (%-PT) *2</b>	0.6%
<b>CLF (LEVEL) *3</b>	56.2%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (%YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Latin America
<b>WORLD SHARE *1</b>	2.7%
<b>CTK</b>	6.4%
<b>ACTK</b>	3.5%
<b>CLF (%-PT) *2</b>	0.9%
<b>CLF (LEVEL) *3</b>	31.6%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (%YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Middle East
<b>WORLD SHARE *1</b>	13.0%
<b>CTK</b>	18.3%
<b>ACTK</b>	17.7%
<b>CLF (%-PT) *2</b>	0.2%
<b>CLF (LEVEL) *3</b>	45.5%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (%YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	North America
<b>WORLD SHARE *1</b>	28.1%
<b>CTK</b>	2.0%

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(\*1) % of industry CTKs in 2022 (\*2) Year-on-year change in load factor (\*3) Load factor level

## December Regional Performance (Total Market)

**Asia-Pacific airlines** posted a 0.9% increase in demand in 2023 compared to 2022 (-1.4% for international operations) and a capacity increase of 28.5% (+16.6% for international operations). In December, airlines in the region recorded the best performance of all regions, posting an 18.5% increase in demand (+15.4% for international operations) compared to 2022. Capacity increased 31.1% (+22.9% for international operations) during the same period.

**North American carriers** reported the worst year-on-year performance of all regions, with a 5.7% decrease in demand in 2023 compared to 2022 (-4.3% for international operations) and a capacity increase of 0.3% (+2.7% for international operations). In December airlines in the region reported a 2.0% increase in demand (+5.9% international operations), compared to 2022. Capacity increased 2.4% (+8.5% for international operations) during the same period.

**European carriers** posted a 3.9% decrease in demand in 2023 compared to 2022 (-4.1% for international operations). During the same period, airlines posted a capacity increase of 4.5% for both global and international operations. In December, airlines in the region posted an 8.6% increase in demand (+8.7% for international operations) compared to 2022. Capacity increased 7.4% (+7.5% for international operations) during the same period. Airlines in the region continued to be most affected by the war in Ukraine.

**Middle Eastern carriers** reported an increase in demand of 1.6% for global and international demand in 2023 compared to 2022 and an increase in capacity of 13.5% (+13.6% for international operations). In December airlines in the region posted an 18.3% increase in demand for both global and international operations compared to 2022. Capacity increased 17.7% (+17.8% for international operations) during the same period.

**Latin American carriers** posted the strongest year-on-year performance of all regions, with a 2.0% increase in demand in 2023 compared to 2022 (+1.9% for international operations). During the same period, airlines posted a capacity increase of 13.2% (+16.9% for international operations). In December airlines in the region posted growth in demand of 6.4% (+6.3% for international operations) compared to 2021. Capacity grew 3.5% (+4.2% for international operations) during the same period.

**African airlines** reported a decrease in demand of 1.8% (-2.0% for international demand) in 2023 compared to 2022 and an increase in capacity of 5.6% (+5.0% for international operations). In December airlines in the region posted the weakest performance of all with a 1.2% decrease in demand (-1.4% for international operations) compared to 2021. Capacity grew 7.4% (+6.8% for international operations) during the same period.

## Red Sea Disruption

In November and December air cargo experienced a modest rise in demand and yields due to disruptions in the Red Sea\*. The following was observed when comparing data for the week commencing 4 November 2023 and the week ending 9 December 2023:

- A 1% increase in global air cargo demand coupled with a 5% rise in yields;
- In the Asia-Pacific region, demand grew by 2% and yields by 6%;
- A 1% increase in demand between China and the rest of the world and an 11% increase in yields;
- Europe's demand remained steady, but yields increased by 3%;
- In the Middle East, demand was constant with a 4% rise in yields.

Data for the last half of December showed a normalization of demand and yields.

"The recent disruption to maritime routes in the Red Sea has seen some shippers pivot to air cargo. The increased demand saw a spike in air cargo yields on related trade lanes. A similar spike is expected in January as disruptions intensified. While not all cargo is suitable for air transport, it is a vital option for some of the most urgent shipments in extraordinary circumstances. And that is critical to the continuity of the global economy, said Walsh.

\* indicated by [@IATA CargoS](#) data

> [View December 2023 Air Cargo Market Analysis](#) (pdf)

### For more information, please contact:

Corporate Communications

Tel: +41 22 770 2967

Email: [corpcomms@iata.org](mailto:corpcomms@iata.org)

### Notes for Editors:

- IATA (International Air Transport Association) represents some 320 airlines comprising 83% of global air traffic.
- You can follow us at [twitter.com/iata](https://twitter.com/iata) for announcements, policy positions, and other useful industry information.
- \* Please note that as of January 2020 onwards, we have clarified the terminology of the Industry and Regional series from 'Freight' to 'Cargo', the corresponding metrics being FTK (changed to 'CTK'), AFTK (changed to 'ACTK'), and FLF (changed to 'CLF'), in order to reflect that the series have been consisting of Cargo (Freight plus Mail) rather than Freight only. The data series themselves have not been changed.
- Explanation of measurement terms:
  - CTK: cargo tonne-kilometers measures actual cargo traffic
  - ACTK: available cargo tonne-kilometers measures available total cargo capacity
  - CLF: cargo load factor is % of ACTKs used

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Press Release No: 6

Date: 31 January 2024



## Global Air Travel Demand Continued Its Bounce Back in 2023



Translation: [国际航协：2023年全球航空旅行需求全年保持复苏态势](#) (pdf)

**Geneva** - The International Air Transport Association (IATA) announced that the recovery in air travel continued in December 2023 and total 2023 traffic edged even closer to matching pre-pandemic demand.

**Total traffic** in 2023 (measured in revenue passenger kilometers or RPKs) rose 36.9% compared to 2022. Globally, full year 2023 traffic was at 94.1% of pre-pandemic (2019) levels. December 2023 total traffic rose 25.3% compared to December 2022 and reached 97.5% of the December 2019 level. Fourth quarter traffic was at 98.2% of 2019, reflecting the strong recovery towards the end of the year.

**International traffic** in 2023 climbed 41.6% versus 2022 and reached 88.6% of 2019 levels. December 2023 international traffic climbed 24.2% over December 2022, reaching 94.7% of the level in December 2019. Fourth quarter traffic was at 94.5% of 2019.

**Domestic traffic** for 2023 rose 30.4% compared to the prior year. 2023 domestic traffic was 3.9% above the full year 2019 level. December 2023 domestic traffic was up 27.0% over the year earlier period and was at 2.3% above December 2019 traffic. Fourth quarter traffic was 4.4% higher than the same quarter in 2019.

"The strong post-pandemic rebound continued in 2023. December traffic stood just 2.5% below 2019 levels, with a strong performance in quarter 4, teeing-up airlines for a return to normal growth patterns in 2024. The recovery in travel is good news. The restoration of connectivity is powering the global economy as people travel to do business, further their educations, take hard-earned vacations and much more. But to maximize the benefits of air travel in the post-pandemic world, governments need to take a strategic approach. That means providing cost-efficient infrastructure to meet demand, incentivizing Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) production to meet our net zero carbon emission goal by 2050, and adopting regulations that deliver a clear cost-benefit. Completing the recovery must not be an excuse for governments to forget the critical role of aviation to increasing the prosperity and well-being of people and businesses the world over," said Willie Walsh, IATA's Director General.

### Air Passenger Market in Detail

DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)	Total Market
WORLD SHARE <sup>1</sup>	100%
RPK	25.3%
ASK	24.1%
PLF(%-PT) <sup>2</sup>	0.8%
PLF(LEVEL) <sup>3</sup>	82.1%

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<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Africa
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	2.1%
<b>RPK</b>	12.1%
<b>ASK</b>	18.7%
<b>PLF(%-PT)2</b>	-4.3%
<b>PLF(LEVEL)3</b>	73.2%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Asia Pacific
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	22.1%
<b>RPK</b>	60.7%
<b>ASK</b>	53.4%
<b>PLF(%-PT)2</b>	3.7%
<b>PLF(LEVEL)3</b>	81.2%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Europe
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	30.8%
<b>RPK</b>	12.5%
<b>ASK</b>	12.3%
<b>PLF(%-PT)2</b>	0.1%
<b>PLF(LEVEL)3</b>	85.1%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Latin America
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	6.4%
<b>RPK</b>	16.3%
<b>ASK</b>	10.4%
<b>PLF(%-PT)2</b>	4.2%
<b>PLF(LEVEL)3</b>	82.7%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Middle East
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	9.8%
<b>RPK</b>	16.4%
<b>ASK</b>	17.2%
<b>PLF(%-PT)2</b>	-0.6%
<b>PLF(LEVEL)3</b>	78.2%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	North America
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	28.8%
<b>RPK</b>	10.6%

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1) % of industry RPKs in 2022 2) Year-on-year change in load factor 3) Load Factor Level

## International Passenger Markets

**Asia-Pacific airlines** posted a 126.1% rise in full year international 2023 traffic compared to 2022, maintaining the strongest year-over-year rate among the regions. Capacity rose 101.8% and the load factor climbed 9.0 percentage points to 83.1%. December 2023 traffic rose 56.9% compared to December 2022.

**European carriers'** full year traffic climbed 22.0% versus 2022. Capacity increased 17.5%, and load factor rose 3.1 percentage points to 83.8%. For December, demand climbed 13.6% compared to the same month in 2022. December traffic was higher than the corresponding month in 2019 for the first time since the start of the pandemic.

**Middle Eastern airlines** saw a 33.3% traffic rise in 2023 compared to 2022. Capacity increased 26.0% and load factor climbed 4.4 percentage points to 80.1%. December demand climbed 16.6% compared to the same month in 2022.

**North American carriers** reported a 28.3% annual traffic rise in 2023 compared to 2022. Capacity increased 22.4%, and load factor climbed 3.9 percentage points to 84.6%. December 2023 traffic rose 13.5% compared to the year-ago period.

**Latin American airlines** posted a 28.6% traffic rise in 2023 over full year 2022. Annual capacity climbed 25.4% and load factor increased 2.1 percentage points to 84.7%, the highest among the regions. December demand climbed 26.5% compared to December 2022.

**African airlines'** annual traffic rose 38.7% in 2023 versus the prior year. Full year 2023 capacity was up 38.3% and load factor climbed 0.2 percentage points to 71.9%, the lowest among regions. December 2023 traffic for African airlines rose 9.5% over December 2022.

## Domestic Passenger Markets

DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)	Domestic
WORLD SHARE1	41.9%
RPK	27.0%
ASK	22.9%
PLF(%-PT)2	2.7%
PLF(LEVEL)3	82.3%
DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)	Domestic Australia
WORLD SHARE1	1.0%
RPK	6.6%
ASK	4.1%
PLF(%-PT)2	1.9%
PLF(LEVEL)3	82.1%
DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)	Domestic Brazil
WORLD SHARE1	1.5%
RPK	5.9%
ASK	0.7%
PLF(%-PT)2	4.0%
PLF(LEVEL)3	81.4%
DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)	Domestic China P.R.
WORLD SHARE1	6.4%
RPK	147.1%
ASK	105.0%

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<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Domestic India
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	2.0%
<b>RPK</b>	8.2%
<b>ASK</b>	6.1%
<b>PLF(%-PT)2</b>	1.8%
<b>PLF(LEVEL)3</b>	90.6%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Domestic Japan
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	1.2%
<b>RPK</b>	0.9%
<b>ASK</b>	-2.4%
<b>PLF(%-PT)2</b>	2.4%
<b>PLF(LEVEL)3</b>	73.8%
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% YEAR-ON-YEAR)</b>	Domestic US
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	19.2%
<b>RPK</b>	9.6%
<b>ASK</b>	10.2%
<b>PLF(%-PT)2</b>	-0.5%
<b>PLF(LEVEL)3</b>	83.4%

1) % of industry RPKs in 2022 2) year-on-year change in load factor 3) Load Factor Level

**China's** full year domestic traffic rose 138.8% versus 2022, and is now 7.1% above the 2019 level.

**Australia** (-4.2% compared to 2019) and **Japan** (-3.2% compared to 2019) are the only major domestic markets yet to recover pre-pandemic traffic demand.

## Air Passenger Market Overview - December 2023

<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% CH VS SAME MONTH IN 2019)</b>	<b>Total Market</b>
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>RPK</b>	<b>-5.9%</b>
<b>ASK</b>	<b>-5.6%</b>
<b>PLF (%-PT)2</b>	<b>-0.3%</b>
<b>PLF (LEVEL)3</b>	<b>82.3%</b>
<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% CH VS SAME MONTH IN 2019)</b>	International
<b>WORLD SHARE1</b>	58.1%
<b>RPK</b>	-11.4%
<b>ASK</b>	-12.3%
<b>PLF (%-PT)2</b>	0.8%

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<b>DECEMBER 2023 (% CH VS SAME MONTH IN 2019)</b>	Domestic
<b>WORLD SHARE<sup>1</sup></b>	41.9%
<b>RPK</b>	3.9%
<b>ASK</b>	6.5%
<b>PLF (%-PT)<sup>2</sup></b>	-2.1%
<b>PLF (LEVEL)<sup>3</sup></b>	81.5%

1) % of industry RPKs in 2022 2) year-on-year change in load factor 3) Load Factor Level

## The Bottom Line

“Our push to connect our world even more strongly than before the pandemic must not come at the expense of our environment. The industry’s goal to reach net zero CO2 emissions by 2050 remains steadfast. To accelerate the transition, we need governments and fuel suppliers to step up and do more. We saw a strong increase in the use of SAF in 2023, but SAF is still only 3% of all global renewable fuels production. That is unacceptable. Aircraft have no option but to rely on liquid fuels, whereas other transport modes have alternatives. A massive collective effort is needed to increase SAF output as a proportion of overall renewable fuel production as quickly as possible,” said Walsh.

> View the [December Air Passenger Market Analysis \(pdf\)](#)

### For more information, please contact:

Corporate Communications  
Tel: +41 22 770 2967  
Email: [corpcomms@iata.org](mailto:corpcomms@iata.org)

### Notes for Editors:

- IATA (International Air Transport Association) represents some 320 airlines comprising 83% of global air traffic.
- You can follow us at [twitter.com/iata](https://twitter.com/iata) for announcements, policy positions, and other useful industry information.
- [Fly Net Zero](#)
- Statistics compiled by IATA Economics using direct airline reporting complemented by estimates, including the use of FlightRadar24 data provided under license.
- All figures are provisional and represent total reporting at time of publication plus estimates for missing data. Historic figures are subject to revision.
- Domestic RPKs accounted for about 41.9% of the total market in 2022. The six domestic markets in this report account for 31.3% of global RPKs.
- Explanation of measurement terms:
  - RPK: Revenue Passenger Kilometers measures actual passenger traffic
  - ASK: Available Seat Kilometers measures available passenger capacity
  - PLF: Passenger Load Factor is % of ASKs used.
- IATA statistics cover international and domestic scheduled air traffic for IATA member and non-member airlines.
- Total passenger traffic market shares by region of carriers for 2022 in terms of RPK are: Asia-Pacific 22.1%, Europe 30.8%, North America 28.8%, Middle East 9.8%, Latin America 6.4%, and Africa 2.1%.

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# GM Went All In on EVs. Dealers Say Buyers Want Hybrids.

## Some auto retailers worry GM is missing an opportunity to nab buyers who aren't ready for EVs

By [Mike Colias](#) Follow

Updated Jan. 29, 2024 12:40 pm ET

Resize



A move toward hybrids would mark a major strategic reversal for General Motors. PHOTO: DAVID PAUL MORRIS/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Some influential dealers are pressing [General Motors](#) to introduce hybrid models, worried they risk losing customers who aren't ready to make the switch to fully electric cars.

Dealers who serve on advisory committees to the automaker have urged executives in several recent meetings to add hybrids to GM's lineup, according to people involved in the discussions. GM has focused on fully electric cars in recent years and [largely bypassed hybrids](#), which pair an internal combustion engine with a small battery and electric motor to boost fuel efficiency.

The dealers said they expressed concern that more customers are looking for a middle ground between conventional gas-engine cars and EVs, which are more expensive and require regular charging.

GM executives have acknowledged the dealers' views but haven't made any commitments to future hybrid options, the people said. Automakers often solicit input from dealers on vehicle planning but still typically keep the details of future models under wraps.

A GM spokesman declined to comment.

The dealers' pleas for the company to consider adding hybrid models show another dimension of the pressure [facing GM Chief Executive Mary Barra](#) as aspects of her EV push stall.

Making such a move would mark [a major strategic reversal](#) for GM, which unlike many of its rivals, went all-in on EVs and largely sat out the hybrid market, which executives viewed as an unnecessary interim step.

Last month, Barra didn't rule out the prospect of introducing hybrid models in the U.S. when asked about it during an event in Detroit, noting that GM sells them in China.

“I still believe in the endgame, that you want to move to EVs as quickly as you can,” she said. “But we have the technology, and we’ll continue to look at where the market is.”

Across the industry, automakers [have seen the pace of EV sales growth slow](#) after a few years of intense consumer interest.

Meanwhile, hybrids have taken off over the past year amid consumer reticence toward full electrics, turned off by higher prices and worries about getting stranded between charging stations. Many dealers and car executives see hybrids as an important choice on the spectrum between straight gas-powered cars and EVs.

“With EV adoption slower, [hybrids are going to be a bigger part](#)” of the business, Ford Chief Financial Officer John Lawler said at a [Barclays](#) investor conference in November. [Toyota](#), [Honda](#), Hyundai and [Kia](#) are the major players in the hybrid market. Sales of hybrid vehicles in the U.S. surged more than 50% last year, after a small drop in 2022, according to research firm Motor Intelligence.



Dealers’ pleas for hybrid models show a dimension of pressure facing GM CEO Mary Barra. PHOTO: ANNA MONEYMAKER/GETTY IMAGES

Those include regular hybrids, which supplement the gas engine but generally don’t propel the car on electric power alone, and plug-in hybrids, which can travel in electric mode for a certain distance—typically 10 to 40 miles—before the gas engine takes over.

“Hybrids are what’s hot right now,” said Chris Hemmersmeier, a Salt Lake City-area car dealer who has GM stores as well as other brands, including Kia and Jeep.

He said hybrid models at those non-GM stores—including the Kia Sportage compact SUV and [Stellantis](#)’s Jeep Wrangler and Grand Cherokee plug-in-hybrid SUVs, sold under the 4xe name—have been selling briskly, and he’s worried GM’s EV-heavy focus will cause his stores to lose customers.

“I’d like to see GM prioritize hybrids,” said Hemmersmeier, who operates Chevrolet and Buick-GMC stores and hasn’t been involved in the dealer-committee meetings with company executives.

GM offered hybrids for the U.S. market at times over the past two decades. In the mid-2000s, it came out with [hybrid versions of its big SUVs](#), such as the GMC Yukon and Cadillac Escalade, among its most profitable vehicles. Those sold poorly, though, and were phased out within a few years.

GM was among the first automakers to introduce a plug-in hybrid when it released the Chevrolet Volt in 2010. It offered about 40 miles of driving range in electric mode before a gas generator kicked on to power the electric motor. The Volt was celebrated as an engineering feat and garnered a loyal following, but was a money loser and fell short of GM’s internal sales targets. The company [discontinued it in 2019](#).

Today there are dozens of plug-in hybrid models on sale in the U.S., with Stellantis's SUVs the top sellers.

In recent years, GM executives have expressed skepticism about hybrid technology and concern that they would distract from the company's long-term goal of near-exclusive electric sales by 2035.

"Customers generally aren't interested in hybrids, the value proposition there," Barra said at a Barclays investor conference in 2019. "We believe moving to electric vehicles as quickly as possible is the right thing to do."

In recent months, dealers more broadly have expressed worries that U.S. policy to expand EV adoption is getting ahead of consumers.

Last week, auto retailers representing about 5,000 U.S. stores sent a letter to President Biden, urging his administration to stand down from proposed new tailpipe-emissions rules that would require more than half of U.S. sales to be EVs by next decade. They said a lack of charger availability and consumer interest make that unrealistic.

"Wait for the American consumer to make the choice to buy an electric vehicle, confident that they are affordable and won't strand them because of a lack of charging stations," the letter said.

Write to Mike Colias at [mike.colias@wsj.com](mailto:mike.colias@wsj.com)

[Posted week of Jan 22, 2024]

<https://evvoiceofthecustomer.com/>

## Let our customers' voices be heard.

Nearly **4,700 dealerships** reflecting the voice of our customers, representing all major vehicle manufacturing brands spanning 50 states, are calling on President Biden to hit the brakes on the proposed Electric Vehicle Mandate. Add your dealership name to the letter using the form below.



## A New Letter from Auto Dealers to the President

Dear Mr. President,

In November of last year, over 4,000 auto dealers from across the country representing every major automotive brand wrote you a letter asking that you “tap the brakes” on a proposed government electric vehicle mandate. The letter reflected the voice of our customers – the Americans who come to our dealerships every day to buy vehicles that are affordable and meet their needs.

There has been no response to the letter from your Administration.

In the next 8-10 weeks, the proposed regulations are expected to be finalized. As you consider whether to force American consumers to buy electric vehicles at unprecedented levels, we ask that you consider some facts:

- The number of electric vehicles that qualify for the \$7,500 tax credit in 2024 is less than half the number that qualified in 2023 (only 19 versus 43 last year). New rules disqualify vehicles that rely heavily on components and minerals from China, which currently

dominates the supply chain for batteries. The cost premium for electric vehicles is a major factor for consumers, and the loss of these credits is bound to depress consumer demand in 2024 and beyond.

- Despite the \$7.5 billion allocated two years ago to build public electric vehicle charging stations, just three have been opened to date. Range anxiety is a major factor in consumers' reluctance to buy electric vehicles. Based on the government's estimates, 2.8 million public chargers will be needed by 2032, but only 170,000 public chargers exist today. That means 800 new chargers would have to be built every single day -- for the next nine years. Clearly, this is not even in the realm of possibility.
- Electric vehicles represented just 8% of vehicles sold in 2023. The proposed regulations would require that 60% of vehicles sold in 2030 be battery electric – and two out of every three by 2032. Electric vehicle sales are not remotely on trend to meet those requirements. Indeed, the day supply of electric vehicles on dealer lots today is nearly twice the supply of conventional vehicles.

Mr. President, our letter in November asked that you tap the brakes on the electric vehicle mandate. We now ask that you hit the brakes. It is uncontested that the combination of fewer tax incentives, a woefully inadequate charging infrastructure, and insufficient consumer demand makes the proposed electric vehicle mandate completely unrealistic.

On behalf of our customers, we ask that you pause on the electric vehicle mandate. Wait for the battery supply chain to develop outside the control of China. Wait for the charging infrastructure to support a significant increase in electric vehicles. And wait for the American consumer to make the choice to buy an electric vehicle, confident that they are affordable and won't strand them because of a lack of charging stations.

Mr. President, we share your belief in an electric vehicle future. We only ask that you not accelerate into that future before the road is ready.

Sincerely,

*Supporting Dealerships*

Contents

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4

9GW

Total US offshore wind contracts terminated in last seven months

7.7GW

New offshore wind projects awarded by New Jersey and New York in last four months

50%

Increase in levelized cost of electricity for US offshore wind projects since 2021

# US Offshore Wind Cancellation Mania Leaves Few Standing


The latest offshore wind project contracts to be canceled in the US — the BP and Equinor-owned 1.2-gigawatt Beacon Wind 1 project in New York and Orsted-owned 1GW Skipjack Wind off the coast of Maryland — bring the total of dead deals to almost 9GW. That is about a third of the 25GW capacity signed or awarded offtake contracts, according to BloombergNEF.

The pain may not be over. Another 3.3GW of projects have sought contract renegotiations with state regulators and could still be on the chopping block.

## US Offshore Wind: Few Players Remain After Cancellation Frenzy

About half of US offshore wind power contracts are either already canceled or look on course for termination

■ Canceled ■ Renegotiation sought ■ No public evidence of renegotiation attempts  
■ Auction awards in 2023-24 ■ Under construction



Dominion Energy and the consortium of Invenergy-energyRe are the only two 100% US-owned firms building offshore wind projects in the US. All other developers are either European-owned firms or partnerships that include a European company.

Source: BloombergNEF, companies, news reports  
Note: BP and Equinor's portfolio is highlighted separately after their announcement to break partnership in the US offshore wind projects. Sunrise Wind project's capacity is shown under Orsted-Eversource. The capacity could move to Orsted upon successful outcome of New York's fourth solicitation. Total capacity shown here includes projects awarded in New Jersey's third solicitation that closed on January 24.

BloombergNEF

Atin Jain

BP and Equinor terminated the contract for their 1.3GW Empire Wind 1 project in New York in early January, after spiraling cost inflation and rising interest rates slashed the wind farm's expected profitability. Orsted last year canceled two of its offshore wind projects off the coast of New Jersey and took \$4 billion in impairments (see *Orsted U-Turn Deals Deadly Blow to US Offshore Wind Goals: BNEF [web](#) | [terminal](#)*).

The latest series of events leaves only a few advanced stage US offshore wind projects that are still moving ahead with development. However, there are reasons for optimism. Undeterred by the cancellations, states have continued building their project pipelines by handing out contracts, often with sweeter terms than they had offered previously.

New Jersey recently awarded 3.7GW of new offshore wind projects in its third offshore wind solicitation (see *New Jersey's Biggest Offshore Wind Award Is Also Its Priciest [web](#) | [terminal](#)*), and New York awarded 4GW of projects in its third auction late last year (see *New York Hits Offshore Wind Reset, But at a Steep Price [web](#) | [terminal](#)*). New York is also in the process of awarding as much as 4GW of new projects in its expedited fourth solicitation that closed for bidding last week. Some developers are hoping to win new contracts on better terms for their recently-canceled projects in the auction.

### Partnerships break as companies seek more control

There is a shift in the partnership strategy of companies in the US offshore wind market.

BP and Equinor have announced that they are splitting up their US offshore wind joint venture. Each will assume full control of one of the seabed areas that the joint venture previously owned. BP gets the Beacon Wind project area, while Equinor will own the Empire Wind area. BP announced that it will take a pretax impairment of around \$600 million in 4Q 2023, while Equinor expects a combined loss of around \$200 million on its US offshore wind projects.

Orsted is also taking over Eversource Energy's 50% share in the 0.9GW Sunrise Wind project along coastal New York. The deal is subject to a successful outcome of the project's bid in New York's fourth solicitation, however. Eversource has been looking to offload its stakes in US offshore wind projects for some time and will take about \$1.6 billion of impairments in 4Q 2023. Eversource owns stakes in joint ventures with Orsted for the under-construction 0.1GW South Fork Wind project and 0.7GW Revolution Wind projects and in ready-to-be-built 0.9GW Sunrise Wind east of Long Island, New York. The status of the Orsted and Eversource partnership for the under-construction South Fork and Revolution projects is unclear.

The companies previously forged partnerships, hoping that working with partners would allow them to share risk in the nascent market. With the changing macroeconomic and supply chain landscape, companies are now looking for greater freedom and flexibility in project development strategies to control costs overruns and delays — something which is not as easy in a partnership.

Over 10GW of US offshore wind projects that were either recently awarded or have an active offtake contract are being developed by developer consortia. More joint ventures could be in jeopardy if the current headwinds continue.

### The road ahead

Inflation and supply chain challenges have driven up capital expenditure, while financing costs have spiraled due to rising interest rates, hitting developer margins. The levelized cost of electricity of a subsidized US offshore wind project increased to \$114.20 per megawatt-hour in




2023, up almost 50% from 2021 levels in nominal terms, according to BNEF calculations. For more, see *US Offshore Wind Goals at Risk With Contract Revisions* ([web](#) | [terminal](#)).

Developers find it easier and cheaper to terminate contracts and re-bid for more attractive terms than build projects and incur heavier losses (see *Avangrid Axing US Offshore Wind Deal Signals Further Pain: BNEF* [web](#) | [terminal](#) and *Iberdrola Unit's Puny \$49 Million Fine to End US Wind Deal: BNEF* [web](#) | [terminal](#)). A move by New York to hold an [accelerated offshore wind solicitation](#) to partly backfill canceled capacity gave an exit-opportunity to companies like BP, Equinor and Orsted, resulting in the most recent flurry of cancellations.

BNEF believes that the US offshore wind industry is approaching the end of its bruising phase of contract cancellations. The pipeline of projects that still hold contracts at lower prices with fewer contractual protections from inflation is dwindling. While these projects could still terminate their offtake contracts, an easing of interest rates and stabilization of project costs this year should help the developers transition to profitable business cases.

The long-term outlook for US offshore wind remains promising. BNEF expects about 14.5GW of cumulative offshore wind installations by 2030 and 42.3GW by 2035, from just 42 megawatts of total capacity at the end of 2023.



**Related BNEF content:**

*New Jersey's Biggest Offshore Wind Award Is Also Its Priciest* ([web](#) | [terminal](#))

*BNEF Theme: Unleashing the US Wind Power Boom* ([web](#) | [terminal](#))

*Wind: 10 Things to Watch in 2024* ([web](#) | [terminal](#))

*New York Hits Offshore Wind Reset, But at a Steep Price* ([web](#) | [terminal](#))

*Offshore Wind Market Outlook 2H 2023: Ramp-Up Delayed* ([web](#) | [terminal](#))

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#### Contact details

##### Client enquiries:

- Bloomberg Terminal: press <Help> key twice
- Email: [support.bnef@bloomberg.net](mailto:support.bnef@bloomberg.net)

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Atin Jain	Senior Associate, Wind
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Oliver Metcalfe	Head of Wind Research
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
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[about.bnef.com/mobile](http://about.bnef.com/mobile)

# Bell: Calgarians win and Gondek loses as council to axe bogus bag bylaw

*There's an election next year and people have to start seeing the writing on the wall and it isn't pretty*

Author of the article:

[Rick Bell](#)

Published Jan 31, 2024 • Last updated 5 hours ago • 4 minute read



Calgary Ward 1 Coun. Sonya Sharp speaks to media regarding the single-use items bylaw at City Hall on Tuesday, January 30, 2024. Brent Calver/Postmedia

You did it. You really did it.

To quote the legendary Peter Maher, the long-time voice of Calgary Flames hockey: “Yeah, baby!”

Article content

Yes, we’re now only one step away from seeing city council officially pull the plug on the half-baked bag bylaw.

There will be a public hearing in May and a final vote and a last hurdle before throwing the bylaw into the garbage can of history, never to be recycled.

Here’s Mayor Jyoti Gondek from the loser’s dressing room.

“It’s going to be coming to a public hearing to make it disappear,” says Gondek, of the bag bylaw she so much wanted to save.

She talks about the full repeal of the bylaw, the killing of it.

“The full repeal coming forward takes away every measure we have tried to put in,” says Gondek.

Absolutely and that’s the best news we heard all day.

The mayor says “there were components of this bylaw that were actually pretty good.”

But guess what happened?

Calgarians weren't buying what she and others were selling and they pushed back and scared sense into enough councillors to put one in the win column.

“Instead of understanding what was good and keeping it we just threw the whole thing away today,” says Gondek.

Ain't it grand.

People all over the place were enjoying the moment.

Premier Danielle Smith took to social media pictured drinking Canada Dry ginger ale with a plastic straw.

“Calgary is one step closer to getting free napkins, cutlery, condiments and bags back ... next, plastic straws.”



Dan McLean would have loved to give the bylaw the heave-ho Tuesday but city hall has its rules and the pull-no-punches councillor is not going to sit back and hold his fire.

“This bylaw might be more unpopular than this city council,” says McLean.

“We should be listening to the people. We are hired by the people.”

And, looking at poll numbers, this is the most unpopular city council ever along with Gondek, the most unpopular mayor ever.

Yes, she is on the short end of the stick on this one.

The mayor thought a propaganda update from city paper shufflers and a change to the bylaw having the new rules not apply to drive-thrus would somehow save the day.

The plan? Water down the bylaw but don't get rid of it.

Didn't work.

Congrats to the councillors who stood their ground.

This was one experiment that blew up in the faces of the Calgary city hall establishment.



Calgary Ward 13 Coun. Dan McLean speaks to media regarding the single-use items bylaw at City Hall on Tuesday, January 30, 2024. Brent Calver/Postmedia

Down at city hall, often nicknamed the Cowtown Kremlin, they don't get it because they don't want to get it.

They see their job as telling you they're right and you're wrong.

Chabot points to the huge and historic pushback from Calgarians.

"I need to send the copies of all these emails I've received. It seems like they've never seen them," he says, of the city higher-ups.

Councillor Chabot, they can't handle the truth.

Chabot adds this bylaw is "a pain in the butt."

Too true.



Calgary Ward 10 Coun. Andre Chabot speaks to media regarding the single-use items bylaw at City Hall on Tuesday, January 30, 2024. Brent Calver/Postmedia

Sonya Sharp is the councillor who believes punishing people is not the solution and Calgarians got what was going on.

Sharp calls bringing in the bag bylaw the most unpopular decision of this city council's term of office.

There is the other side.

There is Gian-Carlo Carra, the councillor who advises us all to "chill out" because this is "small potatoes."

"We are entering silly season," says Carra.

Silly season seems to be the only season at city hall.

On Tuesday, a chinook of common sense blew into the building.

Carra mocks the anti-bag bylaw emails he's read and speaks of many of them as "sad and laughable."

The councillor is talking about the emails not himself.

Hear Carra as he reaches the peak of pomposity.

"I'm reminded of the Dunning-Kruger effect which is the idea that people who have the least amount of knowledge on a subject have the most amount of confidence."

He's talking about you, dear reader. I think it's an insult.

Kourtney Penner, who got elected because Ward 11 voters must have been sleeping on election day, talks about "putting a price on convenience and consumption."

"I'm OK with that," says Penner.

But everything was not OK.

For this one time the council majority couldn't hold together.

There's an election next year and people have to start seeing the writing on the wall and it isn't pretty.

Jennifer Wyness is the councillor who put forward scrapping the bylaw.

Does she think the bylaw will be declared dead at the public hearing?

"With this council I'm never 100% sure of anything."

Memo to Calgarians. Keep the pressure on, right to the finish line.

[rbell@postmedia.com](mailto:rbell@postmedia.com)





SAF

Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 3h

2024 watch item!

Best indicator for mid/long term #oil?

What will IOCs/NOCs do to 3-5 yr capex plans post Saudi passing on taking MSC from 12 to 13 mmbd.

Negative if they also pull back on capex.

Positive if no change or increase capex...

[Show more](#)

***"does it discourage others to pull back on their capex investment, or does it do the opposite, does it incentivize others to do more because it leaves an opportunity?" Sean Evers, Gulf Intelligence***



SAF Group created transcript of comments by Sean Evers (Gulf Intelligence Founder & Managing Partner) on the Gulf Intelligence Daily Energy Markets Podcast on Feb 4, 2024.

[https://twitter.com/gulf\\_intel/status/1754029960879354353](https://twitter.com/gulf_intel/status/1754029960879354353)

Items in *italics* are SAF Group created transcript

On the Saudi decision to not move to expand their MSC to 13 mmbd/d, at 30:15 min mark, Sean Evers *"well it certainly, I think has sentiment impact perhaps, in the sense of, does it discourage others to pull back on their capex investment, or does it do it the opposite, does it incentivize others to do more because it leaves an opportunity? That will be interesting. One might see the impact of that sooner rather than later. And I think that's possibly something to note."*

Prepared by SAF Group <https://safgroup.ca/news-insights/>



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


SAF Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 16h  
Reminder #CoastalGasLink 100% mechanical completion in Nov 2023.

#LNGCanada 1.8 bcf/d Phase 1 is key Cdn #NatGas event.

Should soon hear if #LNGCanada is moving to LNG cargos for Nov 2024 ie. for winter 2024/25.

Shell #LNG outlook is on Feb 14. TC Energy Q4 Feb 16.  
#OOT



**Construction Update**  
November 29, 2023

**Coastal GasLink achieves mechanical completion ahead of schedule**

In early November 2023, Coastal GasLink achieved mechanical completion ahead of its year-end target. Together with our owners, contractors and indigenous and local communities, we have made history by completing Canada's first pipeline to the west coast in over 70 years.


Mechanical completion includes the safe completion of construction, successful hydrotesting of the full 670 km pipeline and appropriate engineering reviews. With mechanical completion, Coastal GasLink is in the final completing pipeline commissioning activities to be ready to deliver commissioning gas to the LNG Canada facility by the end of this year.

While construction is complete, our work on the project continues, including implementing important operational plans and preparing our team and communities for operations. Crews have been demobilizing from construction activities, including several of our workforce accommodations. A portion of the workforce will return in Spring 2024 to continue reclamation work.


Since project planning began more than ten years ago, we have achieved so much together, on and off the right of way. Coastal GasLink looks forward to continuing to be a part of the local community as we prepare for safe operations for decades to come.

**Let's keep in touch**

While this will be our final Construction Update for Phase 1, we encourage you to stay up to date by visiting our website, subscribing to updates and following us on our social channels @CoastalGasLink. We will continue to provide updates through subscriptions, email notifications and on our website, as needed.



SAF Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Feb 1



OOPS!

must have fallen asleep in the last question on #LNGCanada 1.8 bcf/d Phase 1 on Shell Q4 call

...  
[Show more](#)

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SAF


Dan Tsubouchi  @Energy\_Tidbits · 18h

...

Updated @NOAA 6-10 & 8-14 day temperature outlook covering Feb 9-17.

Warmer than normal in Feb is never a plus a HH #NatGas prices.

#OOTT



<https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/predictions/814day/index.php>



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4

2K





Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 23h  
Houthis Red Sea impact?

...

#Oil floating storage at Feb 2 +8.55 mmb WoW to 72.25.

But only been 6 wks in 60s since Covid & Jan 27 of 63.70 mmb is lowest.

Are some floating storage barrels filling any delivery gaps from tankers having to go via Cape of Good Hope?

Thx @Vortexa...  
[Show more](#)



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Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Feb 3



Bad timing for Gulf Coast refineries if Biden reimposes VEN sanctions .


@EIAgov PADD 3 #Oil imports.

~150 kbd from VEN.

some % of ~450 kbd imports from CAN at risk w/ Trans Mountain  
590,000 b/d TMX startup

some % of ~600 kbd imports from MEX at risk / ~340 kbd Olmeca...

[Show more](#)



1

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14

2.3K



SAF — Dan Tsubouchi  @Energy\_Tidbits · Feb 2  
Great map courtesy of [@EIAgov](#) Josh Eiermann

...

Shows relative tanker travel times from US Gulf Coast to China.

Via Panama Canal (27 days)

Suez Canal (44 days)

Cape of Good Hope (48 days)

...

[Show more](#)



SAF

Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Feb 2  
Imperial Oil CEO on Trans Mountain 590,000 b/d TMX expansion.

...

re TMX 01/29 delay news, "still very optimistic that system will start up in the 2nd quarter"

Also reminds TMX start up should lead to a narrowing of WCS less WTI differentials.

#OOTT

**Q - Greg Parry (BIO 2136827 <GO>)**  
Okay, thanks. Thanks for that, Brad. The second one is, I've asked it before, but I think it was considered proprietary. But I'm just curious, are you a shipper on Trans Mountain? And maybe if the answer is we're not telling you, can you perhaps just kind of walk us through how done you've. See sort of TMX impacting the business top to bottom.

**A - Brad Carson (BIO 17080997 <GO>)**  
Yeah, thanks for the question. I don't think we view it as proprietary, whether we're shipper or not. I'm happy to tell you that we are a shipper on TMX. What's normally viewed as proprietary is the volumes that we plan to ship in terms of total volume split between crude and products. So I won't get into those details with you. I will tell you, though, that relative to other shippers, were relatively minor in terms of the capacity reservations that we've made on the system.

We are quite excited about the startup of TMX, which we view as imminent and targeting sometime in the second quarter. Of course, there was recent news, the beginning of this week, about some delays, but we're still very optimistic that system will start up in the second quarter. And when it starts up, certainly it gives us as a company additional capacity for crude volumes, which again is not significant for us.

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INITIAL DRAFT TRANSCRIPT  
Imperial Oil Ltd (IMO CN Equity) 2020-03-02

It gives us additional capacity for products, which is more significant for us, maybe not in volume, but just more potential to access some higher value markets with efficient transportation.

But more importantly is the broader impact the startup of TMX will have on the industry, providing significantly additional capacity for access out of the basin. And that will have, we believe, as I commented, we believe that will result in a tightening of the WCS differential and will place higher value on WCS crudes, which of course, we're a major. You know, the biggest benefit for us is not the individual barrels we ship, but our view of the impact it will have on our crude value.

We continue to see maximum value, primarily shipping our crude into the mid continent, into the Gulf coast. And so we'll continue to move most of our barrels in that direction, but always looking at where are the highest value markets and making sure we're positioned capture those over the long term. And that's where having optionality to go West, go know. Puts us in a great position. Thanks for the question.

SAF Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Jan 29



No indication yet what impact on Trans Mountain TMX timing.

But WCS less WTI differential widened \$2.10 to \$18.20 today. ...

[Show more](#)

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


Dan Tsubouchi @EnergyTidbits · Feb 2

Reminder #LNG tankers being forced around Cape of Good Hope to avoid Red Sea because of the Houthis AND drought restrictions keeping LNG tankers via Panama Canal at lows.

Also Asian buyers not worried about winter LNG supply risk

Thx @Bloomberg Han Wei, Kornelija Dauksaite...  
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Dan Tsubouchi @EnergyTidbits · 23m

Houthi leader speech

US failed to get China to mediate/persuade Houthis to stop

Red Sea naval operations to continue

Reminds "Yemeni people are accustomed to difficulties and suffering" ie. not easy to get rid of them.

Looks like Houthi vs US/UK attacks to continue...  
Show more

**Seyyed Abdoallah, Yemen's Military Spokes Represents People, Expresses Their Will**

**News - Yemen:** The leader of the Yemeni revolution, Seyyed Abdoallah Bakir Ali Bin Al-Hadi, presented the Houthi revolutionaries through a video message to stop the Yemeni naval operations in support of the Palestinian people.

Seyyed Abdoallah stated in a televised speech on Thursday evening, "One of the signs of failure is knowing that you have lost the support of your people." He pointed out that China understands its interests and does not want to follow the American lead, and knows what the demands are being in Yemen.

The declaration of Yemeni revolution comes after the United States failed to convince Yemen to restrict oil flows to fund the Yemeni naval operations supporting Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.

**Seyyed Abdoallah Al-Hadi announced the continuation of Yemen's military, naval, and land operations in support of the Palestinian people and the Yemeni revolution.** He affirmed that "Yemeni revolutionaries are not interested in other people's lives, and the enemy must pay a high price for that."

He also emphasized that the aggression against Yemen will not affect its people, that it will only weaken its military capabilities, which is not in the interests of the Americans, and they are responsible for the results.

Regarding the United States and British vessels in Yemen, he stated that they have no right and will not be allowed to continue their operations.

He stated: "The US should have a lesson from the other that learned from right and wrong and should turn to the right."

Seyyed Abdoallah pointed out that initially, America announced that its aggressive operations to protect Israel's oil flow would provide a safe passage and available facilities to gain cooperation from other countries, but it failed.

He said: "The Americans and the British cannot even protect their own ships, nor can they protect their naval assets from being targeted by missiles and warships." He added: "If only the US President decided to wage aggression against Yemen to protect Israeli ships, he would be the US President, and there were problems within Congress from some members."

He also stated that instead of stopping arms, the US President should deal with the crisis in his own country and the problems created by his policies in Yemen and elsewhere.

**Abdoallah Bakir**, who served Yemen's revolution with the armed forces, has been a member of the Houthi revolution since its inception. He received a PhD in political science from the University of Sana'a in 1995.

He added that the Yemeni people are accustomed to difficulties and suffering, living with all the hardships of the revolution. They are resilient and steadfast, and they continue to face the problems they are facing with courage and determination. They are not afraid of any threat, and they will continue to fight for their rights and the rights of the Palestinian people.

Regarding the news, messages, and demonstrations in Yemen in support of Gaza, the leader of the Yemeni revolution stated that "the message to the world has been clear: the people of Yemen will continue to support the Palestinian people and will stand with them in their struggle against the Israeli occupation. He also stated that the message to the world is that the Yemeni people are not interested in other people's lives, and they are responsible for the results of their actions."

Commenting on the decision of the International Court of Justice, Seyyed Abdoallah condemned the decision "and does not represent justice towards the Israeli army against the people of Gaza," emphasizing that international law is "not influenced by the United States, and despite the strength of the case, the decision should be rejected."

The leader believes that it is "vital" for the Israeli army to be a member of the United Nations, allowing that this is "vital" to justice and fairness.

Yemeni ships and vessels.

The leader of the Yemeni revolution called on the Arab and Islamic communities, especially the Yemeni community, to spread more awareness about the aggression of the Palestinian people, pointing out the importance of this voice among Western people that reject the Western policy towards what the people of Gaza are facing.

He emphasized the region that since Arab and Muslim regimes has not awakened yet, and that some of these regimes have kept the region with silence, emphasizing the need for everyone to do what they can for Gaza and continue American, Israeli, and British tyranny.

About the

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SAF

**Dan Tsubouchi**  @Energy\_Tidbits · 7h

...

Usual great sunrise looking over the Bow River in Canmore in 🇨🇦 Rockies.

Note the total lack of snow on the ground & in the mountains from this warm, low snow winter.

we need big snow dump in Feb to help farmers, ranchers & try to minimize wildfire season.



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Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 8h  
 Ford Jan 2024 sales just out.



EVs -10.9% YoY to 4,674 (was 5,247)

Hybrids +42.7% YoY to 11,157 (was 7,816)

ICE +2.6% YoY to 136,786 (was 133,293)

Total +4.3% YoY to 152,617 (was 146,356).

...

[Show more](#)

FORD MOTOR COMPANY JANUARY 2024 U.S. SALES						
	January		% Change	Year-to-Date		% Change
	2024	2023		2024	2023	
<b>SALES BY BRAND</b>						
Electric Vehicles	4,674	5,247	-10.9	4,674	5,247	-10.9
Hybrid Vehicles	11,157	7,816	42.7	11,157	7,816	42.7
Internal Combustion	136,786	133,293	2.6	136,786	133,293	2.6
<b>Total vehicles</b>	<b>152,617</b>	<b>146,356</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>152,617</b>	<b>146,356</b>	<b>4.3</b>
<b>SALES BY TYPE</b>						
SUVs	68,120	62,774	8.5	68,120	62,774	8.5
Trucks	80,726	79,572	1.5	80,726	79,572	1.5
Cars	3,771	4,004	-6.0	3,771	4,004	-6.0
<b>Total vehicles</b>	<b>152,617</b>	<b>146,356</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>152,617</b>	<b>146,356</b>	<b>4.3</b>
<b>FORD BRAND</b>						
EcoSport	0	575	-100.0	0	575	-100.0
Bronco Sport	9,821	9,438	4.1	9,821	9,438	4.1
Escape	10,889	7,878	38.2	10,889	7,878	38.2
Bronco	7,427	10,170	-27.0	7,427	10,170	-27.0
Mustang Mach-E	1,295	2,626	-50.7	1,295	2,626	-50.7
Edge	7,402	4,969	49.0	7,402	4,969	49.0
Explorer	18,835	15,617	20.6	18,835	15,617	20.6
Expedition	5,866	5,693	4.0	5,866	5,693	4.0
<b>Ford SUVs</b>	<b>61,135</b>	<b>56,966</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>61,135</b>	<b>56,966</b>	<b>7.3</b>
F-Series	48,702	55,001	-11.5	48,702	55,001	-11.5
<i>Memo: F-150 Lightning (electric)</i>	2,258	2,264	-0.3	2,258	2,264	-0.3
Ranger	303	2,871	-89.4	303	2,871	-89.4
Maverick	12,443	6,272	98.4	12,443	6,272	98.4
E-Series	3,080	2,848	8.1	3,080	2,848	8.1
Transit	14,191	10,129	40.1	14,191	10,129	40.1
<i>Memo: E-Transit</i>	1,121	337	214.0	1,121	337	214.0
Transit Connect	1,270	1,165	9.0	1,270	1,165	9.0
Heavy Trucks	732	1,286	-42.7	732	1,286	-42.7
<b>Ford Trucks</b>	<b>80,726</b>	<b>79,572</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>80,726</b>	<b>79,572</b>	<b>1.5</b>
GT	0	6	-100.0	0	6	-100.0
Mustang	3,771	4,004	-5.8	3,771	4,004	-5.8
<b>Ford Cars</b>	<b>3,771</b>	<b>4,004</b>	<b>-6.0</b>	<b>3,771</b>	<b>4,004</b>	<b>-6.0</b>
<b>Ford Brand</b>	<b>145,632</b>	<b>140,548</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>145,632</b>	<b>140,548</b>	<b>3.6</b>
<b>LINCOLN BRAND</b>						
Corsair	2,056	1,617	27.1	2,056	1,617	27.1
Navigator	2,034	1,608	26.5	2,034	1,608	26.5
Aviator	1,859	1,174	58.3	1,859	1,174	58.3
Navigator	1,036	1,492	-26.5	1,036	1,492	-26.5
<b>Lincoln SUVs</b>	<b>6,985</b>	<b>5,808</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>6,985</b>	<b>5,808</b>	<b>20.3</b>
<b>Lincoln Brand</b>	<b>6,985</b>	<b>5,808</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>6,985</b>	<b>5,808</b>	<b>20.3</b>



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
**Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · 8h

Henry Hub #NatGas \$2.06, should stay weak with @NOAA forecast calling for above normal temperatures for northern half of US.

Doesn't help that #LNG and EU #NatGas prices continue to be soft.

Set up for 2023 repeat with stalled #NatGas #LNG prices thru shoulder season.

#OOTT



SAF

Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 10h


A key reason why #Aramco doesn't need to increase its capacity by 1 mmbd.


Exxon to add ~650 kbd Guyana #Oil by 2027.

Current is ~560 kbd: 120 kbd Liza Ph 1. 220 kbd Liza Ph 2. 220 kbd Payara.

To reach >1.2 mmbd by yr-end 2027 incl 250 kbd Yellowtail in 2025.

#OOTT

**On track to deliver large portfolio of high-value projects in 2025** 



Our unmatched record of consistent excellence in project execution gives us confidence in our plans to start up these 14 value-accretive projects in 2025, seven of which are advanced recycling units. That's a lot of activity, and a significant contributor to future earnings growth.

Yellowtail will be our fourth development in Guyana and our largest development yet, with a nameplate capacity of 250 kbd. We expect to have six Guyana projects online, with a capacity of more than 1.2 Mbd in aggregate, by year-end 2027. These projects have a 30% lower greenhouse gas intensity than the average of our upstream portfolio, with a low cost of supply and strong returns.

The Golden Pass LNG project, where we have a 30% ownership, is a capital-efficient conversion of an import terminal with an estimated send-out capacity of around 18 Mta. Train 1 mechanical completion is expected at the end of 2024 with first LNG in the first half of 2025.

In Brazil, Bacalhau is the first pre-salt, greenfield development by a consortium of international companies with a 40% ExxonMobil working interest. The nameplate capacity of the FPSO is 220 Kbd with first oil planned for 2025.

At our Fawley facility in the United Kingdom, we're expanding our hydroprocessing capability to allow us to transform lower-value export fuels into higher-value finished diesel for the U.K. market. Construction is progressing with modules on site and integration underway.

At Strathmore, Imperial Oil is progressing a 20 kbd renewable diesel facility. Using a proprietary catalyst to turn blue hydrogen and locally sourced bio-feedstock into premium low-carbon

PRELIMINARY PREPARED REMARKS

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Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 11h

How to say they see increasing demand for #Oil #NatGas for foreseeable future.

"we also strengthened our portfolio with traditional and new energy acquisitions to help meet the growing demand for affordable, reliable and ever-cleaner energy" Chevron CEO.

#OOTT



news release

### Chevron Reports Fourth Quarter 2023 Results

- Reported earnings of \$2.3 billion; adjusted earnings of \$8.5 billion
- Record \$26.3 billion cash returned to shareholders in 2023
- Record annual worldwide and U.S. production
- Announced an 8 percent increase in quarterly dividends to \$1.63/share

San Ramon, Calif., February 2, 2024 – Chevron Corporation (NYSE: CVX) reported earnings of \$2.3 billion (\$1.22 per share - diluted) for fourth quarter 2023, compared with \$6.4 billion (\$3.32 per share - diluted) in fourth quarter 2022. Included in the current quarter were \$1.6 billion of U.S. upstream impairment charges and \$1.9 billion of decommissioning obligations from previously sold assets in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. Foreign currency effects decreased earnings by \$479 million. Adjusted earnings of \$8.5 billion (\$3.45 per share - diluted) in fourth quarter 2023 compared to adjusted earnings of \$7.9 billion (\$4.09 per share - diluted) in fourth quarter 2022. See Attachment 4 for a reconciliation of adjusted earnings.

#### Earnings & Cash Flow Summary

	Unit	4Q 2023	3Q 2023	4Q 2022	2023	2022
Total Earnings (Loss)	\$ MM	\$ 2,255	\$ 6,526	\$ 6,353	\$ 21,761	\$ 35,465
Upstream	\$ MM	\$ 1,389	\$ 5,755	\$ 5,455	\$ 17,438	\$ 30,204
Downstream	\$ MM	\$ 747	\$ 1,593	\$ 1,771	\$ 6,327	\$ 8,155
All Other	\$ MM	\$ 119	\$ 178	\$ 127	\$ 2,000	\$ 2,074
Earnings Per Share - Diluted	\$/Share	\$ 1.22	\$ 3.43	\$ 3.33	\$ 11.30	\$ 18.28
Adjusted Earnings <sup>(1)</sup>	\$ MM	\$ 8,455	\$ 7,721	\$ 7,835	\$ 24,663	\$ 36,542
Adjusted Earnings Per Share - Diluted <sup>(1)</sup>	\$/Share	\$ 3.45	\$ 3.05	\$ 3.09	\$ 13.13	\$ 18.83
Cash Flow From Operations (CFFO)	\$ B	\$ 12.4	\$ 9.7	\$ 12.5	\$ 35.6	\$ 49.6
CFFO Excluding Working Capital <sup>(1)</sup>	\$ B	\$ 11.4	\$ 9.9	\$ 11.5	\$ 36.8	\$ 47.5

<sup>(1)</sup> See non-GAAP reconciliation in attachments

"In 2023, we returned more cash to shareholders and produced more oil and natural gas than any year in the company's history," said Mike Wirth, Chevron's chairman and chief executive officer. Cash returned to shareholders totaled over \$26 billion for the year, 18 percent higher than last year's record total, and annual worldwide net oil-equivalent production increased to over 3.1 million barrels of oil-equivalent per day, led by 14 percent growth in the United States.

"We also strengthened our portfolio with traditional and new energy acquisitions to help meet the growing demand for affordable, reliable, and ever-cleaner energy," Wirth concluded. In 2023, the company completed several acquisitions, including PDC Energy, Inc. and a majority stake in ACES Delta, LLC, and signed an agreement to acquire Hess Corporation.

-MORE-



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Dan Tsubouchi @EnergyTidbits · 20h

.SNOV also seems to point to lower, if any, US #Oil growth in 2024 as have "declining demand" for its services.

Expect continued growth for its advanced technologies in international & offshore markets should more than offset declining demand from North America during 2024...

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**NOV**  
 NEWS Contact: Javier O'Donnell (310) 575-5628  
 INVESTMENT RELEASE

**NOV REPORTS FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL YEAR 2023 EARNINGS**

- Fourth quarter revenue of \$2.84 billion, up 7% sequentially and up 17% year-over-year
- Operating profit of \$14 million, down \$22 million sequentially and down \$2 million year-over-year
- Net income of \$208 million, up \$48 million sequentially and up \$49 million year-over-year
- Fully diluted earnings per share of \$1.14, up \$0.27 sequentially and up \$0.25 year-over-year
- Cash flow from operations of \$227 million and free cash flow\* of \$262 million
- Adjusted EBITDA\*\* of \$276 million, up \$27 million sequentially and up \$52 million year-over-year

\*Free cash flow and adjusted EBITDA are non-GAAP measures. See "Non-GAAP Financial Measures," "Reconciliation of Adjusted Free Cash Flow from Operating Activities to Free Cash Flow," and "Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to Net Income" below.

**OPERATING PROFIT** - NOV generated operating profit for the fourth quarter 2023 of \$14 million, an increase of seven percent compared to the third quarter of 2023 and an increase of 14 percent compared to the fourth quarter of 2022. Total income for the fourth quarter of 2023 was \$108 million, which included the release of valuation allowances on deferred tax assets of \$480 million. Operating profit was \$148 million, or a 9 percent of sales for the fourth quarter, versus 10 percent from the Company reported net gain on the charge of \$55 million (see Corporate Information for additional details). Adjusted EBITDA increased 10 percent sequentially to \$276 million, or 12.2 percent of sales.

**REVENUE** - For the full year 2023 sales were \$5.58 billion, an increase of \$1.34 billion from 2022. Net income for the full year 2023 was \$795 million, which included the release of valuation allowances, compared to \$275 million for the prior year. Operating profit increased 145 percent to \$615 million or 11 percent of sales for the full year 2023. Adjusted EBITDA increased 6 percent, to \$1.0 billion or 17.7 percent of sales for 2023.

**NOV'S** fourth quarter results topped a solid year which saw 13 percent like-growth compared to 2022, and significantly better availability of three operating segments: Completion Services, Chemicals, Resin and ESD. Adjusted EBITDA and margin for the year were the highest since 2013. The Company's new products and technologies are seeing rapid customer interest, adding business momentum in international and offshore markets, even in strong demand for our long-cycle capital equipment business over the next several years. Higher profit and improved operating results, supported by the continued normalization of the global supply chain, also resulted in healthy improved cash flow in the fourth quarter.

**NOV** generated solid earnings from various markets, and expects ongoing revenue growth in the energy services, we expect the growing need for access, reliability, safety, and low cost sources of energy will continue to bring revenue to all key markets for years to come. We believe NOV's product and technology portfolio is well-positioned to capitalize on these market drivers, particularly as the supply chain and equipment markets remain robust and efficient.

SAF - Dan Tsubouchi @EnergyTidbits · Jan 31



.SCLB pointing to lower US #Oil growth in 2024.

"in the US, onshore drilling & completion activity in 2024 is anticipated to be flat compared to 2023"

Show more

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**Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · Feb 1  
OOPS!



must have fallen asleep in the last question on #LNGCanada 1.8 bcfd Phase 1 on Shell Q4 call

Sounds like something @JeremyMcCreaCFA mentioned, #CoastalGasLink may start to take #NatGas earlier than expected ie, earlier support to AECO, hopefully in late summer.

#OOTT

running. It just gives us that runway. Lucas, into the future in terms of being able to just see that free-cash flow growth, I think comfortable.

**A - Wael Sawan (BIO 17559980 <GO>)**  
All right, thank you very much, Lucas, for the question. Look, we go to the next question please.

**Operator**  
Our final today is Jeffrey Lambujon from TPH & Co.

**Q - Jeffrey Lambujon (BIO 1787240 <GO>)**  
Hi, everyone, and thanks for squeezing me in. This first is a follow-up on one of the projects you mentioned earlier, LNG Canada. Could you provide a status update there. Whether in terms of completion and shorter timelines or however you'd characterize it as you see things today. And then my second question is on the structural cost reductions. But as you mentioned already well in flight, following a strong in 2023, hello, you referenced that this is going to be an ongoing initiative, even beyond the 2025 timeframe that balance the near-term target. But can you comment on how you're thinking about sources for and timeline deliverability. For these reductions over the near-term. Just at least as far as the visibility that you have and to share. Thank you.

**A - Wael Sawan (BIO 17559980 <GO>)**  
Thank you very much. Our free, I'll take the first one and then let Sinead address the second one. LNG Canada. You will have. We also address this last year, we have seen of course the GasLink Coastal GasLink Pipeline completed mechanically last year and ready and available to ramp-up through the course of 2024. The facility itself at Kitimat is now just over 90% complete. As per the report from the joint-venture. So they're making good progress and. I would expect that we would expect that later this year, they would start-up. The commissioning of the plant. That of course takes several months well into 2025, but it's comforting to see the progress that is being made.

And of course, once we start producing those commissioning cargos will be made available from day-one to our foundational customers. As you would expect. So. Pleased with the progress. But this no doubt this is a very-very complex facility that's going to be. Be ramped-up. And therefore, we are going to be to watch it and to support the team as they do that in the course of the coming 12 months to 18 months.

**A - Sinead Gorman (BIO 22375931 <GO>)**  
And thanks, Jeffrey, you asked about the OpEx. You've heard me talk about hopefully [sh]S&M, in terms of the progress to, one billion after only seven months. Great progress. We talked about it in terms of where we play and how we play in terms of where we play the portfolio moves the predominance of that at the moment. And you can see, of course, is ramping-up with Pakistan coming through.

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SAF

Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Feb 1  
#LNGCanada


...

Shell Q4 call. No specifics on timing for 1.8 bcf/d Phase 1 or potential for 1.8 bcf/d Phase 2.

But CEO Sawan includes in his "very attractive high margin projects", "you can imagine how much value that [LNG Canada] is going to create".

See SAF transcript.  
#OOTT

Quarterly results presentation



SAF Group created transcript of comments by Shell CEO Wael Sawan on the Q4 call on Feb 1, 2024  
Items in "italics" are SAF Group created transcript

In Q&A, 7:53am MT. Sawan "what's critical is it's *high quality* barrels, you are talking predominately deepwater barrels, predominately LNG barrels. And what gives me particular confidence in the coming years is you are talking about some very attractive high margin projects coming in.....and then of course you have LNG Canada that is also sort of making good progress and LNG Canada, while it does not have a lot of, if any bookable reserves, you can imagine how much value that is going to create."

Prepared by SAF Group <https://safgroup.ca/news-insights/>

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SAF

Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Feb 1


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China Baidu city-level road congestion -9.4% WoW for Jan 31 week but about to crash.

Spring Festival travel rush just started last week incl Lunar New Year on Feb 10.

Rush to leave cities is just starting.

Thx @BloombergNEF #OOTT



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**Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · Feb 1  
Red Sea missiles/drones continue.



Last night & this am, @CENTCOM reports Houthis launched 1 ballistic missile and 13 drones.

#OOTT



### Press Release

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
7115 South Boundary Boulevard  
MacDill AFB, Fla. 33621-5101  
Phone: (813) 529-0220

Jan. 31, 2024  
Release Number 20240131-03  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE


**CENTCOM Self-Defense Strike Against Houthi UAVs and Ground Control Station**

**TAMPA, Fla.** — On Feb. 1 at approximately 1:30 a.m. (Sanaa time), U.S. Central Command forces conducted strikes against an Iranian-backed Houthi UAV ground control station and 10 Houthi one-way UAVs.

U.S. forces identified the UAV ground control station and one-way attack UAVs in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and determined that they presented an imminent threat to merchant vessels and the U.S. Navy ships in the region.

U.S. Forces subsequently struck and destroyed the UAV ground control station and 10 one-way attack UAVs in self-defense. This action will protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for U.S. Navy vessels and merchant vessels.

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### Press Release

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
7115 South Boundary Boulevard  
MacDill AFB, Fla. 33621-5101  
Phone: (813) 529-0220

Jan. 31, 2024  
Release Number 20240131-02  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

**Houthi Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile and Iranian UAVs Shot Down in Gulf of Aden**

**TAMPA, Fla.** — On Jan. 31, at approximately 8:30 p.m. (Sanaa time), Iranian-backed Houthi militants fired one anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen toward the Gulf of Aden. The missile was successfully shot down by the USS Carney (DDG 64).

At 9:10 p.m., the USS Carney engaged and shot down three Iranian UAVs in its vicinity. There were no injuries or damage reported.

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**Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · Feb 1  
Shell CEO bullish on LNG

@steve\_sedgwick awful lot of new LNG capacity in 2nd half of 20s, "is LNG set to remain the star it has been?" CEO Sawan "I very much believe so .... LNG has a long-term role to play & will continue to be robust"

Q4 call at 7:30am MT #OOTT #NatGas



SAF Group created transcript of comments by Shell CEO Wael Sawan with CNBC's Steve Sedgwick on Feb 1, 2024  
<https://www.cnbc.com/video/2024/02/01/shell-ceo-says-he-is-pleased-with-the-energy-firmas-progress-in-2023.html?&q=searchterm=shell>

Items in "italics" are SAF Group created transcript

At 3:05 min mark, Sedgwick "do you have concerns about the medium to longer term picture for LNG? There is an awful lot of capacity coming on line in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of this decade as well. Is LNG set to remain the star it has been?" Sawan "I very much believe so. I mean we see LNG demand continuing to grow. There is a lot of latent demand, just 2023, we opened up a number of markets including the likes of Vietnam, Philippines and others. And at these price points right now, now that the market has reached a better equilibrium, you are beginning to see that latent demand starting to be met through a lot more buying. If you indeed look into the 2026 onwards period, there will be more LNG. We are absolutely convinced that the role of LNG plays in both achieving energy security, in particular in Europe and in Asia, as well as energy transition with coal-to-gas switching in places like China and India, will mean LNG has a long-term role to play and will continue to be robust".

Prepared by SAF Group <https://safgroup.ca/news-insights/>

🗨️ 1    🔄 7    ❤️ 14    📊 3.2K    📌    📤

SAF **Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · Jan 31  
Negative for China economy.

...

China net monthly foreign direct investment is negative for last five months.

- Dec -\$0.84b
  - Nov -\$1.96b
  - Oct -\$0.59b
  - Sept -\$2.07b
  - Aug -\$1.35b...
- [Show more](#)



1 2 1 2.1K




Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Jan 31

.SCLB pointing to lower US #Oil growth in 2024.

"in the US, onshore drilling & completion activity in 2024 is anticipated to be flat compared to 2023"

Flat D&C vs US exit 2023 oil up ~1 mmb/d YoY w/ accompanying higher decline to offset = growth challenge in 2024.

#OOTT



5 9 6.6K



Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Jan 31

#OOTT Positive view from China smaller & export oriented firms.

China Caixin Manufacturing PMI Jan 50.8 (est 50.8) vs Dec 50.8, Nov 50.7, Oct 49.5.

"Chinese manufacturing companies signaled an expansion of output for the 3rd month running in Jan"

Thx @SPGlobalPMI #OOTT



6 9 2.3K

SAF

Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 33m

#LNG101.

Good Freeport LNG 4:30 min video of step-by-step LNG process from feed gas thru removing mercury, acid gas removal, dehydration, NGL extraction, to liquefaction process, cooling to -263F so gas condenses into liquids, and loading #LNG for tankers.

#OOTT #NatGas



1 1 6 1K

SAF

Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 1h

For those not near their laptops, @EIAgov just released at 8:30am MT its #Oil #Gasoline #Distillates inventory as of Jan 26. Table below compares EIA data vs @business expectations and vs @APlenergy yesterday. Prior to release, WTI was \$76.45. #OOTT

Oil/Products Inventory Jan 26: EIA, Bloomberg Survey Expectations, API			
(million barrels)	EIA	Expectations	API
Oil	1.23	-1.10	-2.49
Gasoline	1.16	2.00	0.58
Distillates	-2.54	-1.00	-2.13
	-0.15	-0.10	-4.04

Note: Oil is commercial so builds in +0.9 mmb in SPR for the Jan 26 week  
 Note: Included in the oil data, Cushing had a 1.97 mmb draw for Jan 26 week  
 Source EIA, Bloomberg  
 Prepared by SAF Group <https://safgroup.ca/news-insights/>

1 2 1.1K



**Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · 5h  
Makes sense. Hard to see #OPEC abrupt pivot to its long term #Oil demand view especially in face of energy transition delays such as in EVs.

📍 @ericnuttall with 2 of the most "energy literate" people in Riyadh on 09/19/23 - Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz & @CroftHelima #OOTT



**Eric Nuttall** @ericnuttall · Jan 30  
Much speculation this morning on the reason for Saudi Arabia maintaining its MSC at 12MM Bbl/d. As one of the most "energy literate" people that I've ever met, I do not believe today's announcement reflects a bearish pivot on the part of HRH ABS on long-term oil...  
[Show more](#)

🗨️ 1 🔄 13 📊 2.2K 📌 📤

**Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · 21h  
Iraq's Kataib Hezbollah announced the suspension of all military operations against American troops to prevent embarrassment to the Iraqi government. Washington has blamed the group for the recent deadly drone attack on American troops in Jordan" reports @KarwanFaichiDri #OOTT

**Iraqi Hezbollah decides to suspend attacks on US troops**

**ERBIL, Kurdistan Region** - Iraq's Kataib Hezbollah, supported by Iran, on Tuesday announced the suspension of all military operations against American troops, "to prevent embarrassment to the Iraqi government." Washington has blamed the group for the recent deadly drone attack on American troops in Jordan.

**They announce the suspension of military and security operations against the occupation forces,"** said Kataib Hezbollah in a statement in an apparent reference to the US troops based in Iraq and Syria.

The group added that it does not want to cause "embarrassment to the Iraqi government" without elaborating.

A drone strike on Sunday killed at least three US service members and injured tens others in an American military base in northeast Jordan, near the Syrian border. Washington has blamed groups supported by pro-Iran Kataib Hezbollah for the attack.

Kataib Hezbollah is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a network of shadow Iraq militia groups affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

There have been at least 155 attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since mid-October, according to the Pentagon. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed most of them, linking it to the US support for Israel in its war in Gaza.

Around 2,500 American troops in Iraq and 900 in Syria are leading an international coalition through Operation Inherent Resolve that has assisted Kurdish, Iraqi, and local Syrian forces in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), which once held swathes of land in Iraq and Syria but was declared territorially defeated in 2019.

Kataib Hezbollah in its Tuesday statement directed its members to practise self-defence when attacked.

The United States National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby said on Tuesday that the US response to the Jordan attack will include "multiple actions."

"It's very possible that what you'll see is a tiered approach here, not just a single action but potentially multiple actions," Kirby told reporters aboard Air Force One, reported AFP.

Last week, US struck facilities of Iran-affiliated militias in Iraq, mainly Kataib Hezbollah, in retaliation for the group's recent attacks targeting American personnel in the country. At least one millioner was killed in the airstrikes.

Yehia Rasool, military spokesperson to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, described the US "Wednesday strikes as "unacceptable" and a violation of Iraq sovereignty, calling on the international community to prevent the aggressions that threaten the country's stability.

🗨️ 3 🔄 1.3K 📌 📤



Dan Tsubouchi @EnergyTidbits · Jan 30

~4,700 dealerships "now ask that you [Biden] hit the brakes" on his proposed EV mandate. "uncontestable" that the mandate is "completely unrealistic".

ie. "means 800 new chargers would have to build every single day" to 2032


ICE vehicles & gasoline are here for longer!

#OOTT

Photograph of Jan 11, 2024

**Let our customers' voices be heard.**

Approx. 4,700 dealerships reflecting the voice of our customers, representing all major vehicle manufacturing brands, opposing 50 states, are asking President Biden to hit the brakes on the proposed Electric Vehicle Mandate. Add your dealership name to the letter using the form below.



**A New Letter from Auto Dealers to the President**

Dear Mr. President,

In November of last year, over 4,500 auto dealers from across the country, representing every major automotive brand, wrote you a letter asking that you "hit the brakes" on a proposed government electric vehicle mandate. The letter reflected the voice of our customers - the Americans who come to our dealerships every day to buy vehicles that are affordable and meet their needs.

There has been no response to the letter from your Administration.

In the next 30 weeks, the proposed regulations are expected to be finalized. As you consider whether to force Americans consumers to buy electric vehicles at unprecedented levels, we ask that you consider some facts:

- The number of electric vehicles that qualify for the 7,500 tax credit in 2024 is less than half the number that qualified in 2023 (only 18 versus 43 last year). New rules drastically vehicles that rely heavily on components and minerals from China, which currently demonstrates the supply chain for batteries. The cost premium for electric vehicles is a major barrier for consumers, and the tax of these credits is based on higher consumer demand in 2024 and beyond.
- Despite the \$7.5 billion allocated two years ago to build public electric vehicle charging stations, just three have been opened to date. Range anxiety is a major factor in consumer reluctance to buy electric vehicles. Based on the government's estimates, 2.1 million public chargers will be needed by 2032, but only 170,000 public chargers exist today. That means 2,000 new chargers would need to be built every single day - for the next six years. Clearly, this is not even in the realm of possibility.
- Electric vehicles represented just 8% of vehicles sold in 2023. The proposed regulations would require that 85% of vehicles sold in 2032 be battery electric - and that's not even close to 2032. Electric vehicle sales are not remotely on track to meet those requirements. Indeed, the supply of electric vehicles on dealer lots today is nearly twice the supply of conventional vehicles.

Mr. President, our letter in November asked that you hit the brakes on the electric vehicle mandate. The vote will that you **hit the brakes**. It is uncontested that the combination of these tax incentives, a credit's end date, charging infrastructure, and insufficient consumer demand makes the proposed electric vehicle mandate completely unrealistic.

On behalf of our customers, we ask that you pause on the electric vehicle mandate. Wait for the battery supply chain to develop outside the control of China, wait for the charging infrastructure to support a significant increase in electric vehicles. And give the American consumer the choice to buy an electric vehicle, confident that they are affordable and can't be used because of lack of charging options.

Mr. President, we share your belief in an electric vehicle future. We only ask that you not accelerate onto that future before the road is ready.

Sincerely,  
Supporting Dealerships

SAF Dan Tsubouchi @EnergyTidbits · Jan 17



#Oil #NatGas is needed for longer!

Kerry blames communities for wind delays & misinformation for lower EV sales. @FerroTV didn't buy EV misinfo...

Show more

2 10 33 9.3K




Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Jan 30



Russia #Oil shipments for 01/28 week down with weather hitting loadings & pause at Ust-Luga post Ukraine drone attack.

4-wk oil shipments ~3.09 mmb/d, so in line with commitment to cut oil exports by 0.5 mmb/d.

Thx @JLeeEnergy @business #OOTT



3 13 2.4K



Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · Jan 30



Ouch!

"Neither side, certainly the Biden Admin but also the Mullahs in Tehran are not looking for a broader war here. As I've said before, they'll fight to the last Houthi, they'll fight to the last Iraqi. They don't want a big broad regional war with the US..." @stavridisj to...

Show more



1 1 1.4K





SAF **Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · 46m

No indication yet what impact on Trans Mountain TMX timing.

But WCS less WTI differential widened \$2.10 to \$18.20 today.

#OOTT



SAF **Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · 3h

*"Trans Mountain encountered technical issues which will result in additional time to determine the safest and most prudent actions for minimizing further delay."*

Thx @AmandaMsteph for flagging....  
[Show more](#)


1 5 1.1K

SAF **Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · 3h

*"Trans Mountain encountered technical issues which will result in additional time to determine the safest and most prudent actions for minimizing further delay."*

Thx @AmandaMsteph for flagging.

#OOTT

 **TRANS MOUNTAIN**

<https://www.transmountain.com/news/2024/trans-mountain-provides-statement-on-mountain-3-horizontal-directional-drill>

### Trans Mountain Provides Statement on the Mountain 3 Horizontal Directional Drill

[Home](#) > [News](#)

Jan. 29, 2024

During the pipeline pullback activity for the Mountain 3 Horizontal Directional Drill (HDD) between January 25 and 27, 2024, Trans Mountain encountered technical issues which will result in additional time to determine the safest and most prudent actions for minimizing further delay.

Trans Mountain is fully focused on the completion of the pipeline and will not be providing interviews at this time as it works towards the anticipated in-service date in the second quarter of 2024.

3 2 13 2.7K

SAF Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 6h  
If it walks like a duck,...

Regs don't allow pickups into more packed parts of the city "so the fact that [Tesla Cybertruck] was called a Urban Traveling Wagon, maybe not so catchy, but maybe could you get around some of the regulations" reports @onlyyoonty in Beijing....

Show more




0:46 113 Intel INTC 43.05 +0.60 Rail Vision Ltd RVSN 13.95 +0.4471 Equino  
DOW -4.59 -0.01% SAP 500 +0.90 +0.02% NASDAQ +17.16 +0.11%

🗨️ ↺️ 1 ❤️ 1 📊 1K 📌 📤

SAF Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 11h  
Here's why #NatGas will be needed for way longer!

"about half of US offshore wind power contracts are eight already cancelled or look on course for termination" See 🗨️ @BloombergNEF Atin Jain.

#OffshoreWind is one of critical success factors for timely #energytransition #OOTT



🗨️ 2 ↺️ 5 ❤️ 13 📊 2.9K 📌 📤



**Dan Tsubouchi** @Energy\_Tidbits · 12h

Here's why HH #NatGas is down \$0.21 to \$2.51 today

Never a positive when it's way warmer than normal in what is normally the peak winter weather demand period for #NatGas.


#OOTT



**The Weather Channel** @weatherchannel · 12h

As we kick off the new week, we're tracking all the weather stories you need to know, including a winter warm-up across the country.

Tune in to @AMHQ for the latest updates!



1

3

5

3.2K



SAF

Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 13h

Plausible deniability!

— Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 13h

Does Iran say to proxies don't tell us the details, just do it?

Proxies "**do not take orders**" from Iran "**in their decisions & actions**". Iran "**has no involvement in the resistance groups' decisions on the way they support the Palestinian nation or defend themselves...**" ...

Show more

<https://en.ira.ir/news/85369016/Regional-resistance-groups-take-no-order-from-iran-in-their-actions>

Jan 29, 2024, 11:25 AM

Journalist ID: 5288 News ID: 85369016

### Regional resistance groups take no order from Iran in their actions: FM spokesperson

Tehran, IRNA – Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kanaani has said that resistance groups in the West Asia region do not take orders from the Islamic Republic for their decisions and actions including those in support of the Palestinian people or defense of their countries against acts of aggression.

"The resistance groups in the region do not take orders from the Islamic Republic of Iran in their decisions and actions. The Islamic Republic has no involvement in the resistance groups' decisions on the way they support the Palestinian nation or defend themselves and the people of their countries in the face of any aggression and occupation," Kanaani said in a statement on Monday.

He made the comments in reaction to a drone attack, which killed three American forces in Jordan on Saturday night. US President Joe Biden said the attack hit American forces stationed near the Syrian border, and blamed it on Iran-backed groups operating in Iraq and Syria.

The spokesman rejected "the baseless accusations" against Iran, describing them as "a blame game and a plot by those who try to protect their own interests and cover up their problems by dragging the US into a new conflict in the region and provoking it to intensify the crisis."

Kanaani also said, since the onset of the Gaza war in early October, Iran has repeatedly warned against the spillover of the conflict due to continued Israeli attacks against Palestinians and the US all-out support for the genocide in Gaza and the West Bank.

The Islamic Republic has also reiterated that the constant violation of the national sovereignty of Iraq and Syria by American forces as well as attacks against groups and people in those countries and Yemen is the main cause of escalating instability.

The spokesman stressed the need for protecting peace, stability and security in the region, saying that an end to the Israeli attacks in Gaza and an immediate ceasefire there can pave the way for restoring tranquility in West Asia.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is monitoring the ongoing developments in the region with vigilance and preparedness, Kanaani said, adding that the responsibility for leveling such provocative accusations against Iran lies with those behind making such unfounded allegations.



1



2.8K





Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 13h

Does Iran say to proxies don't tell us the details, just do it?

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#OOTT

<https://en.irna.ir/news/85369016/Regional-resistance-groups-take-no-order-from-iran-in-their-actions>

Jan 20, 2024, 11:25 AM

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3 replies, 3 likes, 3.9K views




Dan Tsubouchi @Energy\_Tidbits · 23h

Will Chinese get back to spending instead of just saving?

01/26/24, China commerce ministry "declared 2024 the "year of promoting consumption" as it stressed the need to revitalize demand.. report @JDMayger @yujingliu\_@EngleTV

If so, should add support to #Oil in 2024

#OOTT



4 replies, 13 likes, 2.7K views



Dan Tsubouchi @EnergyTidbits · Jan 28

Biden response today to attack that killed US service members.

"and have no doubt - we will hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner our choosing" "and we shall respond"

Brent +\$0.25 to \$83.80.

#OOT



Dan Tsubouchi @EnergyTidbits · Jan 28

another front opening up for US to attack in middle east? houthis , iraq, have already had direct US attacks. US has to directly hit back in a respond to this attack in jordan

#Oil markets may not worry about a broad middle east conflict but ...

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2.8K



Dan Tsubouchi @EnergyTidbits · Jan 28

another front opening up for US to attack in middle east? houthis , iraq, have already had direct US attacks. US has to directly hit back in a respond to this attack in jordan

#Oil markets may not worry about a broad middle east conflict but should they at least think there is...

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AP The Associated Press @AP · Jan 28

BREAKING: Three Americans killed, 'many' wounded in drone attack by Iran-backed militia in Jordan, Biden says apnews.com/article/biden...

6K